


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Political Affairs

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Moscow's Prokofyev on Referendum, Plenum

91UN0968A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 5 Feb 91 pp 1-2

[Report on a news conference given 4 February by Yu.A. Prokofyev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and first secretary of the Moscow City committee, by S. Meleshko and A. Osinskiy: "So Who Needs Confrontation?"]

[Text] The news conference that took place yesterday in the CPSU Moscow City Committee [Gorkom], which, incidentally, was the first this year, had, to judge from the number of representatives of the Soviet and foreign mass media present, the duration, and the thoroughness of the exchange of opinions, generated great interest. The main reason for the interest was, we think, the actual subject of the news conference held by Yu.A. Prokofyev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom, namely, the results of the joint Central Committee and Central Control Commission plenum.

"I attach great importance to our news conference today because the situation in society is now very complex," Yu.A. Prokofyev emphasized. "A number of the most recent ukases issued by the president of the USSR, and events in Lithuania are causing misunderstanding among many people. Some people believe that there has been a recoil from perestroika, that it has failed... It is, however, not a matter of rejecting perestroika or of altering the course chosen earlier. No, the main thing is, without changing course toward reforms, to effect them in society without social explosions and upheavals."

"The main thing in perestroika," Yu.A. Prokofyev said, "is to carry out the economic reform. When this goal has been reached, the party will not abandon the introduction of market relations. Second, the party will abandon monopoly in ideology. The multiparty system has become a reality, and there is no justification for sounding the alarm as if someone were about to reject the multiparty system. Third, the CPSU's abandonment of total power and the transfer of all power to soviets. The party does not intend to abandon these directions of perestroika. However, it should be borne in mind that all forces now operating in the political arena in the country are divided in the main into two parts—those who favor continuation of the reform of socialism, and the others, who stand for the restoration of capitalism."

"It might be said that two main problems now worry society, namely, the threat of the disintegration of the state and the economic crisis. And they were the priority subjects of discussion at the plenum."

These issues were also noted at the news conference. The first question, asked by MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA correspondents also touched on the problem of preserving the integrity of the USSR.

[Question] Preparations for the referendum on the question of preserving the USSR should today be the focus of party political work. How are the Communists of Moscow preparing for the referendum?

"We have met with representatives of the Crimea party obkom," Yu.A. Prokofyev reported, "and they shared their experience in taking part in the preparations for the recent well-known referendum in the Crimea. The main task for the party organization in the city is to carry out extensive explanatory work in the labor collectives and at places of residence with respect to the kind of renewal for the USSR and why it is necessary. It is very important to explain precisely this to people and not to be distracted by empty appeals and slogans. It is necessary to show what will happen if the Soviet Union as such disintegrates."

Then the following questions (along with the answers, of course) were asked, two of them by MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA.

[Question] Last Friday an article entitled "the Lithuanian Syndrome" was published in our newspaper and immediately generated very contradictory opinions. How do you assess that article? To what extent does it reflect the thought that you expressed at the plenum to the effect that a new stage has started in this secret war that was deliberately unleashed two years ago in a planned way and according to a clearly defined scenario?

[Yu. Prokofyev] I think that the significance of the article "The Lithuanian Syndrome" lies precisely in the fact that, as the authors say, people must learn to think independently. They should be able to analyze the materials and facts that life brings to them. And to analyze regardless of the authorities. And, in my opinion, the authors also wanted to show to the maximum the truth that is to be found in the events in Lithuania that enable nationalist forces to rally around Landsbergis and intensify the anticommunist hysteria in the country in general.

[Question] One of the most important matters considered at the plenum was the organizational and political consolidation of the party organizations. It was noted in particular that there has been a noticeable weakening of party discipline, and it was pointed out that it is essential to make an end to the free-anarchist approach to procedures in the party, which it has been possible to see quite often of late. How far is this an urgent problem for the capital's party organization and what is being done to resolve it?

[Yu. Prokofyev] That the party has been weakened cannot be denied. I think that it will still be observed for some time. Resignations from the party will continue and there will be various trends within it. But it is not a question of imposing rigid discipline. First and foremost we need a program around which party members can unite. Obviously it is necessary to have member reregistration; those who support the party's program aims will remain with it, those who are against them—well, they can choose another party or movement. The trouble is

that within the party there is now a large number of those who are in a wait-and-see mode. In other words, we must accelerate work on the CPSU program and at the same time initiate real activeness and independence in the primary party organizations. There was talk of this at the plenum. The city party organization is also working in this key.

Many other questions were asked at the news conference. For example, why are Communists reconciling themselves to the inflaming of anticommunist hysteria? What kind of political situation exists in Moscow? What specifically is envisaged in the action program for the Communists of Moscow with respect to social safeguards for workers, in particular workers in culture, and what is being done today?

Here are some of the answers.

The political situation in Moscow has now been stabilized. The Lithuanian situation caused a outburst in Moscow: It is common knowledge that a large meeting with an anticommunist and antipresident thrust was organized. In general, the impression is being created that all the time someone is supercharging the situation. For example, at the last congress of USSR people's deputies, it was a matter of consolidation. Both Popov and Sobchak spoke constructively, and even Colonel Alksins stated that if Popov had a good program it should be discussed and acted upon. And suddenly there was Shevardnadze's quite unexpected statement, not at all in the spirit of the working atmosphere that had been created at the congress... Or take the situation in the Baltic. There, too, in general, normalization was in progress since the details had been drawn for a referendum on entry into the Union, but then the well-known events took place. And many such examples could be cited.

The thought was voiced that in the peaceful competition with those who call themselves democrats, the CPSU is winning because it is acting from more constructive positions. But when a situation is created in which as a result of the constructive actions by the CPSU the situation is being normalized and the rating of those forces that favor a change in the sociopolitical system is, naturally, falling, hotbeds of tension are immediately created.

With respect to social safeguards for cultural workers... The city party committee had appealed several times both to the country's president and government. The gorkom regarded as illegal the imposition of taxes on the enterprises and cooperatives of our creative unions, and it still does. In any society, culture should be developed with the help of the state and should be stimulated by the state.

In conclusion, Yu.A. Prokofyev once again emphasized that today the party faces two main tasks, namely, preserving the Union as an integral state on a renewed basis, and extricating the country from economic crisis.

No changes have taken place in any of the main directions of perestroika processes. It is also a question of introducing market elements and a market system for regulating money-exchange relationships in our country, and of preserving the multiparty system in our society. Neither will there be changes in the position of the party with respect to the soviets. The party is not about to return to itself all the functions of power; full power should belong to the soviets, which will be developed and perfected.

It is, however, also necessary to be aware of the following. No one political party and no one political force anywhere in the world should ever calmly allow itself to be destroyed. And with certain forces the question has now become precisely that of removing the CPSU from the political arena and of repressive actions against its members. It goes without saying that the CPSU cannot and will not permit this. It will, therefore, engage in active political struggle within the framework of the Constitution, a struggle not to destroy political opponents, but to maintain and strengthen its own positions.

Range of Political Parties, Platforms Analyzed

Compromises Among Parties Urged

91UN0944A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 7, 20 Feb 91 pp 1,3

[Article by G. Rakitskaya, candidate of economic science: "There Are Such Parties... Political Scientists G. Rakitskaya and G. Diligenskiy Ponder the Country's Political Map: A Variety of Interests Is Already a Reality"]

[Text] Substantial ideological divergencies have already been detected and are being brought to the forefront in the anti-barracks [antikazarmanny] movement with the real initiation of economic reform. It is quite easy to be mistaken if you judge the characteristics of the new organizations by their self-designations. Political self-determination really reflects the struggle for possible variations of the future.

Proponents of the "adaptation to a civilized Western world" ideology and program advocate a return to allegedly "normal," "natural" ways of life: To private property without which, in their words, a market and an effective economy cannot exist. It is true that by private property they in fact mean private-capitalistic property with exploitation of hired labor. The platform's characteristic trait is arguments in favor of redemption of state property during the course of privatization and propaganda of the inevitability of the people becoming victims (including massive unemployment) while conducting reform.

This ideology has two main types: Liberal reformist and radical democratic. The liberals are relying on a transition from totalitarianism to bourgeois democracy by means of a voluntary self-reforming mode. A liberal

reformer is deathly afraid of popular initiative, a revolutionary social movement, and "rally" democracy and does not believe in the possibility of a peaceful revolution. It is precisely advocates of liberal reformism who insistently propagandize the idea on the transition to a market using a strong center. Precisely they helped the president to take away a large portion of authority from the organs of Soviet rule. There is a serious danger that the strategy of liberal reformism will not lead to democracy although it will lead to a market.

Radical democrats consider precisely the profound contradiction of totalitarianism and democracy. Therefore, the methods propagandized by them are much closer to revolutionary: Pressure on the authorities using broad protest, civil disobedience, and the creation of parallel power structures.

People who call themselves liberal democrats, constitutional democrats, and also many Christian democrats are most often liberal reformers. The capital club "Moskovskaya tribuna" [Moscow Speaker's Rostrum] and the majority of "Memorial" Society's Moscow activists gravitate in this direction. An essentially liberal wing has appeared in organizations that call themselves social democratic. Many of those people who left the CPSU along with the Democratic Platform also occupy a liberal reformist position in the Russian Federation Republican Party they founded, although this platform initially stated that it was social democratic. DS [Democratic Socialism], which has both trends, on the whole stated that it was an outstanding representative and the vanguard of the radical democratic trend.

The Soviet social reformists (advocates of the platform of the continual movement toward socialist ideals) support the development of society along a different path than American, British, or Japanese democratic capitalism. They call this variation something else: Democratic Socialism, the social democratic path, or Swedish Socialism. A social reformist advocates variety and equality of all forms of property, including private property with hired labor, and collective property. The central point is the aspiration to promote the establishment of the "cultured" capitalistic entrepreneur, from whom they then intend to protect the hired workers. Emphasis on social assistance to those strata of the population who will become victims of market competition is also characteristic.

The social reformists have socialist principles—a certain moral ideal which they must always aspire to but which it is impossible to completely attain. A social reformist opposes the parliamentary struggle with revolutionary methods and asserts that, upon assuming power, he will lead society along the path of increasing social justice. The fact that the conditions for employing exclusively parliamentary methods will appear among us only as a result of the victory of the revolution is sort of beyond the attention span of social reformists, at least Russian social reformists.

Organizations that call themselves social democratic primarily adhere to the social reformist concept. We need to say the same thing about the ideologues of the former Democratic Platform in the CPSU. It is true that consistent social reformists may soon become not the center of their parties but the left wing as a result of the overall adjustment of the democratic movement that has been noted.

The next three concepts are similar since they advocate models that have been tested through foreign experience as a model for restructuring [pereustroystvo] our society. Concepts have also been defined in the ideological spectrum for the transition to a new future that is unknown to history. We are not talking about completely new ideological trends (the ideas that they are based on are precisely old ones) but about searching for society's really possible changes toward a fundamentally new direction of development—in the direction of socialism.

The foundation of the stateless self-government concept is the slogans of denationalization [razgosudarstveneniye], deideologization, and depoliticization that was born during a previous stage of our struggle with the regime. No one in the democratic movement with the exception of the anarchist-sindicalists has expressed the platform of denationalization in its integrated form. For them, denationalization is part of the movement toward an anarchic [bezvlastnyy] future and the near future is distinctly and clearly called: Stateless Socialism. They are consistent. They want to completely eliminate the state. And advocates of various forms of self-government and increased independence are prepared to be satisfied with "fortifications" against the state and with the recording of special independent rights of residence, the collective, and the enterprise. The meaning of these drafts is dreams about secession from a totalitarian state instead of a struggle for a popular democratic state.

The ideology of the self-designated vanguard or pseudosocialism is in the appearance of a renovated barracks. The general attribute of pseudosocialist ideology is the extreme simplification and vulgarization of the initial roots and distortion of the primary revolutionary-humanistic foundations of Marxism. Old Marxism counted on the vital historical creativity of the people themselves. But modern pseudosocialists leave the workers and people the passive role of the executors of their guiding instructions. For the pseudosocialists, the people must accept the detailed drafts set forth by the all-seeing vanguard and live and act as they are instructed.

The United Workers Front most consistently and openly propagandizes pseudosocialist ideology. It influenced the content of documents of the Marxist Platform in the CPSU and of the intermovements in the republics. It has been absorbed among its elements in certain small workers organizations who consider themselves to be Marxists and by the socialist party.

The platform of the peaceful popular democratic revolution that reveals the possibility of a socialist path confronts the concepts of voluntary self-reform of the regime and the hopes for its adaptation into a democratic regime through the will of strong leaders or as a result of the seizure of power by some new political group. This is the ideology of peaceful development of the revolutionary process. The workers movement is recognized as an integral part of the democratic movement and its main direction is to liberate all workers from any form of oppression, discrimination, or arbitrariness, including from economic exploitation. The platform of the Confederation of Labor is the closest to the concept of consistent revolutionary humanism.

Since the Autumn of 1990, a new subject of political action has appeared on the social arena—the movement for self-government of workers collectives. It is growing rapidly and gaining momentum. The country's Union of Workers Collectives was founded in December and regional unions of workers collectives are being formed. There is a high probability that the movement will become massive and powerful and will find methods for organic mutual coordination with the democratic workers movement. It is capable of having a substantial impact on the apparatus' denationalization and privatization plans.

The ideological delimitation process that has begun naturally does not signify that the bases for cooperation and for an alliance of democratic forces have been exhausted. There are enough common tasks and directions for joint actions for a long time yet. The matter here is something else. The possibility has been discovered and the need is ripe for development of a real multiparty system.

UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, IDEOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DELIMITATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IS A NECESSARY STEP TOWARD THE SEARCH AFTERWARD FOR WAYS TO ACHIEVE COMPROMISES AND FOR PEACEFUL COORDINATION OF DIFFERENT INTERESTS (INCLUDING THOSE THAT CONTRADICT EACH OTHER). AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS A REQUIRED STEP TOWARD THE FORMATION OF A STRONG, GENUINELY POPULAR FRONT BASED ON THE CONSCIOUS, VOLUNTARY UNIFICATION OF ALL DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS TO OPPOSE ATTEMPTS TO TURN US BACK.

Diversity of Names Masks Common Goals

91UN0944B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 7, 20 Feb 91 pp 1,3

[Article by G. Diligenskiy, doctor of historical science: "There Are Such Parties... Political Scientists G. Rakitskaya and G. Diligenskiy Ponder the Country's Political Map: For Now—There Is Only a Diversity of Names"]

[Text] Alas, a very sad picture is presented while becoming acquainted with the programs of the new parties. Much has already been said about the fact that they lack a mass base. But this is not really the matter. Something else is worse—there are almost no parties who have succeeded in acquiring their own personality. And really the principle of a multiparty system requires differences—otherwise, how can you give the voter the opportunity to choose?

It is difficult to draw a precise distinction between programs and ideologies. To be sure, there are organizations that have sufficiently precise characteristics. This is first of all Pamyat. Or, let us say, the protoparty [protopartiya] that pretends to the role of a fighter against Gorbachev's "revisionism" that has been formed around Nina Andreyeva—here also everything is quite well-defined: Great power chauvinism and imperialist positions of the Stalinist pattern. On the other flank of the political spectrum—differences are only in the form of labels. For example, let us compare the two largest Russian parties—the democratic and the social democratic parties. Their leaders, interesting and thinking people, have managed to talk about themselves in polyphonic Russia. They are original but just as we turn to program developments, we immediately become acquainted with twins.

One more sin of a number of the democratic parties is their elitist nature. It is as if they are oriented toward strictly defined strata of the urban intelligentsia but if these reference points are not changed, the problem of mass support will remain unresolved for them. Believe me.

The Social Democrats say that they base themselves on the middle class. But the middle class is an eroded concept. When O. Rummyantsev decodes its component parts, he obtains quite a strange list—new entrepreneurs, informal movement participants, and... housewives. In short, Social Democracy is irrelevant in the big picture. The name is pretty but essentially it is a dress that someone else is wearing. Travkin also advocates social reform and a market, in short, that same gentlemen's collection of common democratic principles that are present in some form even in the program documents of Polozkov's party.

In my opinion, the secret is the fact that the process of forming new parties is linked to the nature of perestroika like a "revolution from above." The democratic parties essentially repeat those same slogans and use those same ideological reference points which were initially issued from above. At the same time, they act like an opposition and present against the center those same ideas they have introduced into circulation. They do not have enough ideological independence or ideological initiative. For now, everything is reduced to just anti-communist slogans. Current social democrats openly talk about the fact that cooperation with the CPSU is unacceptable to them. Clearly it and other parties rely on

massive hostility toward the party apparatus. They promote a very powerful mood but, I repeat, they are not original: Who is sharper, who is softer—They all proclaim the same anti-communist manifesto.

However, there is also the problem that their hypothetical enemy is sooner not a party at all. A Spaniard could not have dreamt up the alliance between General Franco and Dolores Ibarruri in a nightmare. But this nightmarish dream in some ways nevertheless approaches today's CPSU reality where there are simultaneously both Nina Andreyeva and Aleksandr Yakovlev. Here the question arises: Just who do the democrats have in mind? Their struggle against the power of the Party bureaucracy [partokratiye] and the nomenklatura would be entirely understandable. This goal seems strange with regard to 17-18 million party members. With the exception of a handful of veterans and CPSU members, it seems to me that no one is distinguishable from those same social democrats. Really membership in the Communist Party was for many of our fellow citizens like an average Englishman's membership in the Anglican Church. And at the same time, the majority of our people experience an identical hatred for totalitarianism.

For new small parties to be oriented toward a total confrontation with the CPSU in this background is tantamount to cutting off ties to a significant part of the potential participants in the democratic process, all the more so since differentiation within the CPSU will increase. Attempts are arising in the RSFSR to create an alternative to Polozkov's Russian Communist Party and forces will appear that are ready to seek a rapprochement with Democratic Russia. Furthermore, the small parties that appeal only to "anti" and that do not set forth programs that have exceeded, on an intellectual level, those that arise in the Russian parliament's deputies groups are depriving themselves of the stimulus for development.

I am afraid that the abundance of labels will increasingly remind us of a political masquerade in the "retro" style (anarchic-syndicalists and kadets) or in the western style. But the phase of our development is such that these clothes, that have still not been born during their design, are already doomed to lag behind fashion. Alas, the very technology is old!

The paradox is that if we cast tone, style, and disguises aside, the essence of the orientations of all forces on the left flank—democratic platforms and moderate reformists of the type from the Moscow Gorkom leadership to anti-communists—is very close. There is little that separates them in their platforms. The experience of perestroika is so meager with positive results that society simply is not capable of presenting real alternatives for its own development. The general contour is the only thing that is clear. The opposition moves along the line of reform and counter-reform, even among those who until recently had a monopoly on power. The correlation of forces is also changing in their camp.

Can we predict the development of the multiparty system today? To some degree—yes. The future is linked with the transition to market relations which provide the stimulus to civilian society and parties will be able to better concentrate on the solutions of urgent problems and rational grounds will appear among them, we must assume, and not simply emotional-ideological grounds. It is possible that the existing parties will evolve and overcome their inherent weaknesses and they will be able to become the leading structure for the formation of new associations. A no less real variation is that many of the existing organizations will die a natural death. And some sort of new parties will arise to replace them.

I think that the prospect for a break up of the CPSU that is more profound than the departure of the democratic platform also theoretically exists. The CPSU could possibly break up into several parties, one of which will unite the conservative-nomenklatura forces. Others may renounce the primary Marxist-Leninist postulates and form a major reform party. If this does not occur, which is also entirely possible, then the CPSU will simply cease to exist and will be reduced to its own conservative wing.

With the development of a market economy, the problem of relations between people of hired labor and entrepreneurs will worsen. A party must arise that is closely linked with independent trade unions, a party of another social democratic type than the current one and possibly not just one.

IN PUSHKIN'S WORDS, "POPULAR OPINION" IS ON THE SIDE OF THE DEMOCRATS BUT IT MUST BE EXPRESSED IN SUFFICIENTLY POWERFUL AND ORGANIZED FORMS SO THAT IT CAN REALLY COUNTER SOME FORCE OR OTHER UPON WHICH THE CONSERVATIVE SUPERSTRUCTURE IS BASED. NO ONE HAS YET REFUTED THE FACT THAT THE ORGANIZATION WILL INCREASE THE FORCES TENFOLD AND WILL HARDLY BE ABLE TO REFUTE IT.

Regional Strength of Opposition Noted

91UN0944C Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 7, 20 Feb 91 p 3

[Letter to Yuriy Zarechkin, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA sociopolitical problems editor: "There Are such Parties..."]

[Text] *We need to conduct in concert along with others a referendum on temporarily ceasing the activities of all parties. The people will say if we need the CPSU or similar parties at this stage or if we should allow the parties sort out their internal party affairs for now and bring their ideologies in order by the next elections for president and parliaments and, having registered, then the parties can already organize their participation in the election campaign. Inclusion of this question in the referendum must arouse the people's activity and provide the hope that later its participation in the process of bringing the country out of the crisis will be more energetic.*

P. Dolmatov,
Engineer and inventor—Moscow



Key:

1. Cities in which opposition CPSU parties that are primarily part of the Democratic Russia bloc have a majority in the city Soviets.
2. An oblast in which parties who are united in the Democratic Russia bloc have a majority in the oblast soviet.
3. Cities in which the parties that are united in the Democratic Russia bloc have up to 30 percent of the deputy seats in Gorsoviets and have the capability to influence the development of policy.
4. Republics where proponents of national independence were victorious in parliamentary elections.
5. In Tomsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, representatives of parties that are united in the Democratic Russia movement have nearly 30 percent of the seats.
6. V. Priblyovskiy composed the map.

We always have extreme points of view in our country. And we could have simply consigned the Moscow engineer's opinion to the editorial archives. Almost like, let us say, figure skating judges who are more principled than we are do, remember: They throw out the best and the worst evaluations of sportsmen and calculate the average of the rest. Naturally politics is a contradictory game of numbers, a sort of statistical sociology, but can we completely throw out quite personal negative assessments in our mail of the current, as some think, destructive political life?

Far from everyone is currently capable of sorting out to where these increasingly new parties and movements are calling them and which signify pluralism for a society that is looking for democratic foundations and the varied nature of the political currents that have collapsed on it. Why are they not capable of sorting this out? Unaccustomed? Difficult? Overcome with distrust in everyone and everything?

It seems to me that there is no sense being afraid of freedom of opinion itself nor moreover of the questions surrounding it. It is another matter if hopes for a respite

or a time out which is allegedly needed for transition from one qualitative level of political life to another will eliminate psychological difficulties. From whom will we request a break in the struggle of ideas? From whom will we once again expect reason, conscience, and justice? Distrust of some people in my opinion can only destroy the trust of others.... We all need to seek answers together—reds and greens, blues and yellows. You cannot declare the truth with slogans. You need to make truth. Alas, this is also work.

About three years ago, at a meeting in our editorial offices with our American colleagues, they asked me: "What do you think, will there be a multiparty system in a restructured Soviet Union?" I stated, maybe too boldly for that moment: "Absolutely. That is the natural logic of movement toward democracy." And I added in answer to the more precise question about how soon the multiparty system would come about: "It will happen but not too fast...." And now I think is three years fast or not? There actually is a multiparty system. Yes, even official registration of parties—according to the law!—has been announced. Obviously, the process nevertheless occurred more rapidly....

The CPSU is currently not resolving the problems of the political struggle in Soviet society by itself ("not alone with itself"). It remains an indisputably eminent figure but its "field of battle" is already something else. And everything is different. Although if today we also prefer to talk more about other parties, it is not nearly because we have ever left "society's leading political force" (still?) to one side. There simply are other parties. And let us be more precise about what we are dealing with and what opposition force is fighting the previously single party structure. Let us admit: Pluralism is not only different opinions and different political creeds but it is first of all a political struggle. How can we forget about that?

Party Leaders Questioned on Tactics

91UN0944D Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 7, 20 Feb 91 p 3

[Unattributed Article: "Three Questions to the Leader"]

[Text] 1. What steps do you intend to take in the event of the establishment of a dictatorship?

2. What are your party's possible tactics while continuing the process of democratization?

3. Tell me about your plans for the next year.

Mikhail TOLSTOY

Deputy chairman of the DPR [Russian Democratic Party]

RSFSR People's Deputy

THE RUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY WAS FOUNDED IN 1990 AND HAS 28,608 MEMBERS. THERE ARE PARTY BRANCHES IN MORE THAN 100 REPUBLIC CITIES.

1. Dry crusts [of bread].

2. Having dried the crusts, transition to new elections according to party lists that must provide a qualitatively new composition of deputies. Preparations for the elections—are not only composing lists and agitating for candidates, but it is first of all mass explanatory work about the principles of building a democratic state with a free economy.

3. Strive for the existence of clearly expressed party groups in the Soviets of all levels to conduct coordinated policies of democratic forces in legislative organs and in self-governing organs.

Viktor AKSYUCHITS

Chairman of the Political Soviet

Co-chairman of the RKhDD [Russian Christian Democratic Movement] Duma

RSFSR People's Deputy

THE RUSSIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT WAS ORGANIZED IN APRIL 1990. IT ENCOMPASSES NEARLY 15,000 PARTICIPANTS IN 100 CITIES AND POPULATED AREAS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, UKRAINE, LITHUANIA, AND LATVIA. THERE ARE NEARLY 7,000 MEMBERS IN THE RKhDD POLITICAL ORGANIZATION.

1. In today's crisis situation, the movement is ready for possible repression and prohibitions. But we do not plan to disband the organization under any circumstances.... We recognize that the threat of a dictatorship originates first of all from the very reactionary and destructive forces of the country—the communist nomenklatura which is attempting to base itself on armed force and the KGB.

The movement intends jointly with all democratic forces to participate in the organization of mass acts of social protest, while striving for the consolidation of society and while defending the need for only peaceful forms of struggle.

2. Our party's task is not a struggle for power but a struggle for freedom of the human personality and the flourishing and welfare of society.

Christian Democracy is uniting with all of the country's anti-totalitarian forces and in this sense it shares common democratic forms of political struggle—rallies, demonstrations, and strikes. But the RKhDD's primary task is the formation of long-term programs to transform the country based on ethnic and human spiritual dignity.

3. While assessing the contemporary situation as a transition period, the movement is conducting work to prepare a Constituent Assembly which will only be empowered to found new forms of statehood. The campaign for democratic elections of the Union President has begun.

Vyacheslav SHOSTAKOVSKIY

**Co-chairman of the RPR [Russian Republican Party]
Coordinating Soviet**

Professor

THE RUSSIAN REPUBLICAN PARTY WAS FOUNDED IN NOVEMBER 1990. IT TOTALS NEARLY 20,000 MEMBERS. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS EXIST IN ALL OF THE MAIN AREAS OF THE RSFSR.

1. Neither our founding congress nor the meeting of the coordinating soviet which occurred recently discussed operating tactics under conditions of a dictatorship. We were united on something else.... It is important to do everything possible to prevent a dictatorship. And to do this, we need to promote the rallying of democratic forces in every possible way and to increase the unity of the Democratic Russia movement and expand its social base.

2. We are striving to become the party of social initiative and we are exerting efforts to conduct our own actions in each microrayon, city, oblast, and republic.

3. Of course, the main thing is the achievement of political stability and the creation of conditions for radical economic transformations. And this is possible, from my point of view, only with the renewal of the union state and the formation of a Union of sovereign republics.

Genuine, full-fledged sovereignty of the Russian Federation is a strategic priority of the republican party and our primary goal this year.

Boris KAGARLITSKIY

Socialist Party Ispolkom Member

Mossoviet Deputy

THE SOCIALIST PARTY WAS FOUNDED DURING THE SUMMER OF 1990. IT HAS NEARLY 300 ACTIVE MEMBERS. THERE ARE DEPUTY GROUPS IN A NUMBER OF MAJOR CITIES. ITS PRIMARY AREAS OF ACTIVITY ARE: MOSCOW, VOLGOGRAD, LENINGRAD, AND EASTERN SIBERIA.

1. Socialists will oppose any dictatorship regardless of the fact that it is covered with "communist principles" or with slogans on the "Rebirth of Russia," "A return to the bosom of European Civilization," or "Free entrepreneurship".... Any variation of authoritarianism is identically dangerous for us.

2. We need to form a new "model" of democracy that organically corresponds to our country's conditions and traditions. This obviously must be a democracy that is based on a system of local and production self-government when freedom is guaranteed not by the existence of parliament in the center but by the direct mechanism of government by the people.

3. We will render political and practical assistance to the formation of free trade unions. We are faced with working on the creation of a leftist press that is capable of challenging the monopoly of liberals and communists in the mass media in order for real pluralism to appear in society. We must set up cadre political training and not only for our party but for social movements that are close to us.

Yuriy LEONOV

MRP [Marxist Workers Party] Soviet Member

Middle School Teacher

THE MARXIST WORKERS PARTY WAS FOUNDED AT A CONGRESS ON MARCH 24, 1990. THERE ARE NEARLY 100 ORGANIZATIONS IN EIGHT REPUBLICS. THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 5,000-7,000 MEMBERS.

1. First of all, we are convinced that a military dictatorship cannot be the ideal not only for the majority of citizens but for the military themselves. This dictatorship arises each time the interests of the ruling minority diverge from the interests of the millions. And, consequently, the transfer of real power to the majority of the workers is the only way to save the army from functions that are not in its nature. Our tactics will consist of precisely this and not an absurd campaign of "civil disobedience" or strikes.

2. Today the ruling minority has adequate peaceful methods for supporting its own dictatorship. The peaceful elimination of millions of workers from the rule of the state is called democracy. The foundation of this democracy in many countries is not bayonets but a monopoly in parliaments and on newspaper pages (It is not important if they are radical or conservative) and on the commanding heights in the management of the economy.

3. Our main task in the coming year is to attain power for the workers in the center and locally. As we all know, the president issued a decree on enlisting workers to monitor trade. But are workers really capable of establishing order just in the distribution of sausage?

We need to immediately begin to create workers Soviets of all levels—from enterprises to republics and the entire country.

Pavel KUDYUKIN

SDPR [Russian Federation Social Democratic Party] Presidium Board Member

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY HAS NEARLY 5,000 MEMBERS. IT HAS NEARLY AS MANY MEMBERS IN ORGANIZATIONS THAT RECOGNIZE THE SDPR CHARTER AND PROGRAM BUT WHICH FOR SOME REASON OR OTHER HAVE NOT REGISTERED AS LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS. WE ARE OPERATING IN 55 OBLASTS, KRAYS, AND REPUBLICS OF RUSSIA.

1. One of our political resolutions states: "In the event of attempts to restore totalitarianism or to establish an authoritarian regime, including by means of introducing direct presidential rule in Russia (Do not confuse this with the introduction of the institution of presidential power—author's comment), the SDPR will prevent this with all permissible non-violent methods—strikes, civil disobedience...."

2. In this case, we see our task in the work of representative organs and institutes of civil society that are formed to strengthen Russia's sovereignty, to conduct a socio-legal revolution (adoption of a new Constitution), and a transition to a modern market economy.

3. We have already become involved in the political struggle surrounding the March 17 union referendum and we are conducting a campaign under the slogan: "Tell Gorbachev—No, Yeltsin—Yes!". The process of our rapprochement with the Russian Federation Republican Party will deepen which I hope will end in the creation of a united party of the social democratic trend.

Graphic: Popularity of Parties Compared


91UN0944E Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 7, 20 Feb 91 p 3

[Unattributed article with graphic, Untitled]

[Text] During the last year, several dozen new political parties and movements have arisen. During this period, it seems that some of them are quite rapidly gaining momentum. The ratings of at least three new parties were higher last Fall than those of the CPSU (See Fig. 1).

Other parties were unknown to the absolute majority of those polled. So, if elections had been held on a multi-party basis in Russia during the second half of 1990, the


Figure 1



Key:

1. DPR [Russian Democratic Party]
2. SDPR [Russian Social Democratic Party]
3. Democratic Platform
4. RSFSR Communist Party
5. Support
6. Oppose

Figure 2



Key:

1. DPR [Russian Democratic Party]
2. SDPR [Russian Social Democratic Party]
3. RPR [Russian Republican Party]
4. PKD [Party of Constitutional Democrats]
5. LDP [Liberal Democratic Party]
6. RSFSR Communist Party
7. Support
8. Oppose

DPR, SDPR, and DP bloc would have had a good chance of victory. In 1991, the situation has changed somewhat. The ratings have fallen substantially for nearly all parties (See Fig. 2).

Judging by the public opinion polls, anti-party moods which are associated with distrust in the capabilities of some political organizations to change our lives for the better have strengthened in society. Only one of four people polled considers it necessary to create a mass political party in the country that is capable of bringing the country out of the crisis.

Research was conducted by "Monitoring" Russian Sociological Service in October 1990 and January 1991.

KGB's Grushko Gives Press Briefing

91UF0488B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 7, Feb 91

[Unattributed report on press briefing given by USSR KGB First Deputy Chairman V. Grushko at USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center in Moscow; date not given: "New in the Work of the KGB"]

[Text] A briefing with participation of the USSR KGB First Deputy Chairman V. Grushko took place at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs press center. The speaker told the journalists of the KGB organs' fight against economic crime, corruption, and smuggling. Then he answered some questions.

[Unidentified journalist] In one of his interviews, Prime Minister Pavlov talked about foreign preparations for economic sabotage against the USSR, and about the countermeasures on the part of the Soviet Union... Who, in your opinion, is organizing this and for what purpose?

[Grushko] I have not read this interview with Prime Minister Pavlov. But I do not think it indicated clearly that it was a matter of some state policy of Western countries... As far as I understand it, he was talking about the fact that some banks wanted to conduct a certain action.

[Unidentified journalist] Can you confirm or refute the information that several KGB officers have been sent to Iraq to help Saddam Husayn escape from the CIA?

[Grushko] This should not and cannot happen. I have no knowledge of this. If it were the case, I would know.

[Unidentified journalist] There is a new unit in the KGB structure now—Protection of Constitutional Order. Is this a successor to the former Fifth Directorate?

[Grushko] This is a new directorate, since it confronts completely different tasks. The essence of the USSR KGB's Fifth Directorate's activities was the so-called "fight against ideological diversion."

The new directorate was created in order to combat manifestations of extremism in our political and public life. The main "pivot" in the work of the new directorate is the fight against terrorism in our country and cooperation in this area with other countries.

[Unidentified journalist] How many KGB officers have now resigned from the CPSU?

[Grushko] To my knowledge, the count is in the tens. I would not even say that there are hundreds.

[Unidentified journalist] Are there representatives of other parties among the chekists?

[Grushko] I do not know

[Unidentified journalist] The KGB gave a statement to the press in regard to the incident in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] House of Soviets. Why did it state in such strong words that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet is trying to discredit the KGB?

[Grushko] The statement was worded in this way because members of the security service of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman maintained, unequivocally and categorically, that the KGB was using several rooms

to eavesdrop on official personae. Moreover, some statements made for the press other than ours contained insults against the USSR KGB and its personnel.

At our request, and at the request of the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies, a special deputies' commission was created; this commission inspected the rooms and the equipment. At our insistence a special technical commission has also been created; it consists of various specialists who are now studying this problem. I am certain that there can be only one "diagnosis."

Things that were done in this building—and this was way back in 1981—are also done in other locations that house high-ranking officials. This is a common international practice.

RSFSR Security Official on Cost of Secrecy

91UF0514A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 8, Feb 91 pp 4-5

[Interview with V. Rubanov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Public Security and Interaction With the USSR Ministry of Defense and the KGB, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent V. Sigov; place and date not given: "How Much Does Secrecy Cost?"]

[Text] At present, all countries of the world possess undisclosed information that constitutes their military and state secrets. However, does keeping all information of a defense nature secret make sense, and how much does it cost? ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent Yu. Sigov discussed this with V. Rubanov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Public Security and Interaction With the USSR Ministry of Defense and the KGB.

[Rubanov] The institution of state secrets has existed in the world since the time state power emerged. All countries have the right to "classify" the issues of defense, intelligence, and the armed forces. However, in developed capitalist countries the right to impose secrecy procedures in individual spheres is strictly regulated by pertinent legislation.

[Sigov] How is the "institution of secrecy" existing in the Soviet Union peculiar?

[Rubanov] It is clearly specified in all countries of the world who has the right of access to state secrets. Two types of laws exist—laws on state secrets and state powers (for example, in Great Britain) and laws on freedom of information, which govern the access of citizens to secret information (United States).

There are no such laws in the Soviet Union. In our country, information is segregated into "open" and "classified" on the basis of executive normative acts, i.e., secret instructions worked out by the government and the departments. They are not published anywhere, and for this reason the notion of "state" or "military secrets" is interpreted in an absolutely arbitrary manner.

[Sigov] How do the laws treat the notion of "trade secrets," which is new to us?

[Rubanov] On the pretext of secrecy, the state interferes with the economy and violates trade secrecy most vigorously. The latter is an element of economic operations and, therefore, is subject to civil law. This is why, when KGB representatives say that counterintelligence will defend trade secrets, it is at the very least incompetent. Entrepreneurs should determine themselves what constitutes secrets and who they trust with keeping them.

[Sigov] The ARGUMENTY I FAKTY editorial office receives letters from servicemen who are not allowed to travel abroad, even as tourists, because they are "carriers of secrets." At the same time, people who know a great deal more about our army do travel abroad, for example, leaders of that same Ministry of Defense...

[Rubanov] I believe that the existence of all kinds of secret "clearances" and "permits," of which the servicemen are not aware, is a violation of human rights; its very essence is unconstitutional. In the USSR, the department or enterprise at which an individual works or serves determines the degree of secrecy itself. This system results in arbitrariness, and in the event travel abroad is turned down there are no legal grounds; there are merely references to someone's "competent" opinion.

The main point is that when a request to travel abroad made by an individual is turned down because of the "secret nature" of his work, he has absolutely nowhere and nobody to complain to: After all, the ill-fated "executive" instructions have not been published anywhere, and one cannot refer to them!

[Sigov] Have costs incurred by our country due to the excessive classification of information been calculated?

[Rubanov] In the United States, expenditures for protecting secrets and for secret work amount to 20 percent of total expenditures for research and military development—creating technical means of protection, wages of guards, bonuses to the personnel due to the secret nature of work, and so on.

Professor B. Rayzberg has calculated that the USSR loses annually between 30 and 40 billion rubles due to the unjustifiable classification of information, including in science.

[Sigov] Apparently, you mean cases when several scientific research institutes in the USSR go ahead with virtually similar developments because they do not know what their colleagues do (of course, due to "secrecy")?

[Rubanov] The most surprising point is that this happens in scientific research institutes of the same industry or the same ministry. By "classifying" our scientific-research institutes and "post-office box" [secret enterprises] and making them secret, we greatly hamper the development of our own science. The USSR participates little in the international exchange of scientific information; entire avenues are blocked by secrecy practices in our country.

[Sigov] While discussing the security of military and state secrets, we have somehow left out a typically Soviet phenomenon—party secrets...

[Rubanov] Indeed, party secrets are a peculiar phenomenon. Under Soviet law, no public organization, including political parties, has a right to familiarize itself with state secrets. Meanwhile, in our country the KGB frequently communicates secret information constituting state secrets directly to the CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo. From a legal point of view, all such cases have formal attributes of corpus delicti.

At the same time, a paradoxical situation emerges: A state secret communicated to the CPSU Central Committee apparatus becomes a party secret; no criminal penalty is envisaged for divulging the latter in our country. This is why I believe that "converting" state secrets into party secrets is impermissible in a rule-of-law state.

[Sigov] Finally, I would like to find out what the terms of "nondeparture" for foreign destinations currently are for Soviet people who have access to secret information in the line of duty.

[Rubanov] There are still no laws regarding this. If a person who is being hired by a "classified" enterprise asks to be familiarized with secrecy practices, the management does not have to do this. As far as "executive instructions" on access to secret information are concerned, for example, in the United States the matter of the knowledge of state secrets by a citizen may be reconsidered at his request. In the USSR, as a rule, restrictions on travel abroad by individuals due to secrecy are rescinded in five years (there is a reason for this number—under the law, five years of imprisonment is the sentence for divulging state secrets). However, there are cases when restrictions apply for as long as 20 years.

Popov Political, Economic Thesis Critiqued

91UN0814A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jan 91
Second Edition pp 1, 2

[Article by S. Aleshin, member of the Moscow State University party committee and candidate of physical-mathematical sciences, and I. Melnikov, secretary of the Moscow State University party committee and candidate of physical-mathematical sciences: "What Is Meant by the 'Friends of Democracy' and How Are They Waging War Against the People?"]

[Text] Moscow—Lengthy articles by G.Kh. Popov, in which the author provides, in his opinion, answers to pressing questions of present policy, were published recently. Familiarization with them compels attention not only to the content of the articles. We encountered for the first time, perhaps, in so high a concentration a set of methods which can be termed nothing other than de-truth-ization. For this reason an analysis of what was written cannot be made without an investigation if only of some of the methods.

FIRST METHOD—the creation of stage scenery. Popov arranges it in such a way that almost a total illusion of life emerges. He even pretends that he is looking at the stage together with the reader-audience: "I found it within me... to look at the country, the democrats, and myself from a distance...." After this, "10 main answers" are formulated.

This is the first: "A struggle is under way for the version of perestroika which will be realized—democratic or apparatus." So, we are intrigued. A struggle between "democrats and apparatchiks" unfolds before our eyes. For us, who from childhood were taught that democrats are those who are concerned for the people, it is clear that "our people" have become entangled with some bad forces.

The second answer brings us no joy, of course—it transpires that the democrats are unable... although the apparatus lacks the forces also. The chagrin which has enveloped us forces us to wholly forget that the first main answer is not an answer at all but a screen concealing the true alignment of forces. But the sets change increasingly rapidly, and new turncoat-words hang in bunches in the following "main answers."

In the third answer there emerges on stage something unwieldy, obtuse, and sluggish with the name-tag "center," and Popov impatiently organizes around the center a round dance of "the constructive part of the democratic forces" and "the constructive part of the apparatus." And the word "coalition" suddenly surfaces here.

The fourth answer, of course, is that foreign countries will support us, and that it is necessary to hold out for just two or three years.

But what have we here? The fifth answer moves onto the stage something unimaginable, and one does not understand immediately what this is, only that it is very frightening—"the present presidential version of apparatus perestroika." The producer decisively cuts short the panic that has arisen among "our people." We need to sever relations, he says, as far as leaving the stage (this in the sixth answer).

Popov's main answers numbered seven-10 assume, evidently, that the impact of main answers one-six has been so lethal that the reader is already prepared for a struggle for new direct elections... of presidents, governors, mayors, elders. Whoever else is there for us to elect?

So, what is the essence of the first method? It amounts to the fact that real social processes are glossed over, and the reader is offered ersatz. These decorative substitutes of life would be spotted easily were this the sole method in the basket of the "friends of democracy."

The **SECOND METHOD** is the use of known words to denote hitherto unknown phenomena and, at times, to denote also phenomena whose real meaning is the direct opposite of the semantic charge of the known term. This has already happened with the designations right and left. We have been instructed persistently of late that the real person of the left is a radical, and the more radical, the more left, and the real person of the right is whoever is a conservative. It is forgotten here that radicalism may be very, very right and may even create such vampires as Hitler, Mussolini, and others.

A characterization of the "right-wing circles" type in the propaganda of times not so long ago was more often than not the neighbor of the words "reactionary forces," while the words "forces of the left" were the good neighbor of the words "struggle for freedom and democracy." So all radicals wish to be counted among the left. Even if the most inveterate neofascist tints have shown distinctly through the radicalism of some, it has been proposed that we rank all of them wholesale among the fighters for freedom and democracy. But who with us is being exposed as right-wing now? Primarily the communists, of course. They are the chief reactionaries also. The aspiration is to surreptitiously accustom us generally to the fact that everyone who utters the words "patriotism" and "motherland" and works honestly, and whoever, in addition, strives after these concepts is, of course, dangerous and should evoke alarm in each "fighter for freedom and democracy."

One further method chosen by the radicals, as a principal one, perhaps, is demolition and destructiveness as the first principle of social thinking. Of course, if you simply shout out in the square "hit, smash, destroy!" not everyone will understand you. It is necessary, therefore, to first show convincingly the need for destruction, the inevitability of destruction, and narrow down the multivariant nature of views to the single option. Everything is to be destroyed. Morality?—total permissiveness. Self-government through the soviets?—ineffective. The idea of common, collective interest and collective responsibility?—archaic and contrary to freedom and the rights of the individual. Such methods should evoke inner resistance, it would seem, and the idea of destruction as a first step should repel potential supporters, nonetheless the method works time after time.

Why? The crisis is knocking the ground from beneath our feet, and we are losing our sense of manageability and awareness of what is happening and are prepared to accede to such a breakup and such destruction of evolved structures as appears to us manageable.

So words with the prefix "de" frequently enter political circulation not as an element of destructiveness but as an

element of a saving structure which promises a positive effect. We will demonopolize the economy (without this commodity-money mechanisms will not work), we will dismantle the administrative system (an efficient system of administration and self-administration should emerge in its place) and so forth.

But here come new words whose precise meaning in real life differs from the explanations in the political dictionary. We are told: "we will de-party-ize production, all parties must leave," but should read: CPSU committees out of the plants and factories. While advocating de-party-ization, incidentally, some new parties intend to create their own cells on the shop floor and in the Army and the KGB.

We are told: "We will dismantle today's borders between the republics as a barrier to the free movement of the peoples," read: We will dismantle the USSR.

The main thing is that the logic of destructiveness is inexorable. It brings us step by step to the line beyond which there is, other than destruction, nothing. In place of culture it offers us a hackneyed substitute, which is based on the exploitation of by no means the best aspects of human nature. It contemplates a mirage of the rapid achievement of numerous benefits and requires for this quite little: destruction of the very foundations of our society.

This is how this appears in Popov's recommendations.

Denationalization. The author employs this very word repeatedly in various contexts. First, he writes after a comma: "denationalization, de-state-ization." Then the word "de-state-ization" is written after a comma with the word "privatization." The author emphasizes that the foundation of everything is private property and that the main thing in perestroika economically is the sharing out of state-owned property among new owners. Now Popov is in his natural element and he begins to argue with a will "who will receive," "how much," "how," and "who will share it out." He has even prepared a version just in case those "in the general line for de-state-ization, privatization" do not wish to become proprietors. We are required, it turns out, to create suitable conditions for "applicants from outside."

Of course, the author understands the difference between the terms "denationalization" and "privatization" and does not equate them, in our view, fortuitously but in the pursuit of particular political goals. He is consistent in his defense of the principle that only that which is based on private ownership is democratic. Democratic, therefore, from his viewpoint, is merely the version of de-state-ization whereby each is presented with a piece of paper bearing the inscription: Your share of former state-owned property is the equivalent of 15,000 rubles. True, some readers might be asking: If these bonds are in circulation on a par with banknotes, will there not be a rapid depreciation of both money and bonds?

But ultimately the author is not concerned with such details. The scenery of democracy is more important than democracy. He hastens to give his "democratic" version of de-state-ization and is worried that the process is already under way. And proceeding wrongly, in his opinion. It is with good reason that he presents the example of Moscow University. The author asks: Who may lay claim to state property, the property of Moscow University, for example? Only the present leadership of Moscow State University [MGU] or some alternative organization created by the lecturers? Following such a question, we would like rather simply to run and defend MGU's property against the encroachments of the present leadership.

Let us, however, move aside the scenery and take a look at things as they are. It was with good reason that, in accordance with the president's edict, the ordinance of the USSR Constitution declared all property of MGU the sole property of Moscow University, which, thanks to the said documents, became all-Union, self-managing, and autonomous. It may be said that a historic event for national culture is occurring before our very eyes: The university is switching to self-management.

Who is the "proprietor?" After all, in Popov's opinion, "from the democratic viewpoint, any citizen of the country should have the right to lay claim to his share of any state-owned property." But we see that MGU lecturers are not in any hurry to stand in the privatization line. Has there been a de-state-ization of property in this case? Yes, there has, we believe—the university is autonomous, and state organs of administration are not interfering and not dictating how and on what it should be spending the monies allocated it and also the resources which are earned by the university itself.

Has there been privatization of property in this case? No, there has not. The university's property has remained indivisible. It is administered on the basis of a charter democratically, with the participation and under the supervision of the collective of the university.

The questions posed by Popov have, it turns out, little connection with the real-life situation. In addition, they contain traces of those same methods of de-truth-ization—nonexistent conflicts are given pride of place, and vitally important problems are glossed over.

De-soviet-ization. Inasmuch as the reader was offered simultaneously two versions (one in OGONEK, the other in a brochure), it is useful to glance at both. The 10 main answers to the question "what is to be done" of the OGONEK version are absent from the brochure, including main answer 7: "And to begin immediately a struggle for new constitutions of the USSR and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and new direct elections by the population according to lists of political parties of both the deputies of legislative authorities and the leaders of executive authorities...." In a word, the composition of the present soviets is entirely not to the author's liking. Why? Because the deputies

"were elected not as the representatives of some parties but as individuals. They are not accountable to anyone other than the electorate." Strange words, it would seem, on the lips of a man with whom frequency of use of the word "democracy" is close to the maximum.

But let us not be in any hurry. We are invited to ascend to heights of "pure reason" from which what just recently was customary and comprehensible appears largely in a new light (really?). It turns out that "all is far more complex, and the post-perestroika system will not grow naturally from the past, it needs to be implanted artificially and from outside on the redug field of the former system."

The author calls this proposition a "fundamental fact." Well, fact or no fact, we will still take a look at it. As for the fundamental aspect, this is just it, such conclusions do in fact point to certain fundamental things. One feels uncomfortable when, speaking about the implantation from outside on, yes, a redug field, the author reminds us: "just as, incidentally, administrative socialism came from outside." And if we are to speak of the most fundamental conclusion from the fundamental proposition, the desire is to have us believe that neither the electorate, that is, you and me, nor deputies dependent only on us are capable of understanding what is good for us and what is bad. For our own happiness we need to once again be led by the ears, whatever this may cost us. And that is why, of course, all is permitted since what must come is not at all a product of general consent. After all, what can be done with this people, which does not know that "the root of the misfortunes lies in a reluctance to return to the bosom of civilization and an aspiration to preserve the soviets."

We somehow do not believe that it is possible to rely on such a foundation. If we clear away the decorative effects, accents, and the underlying political meaning, what is in fact being proposed? And how consistent is the author himself in his recommendations? When he speaks about the need for three systems of power—legislative, executive, and judicial—he is arguing only, perhaps, with himself. All law-making activity of recent years, and this is the activity of the soviets, has consisted precisely of the structuring on a legal basis of such a division of power. Need we employ for this stinging terms of the "de-soviet-ization" type, need we announce a policy of de-soviet-ization by a general slogan?

Popov writes: "In a democratic republic power lies with the parliament, but locally it is not organs of power that are elected but organs of self-government—municipalities." Consequently, according to him, organs of self-government are not organs of power, that is, belong to none of the three systems of power for which he campaigns. And is the system of soviets to blame for the fact that, instead of displaying concern for urgent problems of the population, deputies locally have engaged in political phrase-mongering?

In this passage of his text he evidently understands the word "power" differently from elsewhere. We are already somewhat accustomed to this. Thus with Popov the word apparatus is one of collective abuse. And we suddenly read: "The main thing in the soviet system are meetings of the soviets, but in a democratic republic, the work of the apparatus." That is, the "apparatus" is bad when it is an apparatus in the soviet system and good when it is an apparatus in a democratic republic. Our republic, of course, is not one of these.

Popov's attitude toward the apparatus is distinctive altogether. To judge by the scale on which bureaucratic structures of the Moscow City Soviet have been created (please do not confuse it with the apparatus of the executive committee), Popov likes the apparatus. Expenditure on the support of the staff of new advisers, group and department leaders, and so forth is close to a million. But he does not like the entire apparatus, just his own. He comes across as a consistent supporter of private property here.

With what does Popov recommend we begin the dismantling of Soviet power? The breakup of the Congress of People's Deputies. He writes: "We need to strive for a version of the Union treaty which contains the idea of a termination of the authority of the congress." "If the apparatus does not permit elections, democrats will be left with the path of extra-parliamentary struggle. Such a struggle will inevitably be severe and would most likely end in the establishment of a democratic dictatorship," Gavriil Kharitonovich sternly informs us. "Democratic dictatorship"—this is his cherished dream. It is a pity that Popov did not at the same time give us the name of the proposed dictator or, in case of special emergency, the makeup of the junta.

Defederalization. So what is defederalization? We are once again helped by the author's prompting, when, after a comma, is written "defederalization," "deimperialization," and it is suggested that we recall the "disintegration of Austro-Hungary and the disintegration of the British Empire." The author, with his characteristic emancipated nature, goes on to speak of the dismantling of the USSR. So, defederalization, deimperialization, dismantling of the USSR.

With exceptional facility "30, 40, or even 50 independent states would be formed in place of the USSR," "Estonia and Moldavia would be diminished," borders would change and people would move "to new places of residence."

And once again the logic of destructiveness hastens to bring us to the secret place—this new "great movement of peoples should begin with the dissolution of the Congress of People's Deputies." The Union parliament should be elected for a two- to three-year term.... It could alter the composition of the USSR... "the present congress cannot perform this role."

And once again in Popov's muddled texts we do not find such "reactionary" words as "friendship of the peoples,"

"historical community," and "mutual assistance." Only the newest propaganda merchandise—"empire," "the center is opting for a policy of a show of force," "free migration," and so forth. This also is understandable, after all, the very foundation of Popov's political dictionary is division: We divide, we are divided, we separate, we are separated, we sell, we are sold....

So the three big guns on which the "democratic" version of perestroika is supported are denationalization, desovietization, and defederalization. It is for this reason understandable why the author's efforts did not lead to the goal—an answer to the question of "what is to be done." The main reason, it seems, is that the chaos of destruction proved too much a fascination for the author and that he himself screened off the real contradictions by the decorative figures of imaginary internal enemies of democracy. An answer to the question of "what is to be done" will not be found on this path.

Conditions Leading to Ekho Deal Viewed

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[Report on interview with P.S. Goncharov, economist, political scientist, and member of the Council on Problems of Social Development of the Experimental Creative Center, by V. Ovcharov; place and date not given: "In Search of 140 Billion—Bait for Simpletons"]

[Text] Newer and newer details connected with the "deal of the century" are becoming public property. It is apparent, however, that they are only the above-water part of the iceberg, and that both the investigation and the public can expect many other surprises ahead. But even what has already been learned raises many questions among the readers. Inasmuch as the answers of official representatives of the Russian government are not altogether convincing, we decided to go to an independent expert—a member of the Council on Problems of Social Development of an extra-departmental corporation, the Experimental Creative Center, which was established through a decision of the USSR Council of Ministers by P.S. Goncharov, an economist and political scientist. This is not the first year that this corporation, which unites several dozen state enterprises, has performed not only humanitarian and engineering studies, it also conducts systemic political science research.

[Ovcharov] A year ago, speaking at a roundtable of the newspaper on models of development of the country ("Is There a 'Third Way' to the Desired Objective?" 7/01/90), you, Petr Sergeyevich, warned: Blind copying of Western economic mechanisms and primitive capitalization will transform our country not into a prosperous Sweden or Germany, but into a state resembling Columbia, which became a "hostage" of criminal syndicates and the drug mafia. I do not want to draw direct parallels, but in some way this prophecy is beginning to be confirmed: collapse of the economy, lawlessness, and legal nihilism are becoming a beneficial soil for the

aggressive actions of homegrown criminal businessmen. The newspapers report about new swindles every day. But, you will agree, that even you could not then suppose that the interests of our businessmen and the Columbia drug mafia would intersect so quickly. I have in mind the sensational report of the investigation: According to preliminary results, in readdressing the "deal of the century" to one of the Swiss banks suspected of laundering money of the Columbia drug mafia, C. Gibbins, according to obligations he signed, was supposed to open an account in a Swiss bank in the name of the manager of one of the organizations in the sum of \$3 million...

[Goncharov] Once on one of our jobs, we—that is, a group of authors of the center—talked about the fact that the world abroad was constructed a long time ago, and that it has lived for a long time in a strict system of mutual relations and according to a different logic than that which has existed in our country for the last seven decades. I have in mind the economic, political, psychological, and cultural system that forms this logic. We frequently behave like neophytes and converts—we latch onto some kind of a term and, not looking into the very complex processes that proceed from it, we begin to play with it like with beads and brilliantly colored pebbles. This happened in many ways with the terms "market," "privatization," "enterprise," and so forth. For us, they became symbols and not concepts. The story with the 140 billion clearly corroborates this.

The fact is that there are no uncontrolled and free money resources on the world market. Not one dollar ends up in a situation where there is no owner and direction in which it is moving. Billions, this is a colossal sum. In the rich West, it is usual to count thousands of dollars with trembling hands. There are such concepts as capital, circulation, and capital "in cash." And it is only the last that any person can administer without taking the opinion of the bank into account. Because all of the other dollars are in business, in circulation. And it is impossible to "withdraw" them. This is the mechanism and the process. And then even a very important business lives on credit. But credit is information science and control. It is the complete dedication of a bank to all operations of a given client.

And what is more. Before any person can open an account abroad, he fills out a declaration in which he writes: The money was not received as a result of drug business, arms trade, and activity prohibited by law. From the moment the declaration is filled out, the person bears full responsibility for the money he has deposited in the bank. How important this is and how powerful are the forces that are in control of all of these moneys (both "clean" and "dirty") is indicated by the fact that Switzerland has stopped the practice of concealed accounts; that is, numbered, unnamed accounts. It was compelled to close all accounts that were previously considered secret, and now they are being published. In other words, the real financial world of the West is creating a situation under which "black" money is put under control. It is another matter how the bankers

use it. In one case, they "reject" it, and in another they allow it go into business. But in the kind they need, and not in the interests of any state or society.

Why do I talk about this. Well, because our country is a very attractive place for any operations that give money a clean face. Therefore, attempts to transact dollars that do not have a "papa" and a "mama" through the Soviet Union have been made for a long time now. Proposals like this in one form or another have been making the rounds in our country for many years. For a minimum of four years of the last five and a half years of perestroika. True, at first, free and "clean" money was offered. And for us at that time such operations made sense. First, because then the Swiss bank was offering transactions at a ratio of \$1 for R5.24. If we consider that, for example, two years ago the USSR Vneshekonombank [Bank of Foreign Economic Activity] established the commercial exchange rate of R6.28, then we must admit that this is a rather realistic rate. And there was no question of putting out extremely high volumes in these operations. There was talk about sums of up to \$1 billion; that is, of a little more than R5 billion. But \$1 billion invested in industry is a colossal sum. It is not less than 10 very large plants, each of which is capable of producing products in the course of a year amounting to tens of millions of rubles. That is, in two to three years, these plants pay for themselves. And this kind of economic action would make real sense.

[Ovcharov] What prevented us from doing this?

[Goncharov] We were let down by our economic logic. Everyone rushed after dollars, but not in order to invest them in the means of production and new technology, which would have begun to fill the domestic market, but in order, to put it bluntly, to rip off a large sum. If we want large sums of dollars to be invested in industry, head-on measures are needed. Under these tasks, it would be necessary also to establish an appropriate structure of financial and economic relations that would encourage this process. The one who invests these dollars inside the country should receive tax benefits, more extensive rights, and an opportunity to engage in business in different spheres. But, here again we miscalculated. Moreover, not economically, but politically. For the reason that, although Marxism is based on the fact that economics has primacy, and everything else follows, feedback in today's society is extremely significant. We know that computerized information now determines the speed of economic processes, and, of course, it can already be said that information science, and, of course politics, determine economics to a significant degree. We have begun to talk about broadening the sphere of production of consumer items. We immediately rushed into drawing up a basket. In a poor country with a collapsing economy, we set a target—to rapidly create a large consumer basket and to fill it just like in a Western supermarket. It was shown over television how much of everything there is there, appetites were whetted in a land of shortages and collapsed civilian consumption. We enticed people with a piece of meat and pretty

clothes on the television screen, and we declared: We will produce consumer goods. We reversed the logic of the economic process—it became easy, important, and prestigious, considering the frightening dynamics of contractual prices, to spend earned hard currency not on means of production but on cheap clothes and the household appliances of yesterday. To sell them inside the country at outrageous prices, to receive an enormous sum of money in rubles, to show them in the commodity fund of the country, and to receive real products for them. And to sell this product again, receive dollars, and once again to import for them what will be needed in a month...

[Ovcharov] But, the 140 billion, we are assured, were supposed to remain on our territory and be invested in production, in joint enterprises, and so forth.

[Goncharov] For the time being, we can only talk about intentions. I have no doubts that this is absolute bungling. Well, for example, what does the assurance mean that the money will be invested? I have questions: Where will it be invested, on what conditions, what rights are granted to the owner of these investments, and what should the country receive as a result. Here is a small example for you. The Italian Government decides to allocate credits guaranteed by them for an operation with the Soviet Union. They say immediately: Such-and-such a sum must go for compensation for nonpayments by the USSR or Soviet partners for the remuneration of their interests; that is, bank interest which these firms pay to the banks... Here is the sum, here are its recipients, and it will be used in this way. This is a normal document that talks in an exhaustive way: about the volume of money and about the type of transactions that can be conducted at the expense of that part of the moneys that are oriented on new transactions. That is all. According to information about the 140 billion that I was able to receive through the media, I see only one thing: One sum is stipulated on this side, and another on that side.

I am not even talking about the fact that the ratio itself gives rise to a big question about the origin of the dollars. It is too low, if one is talking about the correlation of the ruble and the dollar. The ratio of \$1 to R18 is not realistic on the market (I am not talking about the commercial exchange rate, which in many ways exists only on paper). It is an overly favorable rate of exchange. The dollar, which has a boss, could not be sold at such an exchange rate.

Just this alone should have compelled us to think about the fact of where these dollars are coming from. In addition, when we talk about money, especially in sums like these, we should remember, particularly if we are looking to the West, that not one state sells its national currency in any other way than through a bank of issue. Not one government in the world will ever agree to direct support of a transaction of a purely nonbank organization with respect to simply a purchaser, when it is a question of national finances. Whatever the currency

is—closed or open. That is why the USSR Vneshekonombank or Chase Manhattan Bank, when they need the payment currency of another country, buy it through the bank of issue of that country in which the currency is printed. That is the procedure. But on the territory of its own country, that same Chase... gets a license of the bank of issue for work with the national currencies of other states. And it pays appropriate fees to the budget and through other channels. This is the norm of relationships, because in all countries of the world, whether we like it or not, money circulation is regulated. But what do we have? Some organization suddenly decided to sell R140 billion. But, you see, this is half of that cash money of the circulation that serves the entire civilian goods turnover in the country! This is a terribly large sum... This means that the owner of these resources is in a position to apply them to any kind of mass of commodities—from means of production to land and forests. Money is a claim either against national wealth or the national product. One of the two. Think of it: On one fine day, the owner of these resources can declare his right to demand half of our commodity reserves, or something similar to this. How can one say in such a situation that, they say, this money could have been invested, if one does not say where, in what kind of a program, and with what kind of mutual obligations and concessions? And in what way could this transaction in general be considered without the knowledge of the bank of issue—the USSR Gosbank [State Bank]? There can be only one boss in money circulation, if we do not want a crash. And if operations of this kind are being conducted outside this boss, then it means that there is no boss and that the population is "exposed." People simply are forgotten. But, as we know, very different roads are paved with good intentions.

[Ovcharov] There is one question that does not leave me: How could all of this have happened? What were the people thinking about who took part in the development of this unprecedented transaction, and there are, according to information of the office of the procurator, more than a thousand of them—bank employees, governmental institutions of the republic and of the Union, and other organizations?

[Goncharov] As chairman of the board of a commercial bank, Presnya-Bank, I, of course, did not see even one document concerning this affair. But I know that, in the preparation of such documents, it is always possible either to "wash away" the intent of a document, or to reveal it. To the extent that any financial transactions must contain a certain commercial secrecy, each worker at a given level outwardly is not privy ethically to information that does not fall within his jurisdiction. I am confident that among them there are those who are guilty but guiltless. I want to say once more that we are a country of neophytes, novices. We do not know this area of activity. It is customary in this country to haggle in open air markets and with the rustle of nuts in the

background. And even those people who consider themselves authorities are not sufficiently qualified. I do not exclude myself from this circle. I am talking about the fact that under our conditions any kind of serious economic transactions should be the fruit of the thoughts of many experts.

[Ovcharov] What, in your opinion, could the consequences be for us, if the recent facts brought out by the investigation are confirmed?

[Goncharov] Actions of this kind undoubtedly undermine the prestige of the country on the credit market. The Western credit system and the world banks apply the strictest sanctions against persons, banks, or states that deal with drug money. And if in fact the dollars have a doubtful origin, then after this we will receive nothing other than charity in the Western financial system. Moreover, charity received on our knees... It will also be difficult to build relationships with the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and with the IMF. And not because they are that "good," but because this money constitutes those cheap credit resources that are also taken into account by these structures in their control of all of the credit resources of the world. This kind of an operation is not overlooked. This is the first thing.

Second, not one important bank of the world will communicate with people, organizations and structures that are dirtied, for example, by drug business money. If the deal that we are looking into was held and if it was proven that drug money played a part in it, then the government of Russia and the RSFSR Ministry of Finance and the central bank of the republic need no longer turn to banks in the West. All doors would be closed to them.

And the last thing. If this is drug money of the mafia, God forbid, then did it really invest it in the economy of Russia? And where would the billions go? Really to develop production? Hardly. The possessors of such resources are interested in their speedy return as "clean" money. This means that now after paying out \$7 billion, they would try in the shortest time to return them laundered for use in the West. For just in the regime of short-term loans, they could bring 20 percent; that is, \$100 million a year, as the saying goes, for nothing. Who would make a present of all of this? Well, of course, no one. Therefore, the R140 billion applied here to the mass of commodities would require one thing: That something equivalent to \$7 billion would have to leave the territory of our country. Actually, it is possible that only that part would remain to be invested that would be in accounts above the sum that "covers" the \$7 billion. In other words, if it was possible for R110 billion to return all \$7 billion, then the remaining R30 billion would be invested in something. Simply in order to have some kind of a "hook" in the territory of the country. So that both from an economic and a political point of view, we are talking about a losing deal.

Baltics

NOVOYE VREMYA Views Implications of Baltic Events

Bell Tolls for Democratic Hopes

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[Article by Marina Shakina, under rubric: "National Problems," in section "The Country": "Clusters of Hatred"]

[Text] For whom is the bell in the Baltic area tolling? For all of us... The country had not had time to mourn those who died in Vilnius when tragic news arrived from Riga—bullets fired by union detachments of special-purpose militia had killed five persons and wounded ten. Once again, no one knows who issued the order to kill. One thing is clear: those people are convinced of their impunity. Who will stop them? Once again we are deaf to the tolling strikes of the bell that rings in response to our hopes for democracy...

A few months ago one of the fashionable topics for discussion among the politicizing Muscovites was the question: "Is it possible to have a return to the old totalitarian regime?" The opinions were divided, but usually the voices that sounded more convincing were those that asserted, "No, it is impossible." The events in Lithuania and Latvia have shaken that conviction. All that remains is to joke bitterly: every cloud has a silver lining. Well, now we can all verify that.

But No One in Moscow Knew Anything... Once Again...

If one rolls back the tape of political events, it is difficult to get rid of the sensation that the events that occurred in the Baltic area were planned and correspondingly prepared: literally on the eve of those events the chairman of Gostelradio and the minister of internal affairs were replaced. The KGB chairman, speaking at the Supreme Soviet, and later at a press conference, explained to all those who wanted to listen to him "that the KGB task is the fight against destructive forces, and the destructive forces are those that want to ruin the Union." Shevardnadze's resignation and his warning about the impending dictatorship. The hints given by the "red" colonels who gave abundant interviews to the Western mass media, in which they implied that everything would be calm in February. And the paratroopers who showed very auspiciously in the Baltic area like a "grand piano in the bushes."

And, even earlier, the economic blockade of Lithuania that had actually failed. Slightly later, a referendum on the Union treaty would be planned for March, a reference that has all chances of having a negative impact precisely in Lithuania, and primarily in Lithuania, since it is precisely there that the indigenous population constitutes more than two-thirds. If all this is a coincidence,

then it is a very strange one. As the expression goes, if this coincidence did not exist, it would have to be invented.

Since then, the People's Fronts have come to power in the Baltic republics, and the Communist Parties have lost practically all their influence. That region enjoys special attention on the part of the center. It is difficult to explain that attention apart from ideological or imperial positions, inasmuch as, unlike the other union republics, where blood was shed almost everywhere during perestroika (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldavia, Georgia, Belorussia), and where there were pogroms, instances of arson, murders, and terroristic acts, in the Baltic—during the entire period that the new authority existed—there was not a single victim, not a single instance of mass disorder, not a single pogrom. No matter how you twist the facts, there simply were no grounds for forceful interference. We are assured that on 12-13 January in Vilnius the bloodshed was on the point of beginning, and therefore the Army decided to disperse the conflicting sides and during the pacification operation 14 unarmed persons had been killed and more than a hundred of similarly unarmed persons were wounded.

Fog, Fog...

So much fog has been released around the situation in Lithuania, and now also in Latvia, that it is impossible to make any comparison either with Tbilisi or with Baku. Perhaps someone does have detailed information, but neither the Supreme Soviet, the central press, or the government has such information at its disposal. The explanations given by the minister of internal affairs (incidentally, how can he be held accountable? After all, he has only been in that job for a month) are staggering in their hopelessness, as though stating "...well, this is what finally happened to make us fire the shots." The minister of defense assures us that the chief of the Vilnius garrison had operated at his own risk. The president did not find out until after he had awakened the next morning. Currently the president avoids giving an analysis of the situation in Lithuania, makes statements concerning overall topics, and, shaking a sheaf of telegrams, inclines toward stating that "at the request of the workers," he will have to introduce presidential government. A delegation of the Soviet of the Federation that arrived from Lithuania did not state anything intelligible. No matter how one tried to make both ends meet, it proved to be impossible to do so. But, astonishingly enough, that did not worry the deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet very much. They seemed to be immediately satisfied with these convoluted explanations and, for God's sake, do not want any other ones, for God's sake! In the Supreme Soviet building, one can constantly hear the words, "Law! Constitution!" but there is a stubborn avoidance of the essence of what occurred—a military putsch against the democratically elected parliament and the legal government of a sovereign republic.

The anonymous and self-styled national salvation committee, which attempted to seize the authority in the republic, continues to operate and to hide. The chief of the Vilnius garrison, who had acted on his own initiative, feels completely confident about himself now and calmly gives interviews to the "Vremya" [Time] program as though he is the master of the situation. The Russian-speaking workers who zealously hold rallies have begun doing this practically simultaneously in all three republics as though on signal, as though someone has pushed a button and said, "Begin now." At such rallies they make ultimatums to the parliaments and governments and threaten to hold strikes, and the workers who are deputies to the Supreme Soviet censure the two-hour symbolic strike in the Union that was held as a sign of protest against the use of force in sovereign Lithuania, but they approve (or at least take a calm attitude toward) the threats made by the Interfronts in the Baltic republics to begin what is no longer a symbolic strike, but the most actual kind of strike. The reason given for this is not the discriminatory laws, but the rise in prices, which have risen, incidentally, for all inhabitants in equal measures, rather than only for the striking Russian-speaking workers. And the attempt is being made to convince us that the center did not know anything, that everything happened without its knowledge or approval? The impression of monstrous Jesuitry is being created. Once again we are being taken as fools, probably because, once again, we are allowing people to do that.

Left to the Mercy of the Fates

The parliaments of the Baltic republics are, of course, not free of sin. Their politicians are, for the most part, the same kind of dilettantes as our own are. The laws that infringe upon the electoral rights of the nonindigenous population, the forced rates of changeover to the complete use of state languages, and the instances of oppression against the Russian-speaking part of the population, unconditionally, had not done honor to the People's Fronts that have come to power—"measures" such as this do not do honor anyone. Incidentally, the conscience of the NOVOYE VREMYA journalists in this sense is pure—we wrote repeatedly that such steps contradict the international human-rights documents, and that the rights of the nonindigenous population of the Baltic republics must be defended.

Psychologically one can understand the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. The lengthy and practically compliant existence under ideological pressure led to a situation in which the feeling of national dignity that had been driven inward and compressed like a spring has today broken out to the surface, and knows no brakes or moderation. That feeling, unfortunately, distorts the sense of reality—and thus creates the excessive and unreasonable Fronde, the squeamishness toward the Interfronts, the holy faith that "foreign countries will help us," and the disdain of the ties with the democratic forces of Russia, Belorussia, and the Ukraine. Nevertheless, there was no open, armed, or bloody confrontation in the republic.

There are certain reproaches that can be directed at the Russian democrats—from the very first day Boris Yeltsin should have formed his policy with respect to the Russian-speaking population of the other union republics, and should have constantly—tactfully, but firmly—reminded the leaders of the union republics that the situation of the Russians could not be left outside Russia's sphere of attention. He should have supported the ties with the Russian communities, explaining to them by word and proving to them by deed that the concern for their fellow Russian-speakers and the protection of their rights were the important concern of the Russian leaders. That was not done. Obviously the democrats had developed a phobia—the fear of being accused of chauvinism or of having imperialistic intentions. No democratic, civilized alternative was offered to the Russians in the Baltic republics, and as a result they, feeling that they had been betrayed, forgotten, and left to the mercy of the fates, found themselves in the embrace of the Interfronts.

This picture is observed not only in the Baltic republics. The same miscalculation by the democrats led to the spilling of blood in Moldavia, and is also inflaming the passions in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the Russian autonomies.

With Whom, Then, Is the Working Class?

Once again we are being tempted by the class approach. The appeals by the national salvation committee are strewn with the familiar social demagoguery—"the Sajudis policy has not brought the workers anything but a drop in the standard of living," "the attempt is being made to deprive us of socialist choice." It is asserted that the working class has risen up and the crux of the matter is definitely not the interethnic relations. Hence the strange cause—the rise in prices. The cause is even more strange in that not even the center is squeamish about the policy of raising prices, even more strange in that everyone knows that the Baltic republics continue to occupy the first places with regard to the standard of living and the quality of life in the Union, with regard to the level of being supplied with foodstuffs and commodities. Therefore those protests, in the eyes, say, of a Muscovite or Leningrader, or a resident of the Nonchernozem Zone or the industrial rayons of the Urals—who must stand in line both in the morning and in the evening just to buy milk, and who have noiseless forgotten state meat, cottage cheese, and eggs—these protests, once again, sound Jesuitical.

Once again, attempts are being made to give the appearance that our country's economic collapse is the result not of seventy years of the undistinguished management by the administrative-fiat system and the economic blockade, but of the one-year's activities of the new parliaments.

So, then, with whom is the Lithuanian working class? Before answering that question, let us think a bit: who is constructing antitank barricades and installing them on

the streets of Riga and Vilnius? Who is driving trucks and tractors and setting up concrete obstacles to obstruct vehicular traffic on the streets? Who is digging trenches on the approach to the television tower? References to the working class, and requests from the workers and anonymous pretenders from the national salvation committee are good in that it is possible not to find out precisely who is making the demands, how many people are making the demands, and whom they represent. The only method for ascertaining the expression of the nation's will is the holding of a free, democratic election or a referendum. An election occurred in Lithuania not too long ago and it showed that the overwhelming majority of the nation entrusted its faith to the representatives of the People's Front and was in favor of independence. Whether or not we like that, that's the way it is. And it seems that we have gathered up our meager belongings in order to set off on the long path that leads to democracy. But it turns out that we have not even taken a single step.

Dual Government

Today a formula has been found for the situation in the republic—"dual government." Opposing one another are the legally elected parliament, Sajudis, and its adherents. On the other hand is the anticonstitutional national salvation committee, which is rumored to consist of leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party that lost the election on the CPSU platform, together with the representatives of the Russian-speaking part of the population who are grouped around those leaders, a part of the population whose calm and proprietary existence in the republic is under question; and perhaps even the democratic part of the Russian-speakers, a part that does not support the Communists' ideas, but that is indignant at the discriminatory laws and the practical situation. And all this is maintained by the Soviet army's bayonets. The opinion is expressed that a trial balloon had been launched in Lithuania and an attempt had been made to "test-drive" the scenario for a military coup. That actually is similar to the truth, because a day later the identical scenarios began to unfold in Latvia and Estonia. There have already been people killed in Riga—this time it was a job carried out by the union OMON [special purpose militia detachments], who operated on the basis of an order issued by no one knows who. Who, then, will stop them, or will anyone stop them? The center—and this was confirmed by the events in Riga—has dodged the issue, and the Balts have remained one on one with the army and the OMON. The military coup in the Baltic republics did not succeed completely. The tanks got bogged down half-way. But the policy of terror is being carried out "successfully." A few more violent steps like the ones in Vilnius and Riga, and the Union might explode without having lived long enough to hold a referendum on the question of preserving the Union treaty. Is this in the interests of the military and those who are standing behind them?

And what about the president? His position is imperceptible—he does not censure those who carried out the

putsch, but he disowns them. He uses the military's game for his own purposes, obviously attempting to incline the union parliament toward the idea of presidential rule.

What might happen? Presidential rule, although there were no grounds for that. The rumors to the effect that the Lithuanian parliament did not monitor the situation are somewhat exaggerated. It would have been possible long ago, under that pretext, to demand the dissolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which, it would seem, has tired of delving into the difficult deeds of the country, cannot do that, and does not want to do that, and is pleased to separate itself from its legal powers—in favor of the president, the minister of defense, or General Uskhovich. The main destabilizing factor today in Lithuania, it would appear, is specifically the army.

And if there is presidential rule, what then? The dissolution of the parliament and the holding of a new election? There is a risk that a new election will provide an even more radical makeup of deputies. And if there is not an election, what then? It will be possible to keep Lithuania within the confines of the Union and of socialist choice only by one method—a long-lived presidential rule until such time as the ratio between the indigenous and the nonindigenous population changes to the necessary proportion. Although even that is no certainty. Is that a wild idea? Perhaps not...

What is the confrontation in Lithuania leading to? There is yet another intermediate alternative that is foisted on the Baltic republics—the creation of coalition governments. The legal parliaments have the right to reject such proposals—the majority in the parliament has the right to form a single-party government. Nevertheless, coordination councils to smooth out the problems in the Interfronts have been created in Latvia and Estonia.

On the whole, however, the situation has hardened: the Army has not left Vilnius, and the national salvation committee is functioning, sensing the support of the Kremlin and Staraya Ploshchad. A momentary strained equilibrium has been created, and the way in which the future events will move, all things considered, depends upon the reaction in the Union and in the world.

There Is Ecstasy in Combat...

What, then, occurred in Lithuania? A bloody lesson? A reminder: do not forget that you have nowhere to go? That is like an attempt at ideological revenge. Having liberated the people's of Eastern Europe—the borderlands of the Communist ideological empire—the center has no intention of giving up without a fight the next trench: the union republics that are hungry for self-determination. Vilnius has already been compared many times with Prague. It is not precluded that a new series of East European-style pacifications are awaiting us—the pacification actions "in Budapest 1956 and Berlin 1953," "in Prague 1968," and "in Warsaw 1980," except that this time it will be in the capitals of the Soviet Union.

The most terrifying and senseless thing is that both the Russian-speaking population of the Baltic republics and our Army have proven to be pawns in the political and ideological game. The first consequence of the Vilnius events will be the escalation of the hatred of the Russian-speaking minority, which has become the instrument of the policy of "arm-twisting"—everywhere, in all parts of the country. Absolutely everywhere—in Moldavia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan—people will begin viewing them as a fifth column of the party apparatus and the administrative-fiat system.

Another consequence of these events will be the escalation of the hatred of the Communists, who play the first violin in the national salvation committee and who have decided to seize the power in completely Bolshevik manner—to simply usurp it with the aid of military force—and to establish the order that they have read about in the works of Marx and Lenin. And they are the only ones who are unaware that that is a blind alley that is already well known to us and that has been well traveled by us.

Still another consequence of these events will be the escalation of the hatred of the Army, which has been **set up, set up** for yet another time. And not much good will come out of this for our soldiers everywhere, in all the corners of our country where they are currently serving or where they might be sent in order to cover with their bodies the breaches in the domestic policy.

The romanticism of Army duty and the esthetics of militarism have numerous supporters in our country—the strong protects the weak, the strong comes and restores justice. Many people who are by type "bandit Cossacks" represent everything in this way. But the fact of the matter is the determination of who should be defended from whom must be made not by the garrison commanders or even the marshals, but by completely different people—not only in principle, but according to the constitution. So today the impression is being created that the army requires the disarming of the illegal formations precisely so that no one will prevent it from carrying out arbitrary actions.

Aleksandr Nevzorov told about the paratroopers in Vilnius, and his voice rang out from high emotions—"not now, but later the nation will be proud of them." Hardly. Currently they are hated, but later on people will pity them. Did they demonstrated high professionalism, heroism, and moral stoicism in the face of curses as they were seizing and then protecting the television tower in Vilnius? Or in the struggle, one must think, with "an enemy who was armed to the teeth"? The paratroopers' faces are brave, simple, and likeable (that is how it seemed to me, but I think that they do not appear that way to the people of Vilnius who are mourning those who were killed). But can one be proud of seizing the Press House or the television tower, which are completely civilian objectives? Or of measuring one's forces against dilettantes and unarmed infants? One would scarcely think that they will be proud of themselves.

So if, many years from now, the Russian nation has anything to be proud of, it will probably not be the paratroopers, but that unarmed Russia that went out onto the street with slogans "Honor to Russia in Lithuania's freedom," it will be the Russian parliament and its leader, who was the first to raise his voice in the defense of the legal authority in the republic, and, who knows, perhaps was precisely that one who, in accordance with good Russian tradition, to a certain degree defended it.

A Strike at the Union Treaty

The events in Lithuania are a cross on the Union Treaty by which it was represented at the Kremlin. It is extremely probable that, after such excesses, the referendum dealing with the Union Treaty will be boycotted in the republics.

But one can already discern a new framework, the structures of a new voluntary community: the bilateral agreements between the republics have been joined by a joint statement by the Baltic republics and Russia and the intention to conclude a quadrilateral agreement among Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan in Minsk. If the center wants, it can annex itself to that agreement. Boris Yeltsin said at a press conference. But will the center want that? Therein lies the question...

'Danger' to Russian Nation Seen

91UN0953B Moscow: NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian
No 4, Jan 91 pp 8-9

[Article by M. Molostvov, under rubric: "National Problems": "Candles on the Snow"]

[Text] From 12 January through 16 January Mikhail Molostvov, member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's Human-Rights Committee, was in Lithuania, where he witnessed the events that ensued there. In a conversation with NOVOYE VREMYA commentator Lev Yelin he made the following remarks.

It is well known that the 13 January tragedy was preceded by a demonstration in front of the parliament building. The demonstration was against the rise in prices and made the demand that the government resign. But the information that is being disseminated by the union authorities requires clarification. A rally that was conducted, incidentally, under Lithuanian flags, was attended by all kinds of people—from supporters of "Unity" to representatives of the right wing of Lithuanian nationalists. There were few who thought that that demonstration could be used for such far-reaching purposes. There was no logic in the subsequent events, as some people attempt to represent... A young Lithuanian lad whom I met among the defenders of parliament after the 13 January tragedy admitted that the only reason why he had been at the rally was because "Brazauskas is a closet Communist and deliberately raised the prices." A Russian woman who subsequently sold me an airplane ticket to Moscow repeated that view, stating, "My God!

We had only gone there to make a protest about prices... Why did they send in tanks?"

Prior to the arrival of the demonstrators, the parliament had already stated that there had been a temporary cessation of the government's decision to raise prices and the government had resigned. Thus, the demands of the Lithuanian workers had been satisfied, as, practically speaking, had been the demands of "Unity," which, true, also insisted on parliament's resignation. But to the "pro-Unity forces" that seemed to be not enough, and they attempted to break down the parliament doors. They were stopped by water shot from fire hoses. Subsequently there appeared a version according to which they had been doused with boiling water, but, first of all, that is simply impossible from a technical point of view, and, secondly, I had conversations with participants in that assault: there had not been any boiling water. There is no disputing that pouring water on people when the temperature is below freezing is not too humane, but I am attempting to imagine the demonstrators breaking into the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and especially the USSR Supreme Soviet, with demands to overthrow the government and dissolve the parliament. Would they get through? Soldiers' mothers on the approaches to the Kremlin were beaten with rubber truncheons... But, most importantly, there were no casualties that day in Vilnius.

There were very few people who actually rushed at the parliament doors—otherwise they would have easily overcome the weak resistance: it is only now that the building has been overgrown with protective structures. There were very few of them, I repeat, and they were instantaneously dispersed. That was an obviously provocative act. I was absolutely unable to discover in Vilnius any specific adherents of "Unity." Rumors were constantly being born: that "pro-Unity forces" were gathering at such-and-such a plant, and from there they would go the parliament with tank support. But the rumors remained rumors. I was absolutely not surprised by the fact that Leningrad reporter Nevzorov succeeded in pointing out, from "the other" side, only members of OMON with their faces concealed by bandages...

I attempted to go into the Lithuanian Communist Party building, but I was not allowed to go there with Supreme Soviet identification, and I was advised to seek members of the national salvation committee at a certain numbered plant. But I could not go there either, because it was being guarded by the military. I tried to walk to the train station—to a building where, it had been reported to me, the strike committee was meeting—but once again my way was barred by submachine gunners.

I was admitted to the Russian Cultural Center, where, on 13 January, I had appealed to all the Russian people of Lithuania: "Unconcealed violence is being perpetrated in your name... You must disassociate yourself from the genuine criminals, and must purify yourself of the filth that is using our name and our language." On 16 January, at the gates of the Svyato-Dukhov Monastery,

the Russian Cultural Center had a gathering both of Russians and of Orthodox Lithuanians in order to "bow our heads before our common woe." In the Russian Center, people had their claims both against the government and against the Lithuanian parliament ("They began talking to us too late..."), but the pressure there is currently being experienced from the other side. The new archbishop of the Svyato-Dukhov Monastery received an anonymous letter with the threat that he would be shot as a traitor to the Russian people...

On the other hand, are the plans of the "Lithuanian nationalists" realistic—the plans to settle the score with representatives of the Communist Party, plans that were mentioned in official communiques from the center? I doubt that, if only because in 1968, after the invasion into Czechoslovakia, there had also been an immediate "revelation" of Dubcek's plans to construct concentration camps for Communists. History repeats itself...

Together with the delegation from the Soviet of the Federation, I visited V. Landsbergis, and subsequently I observed how that delegation fulfilled the functions of settling the conflict. The situation that had developed was a strange one. A union-level federal agency was acting as an intermediary between the Lithuanian parliament and the local garrison. Of course, it can indeed happen that a war will flare up between parliament and the Army: in this instance, when the Army is headed by a certain junta that opposes the government. But, in my opinion, the situation here had not yet reached the point where the union army and the republic's parliament were arguing, but a sovereign union state was only listening to the claims being made by the different sides and was attempting to consider them carefully.

The military were not able to put forward some kind of Babrak Karmal, Kadar, or Gusak—they act exclusively like an army. The conflict took on the nature of a conflict between the Army and the authority, but a legally elected authority. The fantastic nature of the situation was also illustrated by the achieved agreement to the effect that... the tanks would not travel along the streets at night, shooting at passersby!

Later, Defense Minister Yazov explained that the chief of the Vilnius garrison had acted on the basis of the regulations governing guard and garrison service. From the point of view of the law, that is complete nonsense. True, there exists a historic precedent to which the military could have referred. There had already been a situation in Russia when "a guard had become tired" and was planning to use a weapon if the Constituent Assembly did not disperse. A praiseworthy tradition...

Now M. S. Gorbachev declares that he knew nothing about what was happening in Vilnius on the night of 13 January. It turns out that the Army must have been autonomous. But I still do not believe that we did not actually have a situation that ought to have followed from this—the beginning of an uncontrollable military coup. I think that the president had not yet released from

his hands the levers of authority. And if he had released them, in such instances honorable politicians depart from the scene, because it is inadmissible for soldiers, colonels, or generals to act contrary to the will of the commander in chief, who the president is, and to make decisions for themselves about concluding peace with the local authorities or waging war.

After the days that I spent in Vilnius, I no longer had the conviction that the Army was monolithic. Rather, there are different kinds of armies. Those people who seized the television tower and the radio center were all preselected: tall, strong. They were not even similar to our ordinary soldiers—rather, they were supermen, like those we see in a foreign movie. And in my opinion, they were all officers. In the daytime on 13 January, at the radio center, I was pushed aside and jabbed in the stomach with a submachine gun by one of these supermen. His sheepskin coat was open, and I could see a major's shoulder boards...

Well, in the evening of 13 January, together with the television center's deputy director (during the assault his arm had been broken by a weapon butt), we were driving to the television tower. The tanks that had been rushing around the earth at night and throwing people around were standing around the tower like animals in a zoo. All around—near the fence—were the inhabitants of Vilnius. Candles were burning in the places where the caterpillar treads had crushed people. And near the tower, camp fires were burning—our very ordinary soldier boys were already keeping themselves warm. They eagerly approached the fence and talked with the crowd. They were soldiers from the Vilnius garrison, ordinary mobilized guys. I approached them and said, "Hey, guys, you are Russians... Have you heard Yeltsin's statement? If you cannot avoid executing an order, then at least do not fire at the people. Shoot into the air..." And they all repeated, "We did not do any of the shooting! We were not here last night!"

I cannot prove this, but I was not the only person to get the impression that it was not the simple soldiers who killed and crushed people here, but certain specially selected detachments. In Vilnius there was a widespread story according to which the simple soldiers on the night of the 13th were armed with submachine guns with blank ammunition, and the tank shells were also blank—and that is why there had been such a loud noise throughout the city. Live ammunition had been fired by only a few individuals, officers... In Kaunas I was told that the local garrison's assault troops had not wanted to kill people, and that was why the radio station had not been taken and there had been no casualties. Because if the soldiers had been ready to walk through blood, to blast a road through the crowd, there would have been no difficulty in seizing the radio station.

The Lithuanians, it would seem, were seeking any manifestation of humaneness on the part of the soldiers, and in general reacted very sharply to everything that came from Russia. When on 15 January a rumor spread

through Vilnius to the effect that Yeltsin was coming, people would approach me and say, "We will carry him in our arms!" And then there was an immediate fear: "We only hope he is not killed here!" Although the Lithuanians were actually united by a national idea, not once did I encounter anti-Russian moods. Without a doubt, in the complicated situation that had been developing for several months, there had certainly been manifestations of extreme nationalism, but, in my opinion, one instance that is known to me says a lot: "Unity" was counting primarily on the active support not of the Russians, but of the Poles and the Karaims, as being the ones most infected by the national idea. For example, counting on the Poles living in Vilnius, in the homeland of Adam Mickiewicz... But that did not turn out.

Even when the decision was made to intimidate the entire republic, that did not unite the people against the Russians, and the army was viewed not as something specifically **Russian**. At the pyramid near the parliament building, alongside of the Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Polish, Belorussian, Latvian, and Estonian flags, the tricolored flag of Russia was flying...

As paradoxical as it sounds, the danger currently is threatening not Lithuania: I could only envy the solidity of the Lithuanians' democratic foundations and their faith in their parliament. The Lithuanians will survive as a nation. The danger threatens, rather, the Russian nation, which, over a 70-year period, was wounded more strongly than the others. We have had our roots—the peasantry—chopped off, and we have had our treetops—the intelligentsia—cut off. And if today we do not revive as a nation, we will become partly a Lumpenproletariat, and partly a soldier of the empire. Like those who fired at people on the night of 13 January.

'Myths' Created Around Events Examined

91UN0953C Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian
No 4, Jan 91 p 10-11

[Article by Yakov Borovoy and Aleksandr Chudodeyev, under rubric: "National Problems": "Three Days That Shook the Country: The 11-13 January Events in Lithuania Have Given Rise to Several Myths"]

[Text] The myth concerning anti-Russian and anti-army propaganda on Vilnius radio and television. The myth that "hit men" from "Sajudis" were the first to open fire and that they killed a Soviet Army serviceman. The myth concerning the national salvation committee.

That 'Vicious Television'

Mikolas Burokyavichyus, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee:

"On 12 January, during the entire day and evening, Vilnius radio and television transmitted especially frenzied anti-Russian and anti-Soviet broadcasts... Never before in my life had I heard such unbridled, vicious broadcasts."

Well, specifically what unbridled anti-Russian and anti-Soviet broadcasts were transmitted over Vilnius radio and television on the day before the tragedy? Because it was precisely the existence of such programs that encouraged the national salvation committee to appeal to the military to assault the television center.

We have before us a program listing the 12 January Vilnius radio and television broadcasts. As always, television began its operation at 0900 hours with a news broadcast. Later on, as on ordinary days, children's programs, informational programs, and entertainment programs replaced one another.

The night news completed the television operation that day. But at 0150 hours on 13 January, shots rang out at the Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. At 0200 hours the seizure of the television tower began. At 0220 hours the "Novosti" [News] anchorperson Egle Buchelite stated that assault troops were approaching her office. At that moment the image on the television screens went to black...

Two other Vilnius television channels completely rebroadcast the TsT [Central Television] first and second programs from Moscow. Obviously, the Lithuanian radio listeners also were given the right of choice.

Let us examine the 12 January radio program. Radio began its broadcasts at 0600 hours with the playing of the national anthem. The overwhelming majority of the broadcasting hours were devoted to musical and light programs (concerts as requested by the listeners, radio theater, dance music, brass bands...). As always, a considerable place was occupied by broadcasts for children, including such programs as a radio play based on scenes from Jules Verne's novel "The Mysterious Island." Nor were the sports enthusiasts forgotten. The broadcasts ended with a literary program, "Vechernyaya lirika" ["Evening Lyricism."]

So what was there in these broadcasts by Vilnius radio and television that frightened the Communists and the military so much? Could it be that substantial changes had been made in the program?

"No," Roman Yankauskas, editor in chief of the main television-news editorial office, asserts categorically. "Despite the alarming situation in the capital, that day was an ordinary one for us. Although, of course, slight changes were made in the broadcast schedule. What changes? Several times television rebroadcast the message given by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic."

This was his message:

"Dear people of Lithuania!

"Once again Lithuania is faced by alarming and possible fate-determining days and nights. In addition, we, although we do feel a danger for our Motherland, rejoice that you are alongside of us. Your presence here is the best response to the USSR President's ultimatum.

"We have been together, are together now, and we shall be together! We express our gratitude to all those who are in favor of selfless and loyalty to the independence of Lithuania."

Yankauskas continues: "On that day we attempted to rebroadcast as many broadcasts as possible that were of a light nature, rather than of a political nature. Starting on 11 January we increased the hours of broadcasts in Russian. On the eve of the tragic events, Archbishop Khrizostom of Vilnius and Lithuania broadcast a reassuring sermon to the Orthodox believers. In general on that day, as, incidentally, on all the previous days, there were no anti-Russian or anti-army broadcasts. After all, we are not suicidal..."

And now a few words about the "Panorama" program—which is similar to "Vremya" [Time]. On that day it was anchored by a popular anchorman, Coslovas Jursenas, member of the Democratic Labor Party (Brazauskas' party), and deputy to the Lithuanian parliament. He states, "Of course I remember that broadcast very well and can confirm by video recordings everything that I have said. The main character was Kazimieras Motieka, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic. He appealed to the Lithuanian citizens (both the Lithuanians and the Russians) to be calm and to resist any provocation acts. Yes, K. Motieka spoke of the need for 'civic obedience and the refusal to cooperate with the occupying forces.' But, as much as one wants it, these words cannot in any way be interpreted as an anti-Russian or anti-army appeal."

Incidentally, subsequently there was also nothing of that kind in the statement made by Vilnius mayor V. Bernatonis, who told the capital residents about the rules for conducting oneself on the city streets during those alarming days. Late in the evening, V. Yefremov, an actor at the local Russian Dramatic Theater, appealed for tranquility and peace between Lithuanians and Russians.

Insignificant changes were also made in the program for radio broadcasts. They pertained basically to switching directly to the session of the republic's parliament. Taking into consideration the situation in Lithuania, the parliamentarians actually did fail sometimes to choose the proper expressions... However, from the recordings of the broadcasts it is obvious that their—to state it outright—"unparliamentary language" was completely indistinguishable from the statements made by several of the elected representatives of the people at the sessions of Mossovet or Lensovet... But there is one thing that can be said precisely: there were no appeals to violence whatsoever. There were also absolutely no anti-Russian statements.

A Bullet Has Just Flown By...

The official version of the tragedy in Vilnius states that the assault by the assault forces against the television-center building began after a Soviet Army serviceman had been killed. And that he had been killed by extremists from "Sajudis." The number of casualties was obviously overstated. Many of them died a natural death.

We have before us an official document prepared by the Board of Forensic Experts of the Lithuanian Ministry of Public Health, No. 14, dated 15 January 1991, which bears an official seal and which is signed by A. Garmus, chief forensic expert of the Lithuanian MZ [Ministry of Public Health]. The document contains information concerning persons who had died on 13 January during an attack on the Vilnius television tower. There is a total of 13 names—12 are names of Lithuanians and, as was stated in the document, "Soviet Army soldier V. Shatskikh, born 1969." The document ends with the words, "Bullet wounds inflicted both on the civilians and on the soldier (V. Shatskikh) were made by 5.45-mm bullets."

It is a terrifying bullet, "with a shifted center of gravity," the use of which has been banned by many international conventions. When it enters the body, the bullet "roams around," changing the direction of its movement. A 5.45-mm bullet does not simply "put a person out of commission." It kills him, even if it does not immediately strike a vital organ.

Here is an official document pertaining to an analysis made by the NII [Scientific-Research Institute] of Forensic Expertise, of the Lithuanian Ministry of Justice. The document, dated 15 January 1991, with No. 11-75, for criminal case No. 09-2-001-91, was signed by L. Nechipuruk, expert in bullet tracking and ballistic trajectories (experience in giving expert findings since 1982). We shall quote only the conclusion of that document.

"1. The bullet parts submitted for research, which were removed from the body of victim V. V. Shatskikh, are the core and casing of a bullet with a caliber of 5.45-mm, intended for AK-74 semiautomatic weapons and RPK-74 machine guns.

"2. The (bullet casing) submitted for research was fired from an AK-74 semiautomatic weapon with caliber of 5.45-mm..."

In addition, the soldier was killed by a shot in the back, which puts in doubt the story that he had been murdered by defenders of the television center. Also, experts in pathology and anatomy (the autopsy was carried out in the presence of Soviet Army representatives by physician Oleg Benushis) confirm that the death of this "Soviet Army serviceman" came much earlier than the night of 13 January. The body had already been cold when it was delivered to the morgue.

As subsequently transpired, the deceased V. Shatskikh was actually not an assault trooper at all, but a USSR KGB worker, Lieutenant Viktor Viktorovich Shatskikh [with "i" and "s" separate Cyrillic letters], rather than Shatskikh [with "ts" a single Cyrillic letter], who had been sent to Vilnius as a member of a small group with the purpose, according to a communique from the public communications center of the State Security Committee, "within the confines of its competency to render assistance in stabilizing the situation in the city."

And, finally, one last thing. This is not the first time that 5.45-mm bullets have surfaced in documents prepared by experts. On 20 January 1990 they were "tested" in Baku, and on 2 November 1990 the same bullets were fired at the defenseless inhabitants of Dubossary. It is well known that these banned 5.45-mm bullets are still being "stamped out" by a plant in Volzhsk [or a plant in the Volga area].

Anonymous Committee

TASS:

"After 1740 hours on 11 January 1991, an announcement was made in Vilnius concerning the formation of the national salvation committee. That organization has taken on the concern for the future of Lithuanian SSR. In order to provide for the safety of the committee members and leaders, their names were not given."

History knows a rather large number of paradoxes, but the instance with the national salvation committee will probably become part of the annals of history. In the sense that that organization, having announced, outside the law, the legally elected parliament and the government of the Lithuanian Republic and having assumed the concern for Lithuania's future, has not yet legalized its own activity and has not yet named its own composition, if only partially. For several days, the only legal member of that very secret organization was thought to be Yu. Yermalavichyus, a worker in the Lithuanian CP Central Committee. It was precisely from him that the entire world learned of the creation on 11 January of the national salvation committee. On 17 January Yu. Yermalavichyus "in secret" reported to journalists that "for the first time at a private apartment in Vilnius" he had met the committee chairman and members. Once again he refused to give the name of the committee leadership, but he said that its makeup included laborers, peasants, members of the creative intelligentsia, and employees, primarily Lithuanians. "I shall not give any names, since their lives are in danger," he concluded.

Journalists were also shown another document. In it the responsibility for people's death is shifted to the leadership of the Lithuanian Republic. The national salvation committee calls for the punishing of everyone guilty of the "bloody tragedy in Vilnius." The committee also decreed the "dissolution of the department for the protection of the territory and the state security of Lithuania" and demanded the initiation of criminal cases against the leaders of those departments.

But there also exists another curious document—an interview with Comrade Yu. Yermalavichyus himself in the 17 January 1991 issue of the Lithuanian newspaper *TIYESA*. In that interview the representative of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee emphasizes several times that he is not only the chairman, but also a member of the anonymous committee. Yu. Yermalavichyus rejects all attempts to link his name with the activity of the KNS [national salvation committee], calling it "vicious disinformation."

The circle has closed. The only person known to the public as being linked with the activity of the underground members of the committee has disavowed them. But how could the politically sophisticated state figures, on the run, immediately believe in the existence of the mysterious committee, and immediately respond to its appeal to bestow power on them? Who are these people, if Professor Yu. Yermalavichyus, representative of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee, met with them for the first time on 17 January, that is, four days after the bloody carnage?

Latvian Views on Upcoming Referendum

91UN09484 Moscow *SELSKAYA ZHIZN* in Russian
22 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent A. Timkov: "At a Political Crossroads: About the Referendum"]

[Text] Latvian Republic—The inhabitants of Latvia are already accustomed to efforts at clarifying public opinion. Various organizations and parties have been resorting to this the past two or three years for a variety of reasons. A massive collection of signatures in support of the concept of independence has been effected. Actions opposed to the conclusion of a Union treaty have today become still greater in scope. And there is no end to the rallies and demonstrations at which resolutions have been adopted in the name of the people, regardless of the number of participants—now in support of the parliament and the government, now opposed. We have even seen proclamation of the resignation of the present authorities and declaration of the formation of a new government cabinet.

In short, political forces currently operating in the republic have turned out an adequate arsenal of methods providing support for programs being conducted. When through the haze of polemic speech it is proposed to one opponent or another—from the Latvian People's Front or their parliamentarians, let us say, who have adopted a declaration on the restoration of state independence—that we rely not on some mythical will of the people, but on a referendum, the reply given is that Latvia allegedly did not join the USSR voluntarily, therefore there is no basis for instituting a referendum with respect to its leaving. Now that the USSR Law on Referendum is known and a date scheduled for its conduct, we can expect that the position of the People's Front will

undergo some changes. Especially since some Western politicians, in France in particular, believe that without a universal referendum it will be difficult for them to take any kind of specific steps towards Latvia or support its striving to be recognized as an independent state. However, leaders of the influential sociopolitical organization do not yet wish to dismount from their previously saddled horse. Latvian People's Front Chairman R. Razukas stated unambiguously that there should not be any referendum in Latvia.

What is behind this statement? Let us try to delve into it. After the People's Front demonstrated its ability to bring out to the barricades thousands of republic inhabitants at the necessary moment, we may rightfully conclude that the odds in its favor had increased. Moreover, the mass media relentlessly instilled in the population the idea that not only Latvians, but representatives of other nationalities as well, showed the desire to defend a legal parliament and legal government. And it would seem that, insofar as public opinion was entirely on the side of the People's Front, what reason would there be to make an issue of it and reject a referendum?

Everything is not that simple here. The two-week state of siege in Riga more closely resembled a well-planned show furnished with real decor. It ended without the applause or expressed delight of the public. We may therefore say with a certain likelihood that it had the opposite effect. Latvians, an economy-minded, thrifty people, certainly weighed the cost of confrontation. From whose rations were the foodstuffs diverted, the kind that is hard to come by even if you have coupons? How much fuel was wasted for nothing? What damage was done to the republic economy and people's well-being?

Another interpretation is possible of the rejection of referendum by the Latvian People's Front. J. Jurkans, Latvian minister of foreign affairs, and parliamentarians have grown accustomed to making long visits to the West and abroad. The aim—to evoke sympathy from members of governments and congressmen of other countries, to enlist support and raise the Baltic issue to an international scale. Most importantly—to get foreign states to exert economic pressure on the USSR and force it to "release" Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to free sailing. And this without knowing the opinion of the people!

Simultaneously with the Western variant, an Eastern scenario is being actively developed for attaining independence and converting Latvia into an independent state. And it should be stated for objectivity's sake that the first step here was taken by the Russian leader. He is not disturbed by the fact that the Russian-speaking Baltic population assesses the agreements signed as a betrayal.

Apparently, Latvian politicians fighting for secession from the USSR are thinking, not without justification, that they will be able to realize their final aims through a favorable situation outside the republic. Otherwise, how

does one explain the groundless prolongation of adoption of the law on citizenship? From drafts published in the press, the majority of the Russian-speaking population should be content just with the status of permanent resident. Do we have to state what confusion has been imbued in people's hearts?! The number of persons desiring to change residence from Riga to other cities of the country has increased four-fold. The republic Supreme Soviet could introduce calm in the space of a day, as they say. But evidently the parliamentarians are thinking otherwise.

Moreover, the Citizens' Congress, which has definite support in the Supreme Soviet, has begun issuing identification papers for citizens. These papers are obtained only by inhabitants of prewar Latvia and their descendants. In the view of the leaders of this organization, which was declared illegal by the previous Supreme Soviet, a sort of referendum has begun, during the course of which people will assert what kind of Latvia they would like to see. The Citizens' Congress, too, refuses to participate in a universal referendum.

Not all parliamentarians share the categorical demands of these zealots of a "Latvian Latvia," the Citizens' Congress. Then why don't they dissociate themselves from these demands? Let me state my theories. They understand that contradictions in the ranks of the fighters "for an independent Latvia" will consolidate the positions of adherents of the federation, who want to see the republic in a renewed Union. From this springs the compromise with the illegal Citizens' Congress.

Another reason can also be seen. The Congress has announced the return of plants, factories, and homes to their former owners or their heirs who have settled abroad. There is no need to prove how they will be straining at the leash to obtain possessions and multiply their capital. And so one must think—is it worth ruining relations with them?

And the opposition camp is not feeding any particular hopes on the coming referendum. The Communist Party, which has many times reproached its political enemies for operating without the support of popular opinion, does not today believe in objectivity or the true freely expressed will of republic inhabitants. In the words of A. Rubiks, leader of the Communists, radio and television are currently under the monopolistic control of the People's Front, and there is no cause to think that people could make an unpressured choice. Politicians with another point of view are either simply not permitted to take the microphone or enter the studio, or this is done when such a massive ideological conditioning has been conducted that people unsophisticated in the laws of social development are simply not capable of distinguishing between the lie and the truth.

A. Gorbunovs, chairman of the Republic Supreme Soviet, states all the same that a referendum must be

conducted. His only stipulation is that a determination be made on how to assess the results of voting by military servicemen.

And so this is the political mosaic we see taking shape in Latvia prior to the referendum. Those observers are correct who observe that an uncompromising struggle for power is under way in the republic. But one cannot reject the premise of those who see an interethnic aspect here. This is confirmed in the predominantly single-nationality governmental cabinet, the fairly severe law on state language—declared to be Latvian, and a number of other enactments. But it should be taken into account that people, regardless of their nationality, are tired of the tension, the situation of nerves, the diarchy. Would they not prefer a bad peace to a good fight? Making predictions is a thankless task. But a fact remains a fact—a person feels unprotected when there is a war of legislation and the law is almost inoperative.

Discrimination Against Non-Lithuanians

91UN0879B Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 6, Feb 91 p 8

[Article by V. Bikulcius, political commentator for the newspaper LITVA SOVETSKAYA and candidate of historical sciences, under the rubric: "Events, Facts, and Commentary": "Declarations and Reality"]

[Text] Many people have been to Lithuania, either in passing or for a long stay. Over the years positive stereotypes of Lithuania have arisen for the most part: A region of amber, hardworking peasants, E. Mezhelaitis' poem "Man," which at one time broke through the wall of official scorn for human values, the "mysterious" Banionis, the Polish Roman Catholic Church of St. Anna, which Napoleon supposedly wanted to move to Paris, and hospitable masters who know how to receive and show their very best. But "that" Lithuania no longer exists. Just as "that" Moscow no longer exists, and "those" Ukraine, Georgia, Moldavia, Leningrad...

The amber, however, remains in Lithuania, and the militia has returned the exhibits that were recently stolen from the Museum of Amber in Palang. But the plan for the theft was initially ascribed to some "Polish speculators," which gave rise to resentment among the local Poles. The hardworking peasants are prepared to "war" on the cities, resentful of the breakdown in technical support to the countryside. And the gray-haired poet is silent...

D. Banionis, the fearless chekist in "The Dead Season" and the chairman murdered by bandits in "No One Wanted To Kill," believes that he was forced to act in Soviet films. The Polish Roman Catholic Church of St. Anna is still in its place, but it is not Napoleon that threatens the ancient masterpiece of Vilnius. As previously, the city mayoralty is expected to receive 60 million foreign currency rubles from the hated capital of the "decaying empire." There are no other funds for the regeneration of Vilnius.

The hospitable masters have become very selective in their displays of cordiality. Politicians and journalists, writers and scholars are very aware of whom to meet and whom to turn away empty-handed. The criteria are what and how they speak about Lithuania

"The reverse side of ethnic arrogance is a subconscious feeling of ethnic inferiority." "Nationalism is always aggressive. It wishes for and finds an enemy and, if there are idealists in a nationalist movement, sooner or later they will be swept aside by their more militant rivals." The names of the writers B. Vasilyev and F. Iskander, to whom these words belong, are among the 116 names of cultural figures who signed the appeal "Voice of the Intelligentsia" in connection with the events of 13 January in Vilnius. The opinion of each of the intelligentsia—from the academician to the schoolteacher and skilled worker and peasant—on the rightness of a newspaper headline will be determined by how one feels in his own heart. But "Perestroyka Is Gunned Down in Vilnius on the Night of 13 January?" "Dictatorship Is Drawing Near?" "The Legal Parliaments and Governments" of the Baltic republics, "Elected by the People," are "Defenseless?" Drive to Lithuania, all 116 of you, and not to festivals and songfests, not to celebrations and movie sets as you are accustomed to doing. I will show you the building of the television center where innocent victims died, thrown there by a "defenseless" government and parliament under the slogan "a state of war with the USSR" in a condition of euphoric conviction that everything in Lithuania should only be Lithuanian and that no one else's rights, laws, and interests have any force here. I will show you the place where a lieutenant who was bearing a flag of truce was struck down by the first shot heard. It was a shot in the back fired by "his own people," as the "defenseless" mass media assert. I will show you the entrance to the "legal" parliament where members of Interfront arriving for negotiations were scalded with boiling water from fire hoses. I will lead you around the rayons where they put crosses on the doors of dissenters. Communists are forced to burn their party cards, servicemen are beaten up, and they shoot at military vehicles. Tens of thousands of demonstrators, organized and with all the conveniences and food, are bused in from out-of-the-way places to the building of the parliament where they completely drown out the rallies of dissenters taking place alongside by chanting the slogan "Letuva" and singing, also in an organized fashion.

The local professors will not tell you how, with the help of Western methods, they have gerrymandered the borders of the electoral precincts (a few more Lithuanians, a few more agricultural residents and old people) for elections to the "legally elected" parliament. You will only hear about it behind closed doors in hushed voices from "foreign-speaking" old men—how agitators patrolled the apartments and how doctors in the hospitals asked you whom you would be voting for. If you wish, you can stop in at the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Citizen's Committee, where not one

"radical democrat" or "interregional" has yet wished to set foot. There they will show you the requests of more than 40,000 Soviet citizens of Lithuania concerning how and where to leave the republic...

One understands the grief of the 116 over the blood that has been spilled. However, one must take into account why the bullets whistled and why people found themselves under fire. Among the reasons for the tragedy one cannot help but see the unjust and hasty legislation that designated a significant part of the population to second-class status. This is why committees and other forms of opposition arose in defense of basic human rights. Is it really so difficult to see this situation from Moscow?

Together with you we respect the memory of those who died on that January night, and we will lay flowers there where the blood was spilled. But I cannot tell you of the direct causes of the tragedy inasmuch as the "nationalist" procuracy refuses to cooperate with the procuracy of an "alien state." I understand the deeper reasons. I cannot show you the burial place of those thousands of veterans of war and labor who were prematurely brought to their death by the names "occupiers" and "emigres," and I cannot name for you all the addresses of those unjustly fired from the jobs, discriminated against for political and ethnic reasons. There are too many of them...

On 9 February, the leaders of Lithuania intend to conduct a referendum on the absolute sovereignty of Lithuania. Only those can vote who are citizens of the Republic of Lithuania and those who have the right to such citizenship and wish to make use of it. This means another schism along ethnic and political lines, another attempt to simulate "legality."

This is proof that it is not only and not so much the actions of the Soviet military and the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] that allow Lithuania to remain on the verge of civil war. The realism that is inherent in the majority of Lithuanians, the remnants of the long-standing international traditions of our region, the deep common interests, and the constructive steps of the Union leadership may yet unite people and restore in them respect for political and spiritual culture and the culture of interpersonal relations. The activities of the Lithuanian Communist Party, defamed by local and outside anti-Soviets, and of its numerous supporters are surrounded by the wall of an information blockade in the republic and in the country. That is the subject of another essay. But it is not our destiny to go underground.

Estonian Law on Professional Bilingualism

91UN0957A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 1 Feb 91 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Statement from the Estonian People's Front"]

[Text] Two years have passed since the law on language was adopted. From 1 February those of its provisions

that require professional bilingualism for many categories of workers will come into force. In this connection the Estonian People's Front is issuing the following statement to the population of Estonia.

The struggle to pass the law on language was a manifestation of the desire of the Estonian people to restore their national dignity and an impetus that would include the processes of the renewal of society. The struggle against phosphate mining was a struggle for the physical survival of the people of Estonia; the struggle for the Estonian language is a struggle for spiritual survival.

During the two years that have elapsed since the law was passed the prestige of the Estonian language has been significantly enhanced and it is now the working language of the republic's government and of most local organs of self-government, and also the language of our legislation. Interest in studying the Estonian language has also grown immeasurably among the foreign-speaking population in the republic.

At the same time it should be noted that the republic government and interested authorities have by no means done everything to consolidate the position of the Estonian language as the official language in all the most important spheres of public life, or to create favorable opportunities to study it. The state service that insures the extensive introduction of the official language in everyday practice, and the just created Estonian Center for Languages are working without the proper effectiveness. It is necessary to abandon illusions that the Estonians themselves will demonstrate a calm and restrained example of the preservation and rebirth of the position of the Estonian language. In many fields of life the proper authorities have made not the slightest effort to introduce the Estonian language (for example, in movie distribution). The Estonian People's Front calls upon its fellow countrymen to help, in a calm and dignified manner, the Estonian language function everywhere it is necessary and as provided for by law.

There are grounds for fearing that the periods for the introduction of the provisions of the law may be used for the purpose of bureaucratic restrictions and for misunderstandings, as steps of a provocative nature. The Estonian People's Front appeals for sensible and responsible actions as the law is introduced.

The date of 1 February should not become a pretext for provocations and insults, and should not give rise to alarm and opposition in people. Let us display good will, at least in matters of language. The voluntary nature of language examinations will help our non-Estonian colleagues demonstrate their respectful attitude toward the laws of Estonia. Rejection of the requirements with respect to the compulsory nature of the examinations and postponement of the examinations could become a gesture of good will that Estonians could use to show that passing a law on language is not some intrigue by the bureaucracy but first and foremost a profoundly human question.

Rebirth of the prestige of the Estonian language in Estonia is possible only through mutual understanding.

Tallinn, 30 January 1991.

RSFSR

Kuzbass Political, Economic Situation Described

91UN0926A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 20 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by Ye. Losoto, special correspondent: "The Kuzbass: It Is Cold, Hungry, and Calm: Some Thoughts on the Workers' Movement"]

[Text] It is boring in the Kuzbass, simply boring—and we could simply put an end to it by this statement. But, you know, rumors have been spread to the effect that this is the center of the workers' movement, the "center of Russian anticommunism," the center of something else, something unknown, something being controlled "from a protuberance or tumor."

Somebody who fears the workers' movement and does not understand it ascribes to it the traits of an "unclean" force or power. How much time does it take to lose touch with people? To lose the idea that they are such and such there, that they are people from the lower social strata?

A year and a half is sufficient.

A year and a half ago the leaders of the workers' movement—after arising from the depths of the people themselves and having been borne on high, elevated by the first miners' strike—became graphically convinced that they had lost touch with the people. It could not have been more graphic. The miners did not respond to their call to begin an open-ended political strike. To put it simply and a bit crudely, they yawned and turned away.

The oblast-level workers' committee was shocked when telegrams from the workers' collectives began to come in with sharp protests rather than expressing support. And then the workers' collectives began to recall their own candidates, the persons whom they themselves had nominated. That was the real knockout. There is only one unrecalled person in the city-level committee, while the oblast-level committee has two. And it is a question as to how long they will hold out. A day, a week, a month? It is an utter failure. It was hard for them to admit it, but they did: We failed. It took just a year and a half to lose touch with the people.

I do not wish to cast shame or disgrace upon the leaders of the workers' movement; I do not even want to cite their names. Whatever the case may be, the workers' movement is not something alien to me: I consider

myself to be a proletarian too; it is just that I do mental work. And I hope that, in liberating themselves, these hard workers will also liberate me at the same time.

But just what demands were proposed for the open-ended political strike? That the President should retire and the troops be withdrawn from Lithuania, i.e., the demands repeated the speech which had been made shortly prior to this by Russia's "first person." The workers' committee has an "agreement on intentions" which it signed together with him last year. That is to say, the workers' committee was acting in accordance with the best rules and regulations of international pacts, allied forces, opposition blocs, etc.

However, the people, as I have already stated, yawned and turned away, and the leaders of the workers' movement acknowledged that they had lost touch with the people.

The following reports then came in: The very same thing had happened in Vorkuta and Inta.

None of the miners had any clear idea about what was taking place in Lithuania, and to this day they still do not know what it is all about. The information coming in is mutually exclusive. It is just as far from the Kuzbass to Lithuania as it is to Korea. The information about the "persecution and badgering of Russians in Lithuania" had a powerfully retarding effect on people here in the Kuzbass.

Somebody had hoped that the events in Lithuania would whip up or urge on the workers' movement. But just the opposite occurred.

Does that mean that the people support another crew or team? No, it does not mean that. They do not support one or the other. Both "teams" are "terribly far from the people." The people have been "burned" twice: at first they supported a certain group—and, as a result of this, things became worse than they had been; then they supported another group—and things got even worse. Nowadays it is senseless to call upon them for help.

All of you came from the people; how are you to return to it?

One of my acquaintances who is a party apparatchik told me the following story. When people were singing "The Internationale" at a meeting, the persons in the auditorium and those in the presidium, while looking at each other, were singing the same words—"And parasites never!"—but they were imparting different contents to these words.

It is entirely probable that a person who thinks in the categories of international law (or who supposes that he thinks in them) wants something good rather than bad when he raises or urges people to strike. He has the psychology of a politician, that of the person on the presidium. The presidium's period or term of service is not just a year and a half, but rather an entire life.

A miner has a different psychology. For him to go out on an open-ended strike in wintertime means to place himself outside the society and outside the people. It is just the same as if a peasant were to go out on strike in autumn, or an obstetrician at the very moment when the prospective mother was giving birth. Perhaps such a person would be a fine politician, and the moment chosen would seem successful to him. But the people would tear him apart at the exit from the maternity ward.

Attention must be paid to the miners' serious and painful reaction to the malicious slander that they had, supposedly, deprived the entire country of warmth by "swiping the blanket" for themselves. There is no hunger in the Kuzbass, but just try to explain that to the inhabitants of other regions! At a certain point in time the miners stopped the transport workers, chemists, and metallurgical workers, who had intended to go out on strike after them and to include their demands in their own. The miners told them: It's enough that we are on strike. They are the children of their own people and will not allow themselves to freeze all Russia just because someone or other has taken it into his head to replace the president. They exist in order to provide warmth rather than to freeze people.

Occupational psychology in general is an extremely powerful motive in people's behavior. Our leaders at all levels do not have the slightest idea about this, and, therefore, what they think motivates people is virtually always erroneous and insulting.

In the present instance it looks like this. Certain persons consider that someone is "twisting" the miners and "egging them on." Others explain the failure of the strike as follows: "They are playing games with us again." It is as if the miners comprised a herd of sheep, and the shepherds were fighting among themselves as to whom the herd belonged. Of course, every person experiences the most diverse influences; but he is not a sheep to be driven wherever someone wants him to go.

"The workers' movement"—it can, of course be called that, but only "in advance." Its first phase, in which it is still bogged down and has not moved further along, has been the revolt in the "zone"—that is what I would call it. Yes, people were happy; everybody recalls that. A year and a half ago, stopping their work and pouring out onto the square, people were happy, and their faces shone.

People here are primarily either exiles convicted under various articles of the law or the children of exile-convicts. Some of the latter were dispossessed kulaks, some were repressed persons, others were forcibly resettled here, while still others served time for various matters. People did not used to come here to live voluntarily. Perhaps that is one immediate explanation for the notable difference between the Kuzbass and Vorkuta. Because, after all, some volunteers are drawn to the Far North. Moreover, they are strong, self-confident

persons. And, of course, that is also a mining region, also a place of convict labor and exile, also "at the world's end." but...the Kuzbass is different. It will hardly be drawn or attracted to the role of standard-bearer or flagship of the workers' movement. To the most powerful, spontaneous revolt—possibly. But to be the leader of the workers' movement—I doubt it. And, you know, most people consider that this is so.

Then why did they pour out onto the square at that time? They shouted: "Give us something, Gorbachev! Give us something, Ryzhkov!," i.e., they wanted to be given a somewhat larger "share of the pie." And another thing. They wanted a stop to be made of treating them like cattle. It was a classical revolt in the "zone." There was likewise happiness that they had conquered their fear; they had driven it away—and this was also part of the formula.

There is neither reproach nor malice in these lines. In all probability, the workers' movement could not have begun in any other forms. But it was taken up only by other mining regions (other analogous "zones"). After Stalin's death revolt rolled through all the GULAGs, but, of course, nobody called it a "workers' movement." Nowadays there are some mixed forms, and the distinctions have been slurred over.

I directly posed the following question to one intelligent and sensible interviewee:

"Well now, is this really a workers' movement or not?"

"No," he said.

"Why is that?" I asked.

He explained it as follows: "ideologists" appeared immediately, local social scientists who formulated the "political demands" of the miners—demands which were as similar as two drops of water to the program of the central authorities. And together they failed utterly. Then they changed course and formulated "political demands" which were as similar as two drops of water to the program of the new, republic-level authorities. We know very well what the result has been. And now they say: the workers' movement is either in decline or has completely failed.

The miners inadvertently gave a boost to the bright kids who jumped into the posts of deputies at all levels from the "workers' committee." Many of them have already succeeded in turning away from and breaking with the workers. And one of them even made—to use the language of the "stagnant period"—a "contribution to the treasure-house" of progressive theoretical thought, when he uttered the following statement immediately after the election:

"I have had enough," he said, "of the dictatorship of the proletariat! Now we will have a dictatorship of the intelligentsia."

At the time of the strike the party apparatus took the incorrect position of prohibiting the communists from taking part in it. When they came to their senses, it was already too late. At first, half the people on the workers' committee were communists; later there was not a single one left; they had all turned in their party cards. And now a worker has turned in both his party card and his deputy's certificate. These are already the new trends, even the newest ones.

Sweeping away the old "apparatchiks," new people have rolled in on the wave of the miners' revolt. Their pre-election program was as follows: We will throw 12 million tons of coal for barter on the foreign market, and we will fill up the Kuzbass with goods and products. The people elected them.

It must be assumed that these "people's elected representatives" knew that the capacities of all our ports for transshipping solid fuel amount to 31.2 million tons for the entire country. The state requisition comprises 32 million tons. The government granted permission to ship out for barter another 12 million tons (for all the coal-mining regions). But, so that the Kuzbass would not shake its head and break loose, the government also gave it permission to ship out yet another 12 million tons. After the state requisition had been fulfilled, of course.

That is, the documents were "adjusted." The remainder was too small: this was technically impossible to carry out. And all the specialists knew about this.

The election campaign proceeded apace: posters were pasted up, and passions boiled. "12 million! 12 million!" The people were participating directly in politics; they themselves were deciding their own destiny. They were voting for their own, the people's elected representatives.

The nearest port is Vostochnyy (Nakhodka), which has a capacity of 6.2 million tons, whereas it has been assigned a state requisition amounting to 9.5 million tons.

"Well now," I said, "why was it that the specialists remained silent on this matter. Why did not these very same 'people's elected representatives' straighten things out and put them in order?"

My interviewee shrugged his shoulders and remained silent, as if to say "You yourself can guess the answer." I myself have figured it out this way: For the specialists the pre-election struggle was like a succession of light-bulbs burning out. At one time certain specialists were lying, today others are lying, tomorrow a third group will be lying. This is completely understandable to me; nevertheless, facts are facts. None of the persons in the know became indignant that this entire region was being led by the nose.

Many people say the following: During the time of perestroika people have grown wiser; they have begun to think in broader terms. Perhaps that is so. They are thinking so broadly that they will undertake whatever

they please without any sort of preparation. That is how much wiser they have grown.

...And the people became calm when they saw that the harvest remained under the snow. The land here is good; there is even some chernozem, i.e., dark, rich soil, and the population in the Kuzbass is considerable. But it turned out that there was nobody to harvest the crops. All through the autumn the new authorities had preached the new, mutual relations between the city and the village: the rural people, they said, should do everything themselves. That was supposed to be something good and progressive. In order to help progress, the city stopped furnishing the rural areas with transportation. And the imaginary harvest has disappeared under the snow. Some people from Voronezh came here to obtain coal. The Kuzbass said to them: We will give you some coal if you will give us some sugar. But our guests hesitated: They also have an "imaginary" harvest under the snow. The sugar mills are standing idle; there is no raw material for them to process. In the autumn the authorities were too busy "dividing things up" to see to the sugar beets. Maybe they will succeed in pulling the sugar beets out from under the snow, and maybe not. In Krylov's fable "The Grasshopper and the Ant" only the figure of the grasshopper is vital and lifelike. But the ant turned out to be unartistic and unlikable; he has not been corroborated by our realities.

As a result, the miner now receives that share per month which he needs per shift. By himself he manually carries from one place to another posts weighing 97 kg each; that is his usual work. And so he needs to be restored after such work! A miner receives coupons for an assortment of products which would not be enough even for a child, much less for him. But in the marketplace potatoes cost nine rubles per kg. And meat, as you know, is even more expensive. One senses that hunger is increasing everywhere. When I used to eat my midday meal in the ispolkom cafeteria, I would jot down things like the following in my notebook: No bread for the midday meal, even though it is the peak time for this meal, i.e., 1330 hours. There has been no sugar all week in the hotel's snack-bar. There is tea, if you please, but without sugar. If you begin to say something about this, people look at you as if you had dropped down from the Moon.

"What is the matter with you? Don't you know that there is no sugar anywhere?"

Yes, I know. I know even in specific terms: Your traditional supplier—Voronezh Oblast—has 70 percent of its sugar mills standing idle. It is simply hard to get that into one's head.

Together with V.A. Bryndin, a specialist on foreign economic ties from the Kuzbassugolsbyt Association, I gave some thought to what was happening in the coal sector and throughout the country in general. Coal is, after all, the foundation of our entire life.

In order to trade more actively with other countries, especially through the port of Vostochnyy, we must modernize the railroad, which was built prior to World War I (!), and modernize the bridge across the Amur River—a bridge which was also built before the Revolution. It is estimated that all these projects will cost a total of one billion, 300 million rubles. Who is to pay? And who is to do this work?

Foreign firms wish to participate, but if they invest their own capital, they will become shareholders and will obtain profits forever. That is, a portion of our coal, being mined at such a price (the average miner lives for 52-53 years, and the entire region breathes coal dust) will forever belong to foreigners for the simple reason that they invested their money at a convenient time. That is the so-called "honest business," as legitimized throughout the world vis-a-vis the backward areas. The advanced countries do not engage in dirty work—that is the lot of the backward ones. The advanced countries engage in business.

However, our producers (i.e., the mines), operating with all their truths and untruths, have been forced to go abroad for barter arrangements. Even though the necessary transshipment capacities are lacking, somehow they are crafty enough to accomplish this (simply put, to the detriment of the state: if they ship coal abroad for barter—that means that the state requisition gets stuck).

The foreign consignee got his bearings rather quickly. If the producer unrestrainedly and passionately wants to sell his goods, the goods fall in price. That is the legitimate principle. Our "independent" mines drove coal prices down on the world market. Now each ton is two dollars cheaper, and, of course, the calculation is made for millions of tons. Not only is our own Kuzbass coal cheaper, but so too is that of our neighbors and the state itself. And coal from the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America as well. Everybody was made happy. But it is almost in vain to "clean out" raw materials in such a way. The lower the prices on raw materials—the higher the profits, but not ours.

My interviewee thinks as follows:

If the fulfillment of the state requisition were to be placed under monitoring controls, then nothing at all would be shipped abroad for barter. Last year the Kuzbass failed to fulfill its plan: it fell 2.7 million tons short in the coal which it mined. And the sector as a whole experienced an extremely deep decline: 7.3 million tons. This year the reduction is continuing: the rate of decline is high. We are already shipping a portion of our coal normally used for electric-power production to metallurgical plants, where it will be utilized as coaking coal, i.e., coke. Such coal has a lower calorific value and an inferior quality. Therefore, the quality of the metal will be worse, and it will become lower. Furthermore, the expenditure of coke is being increased.

That is, the coal sector has begun to go downhill like the entire national economy. I asked whether this had happened before and, if so, how long did it last. Yes, it had. At the end of the 1970's there was a decline in production, albeit not so severe. When a decline begins, it takes three or four years just to stop it; then another three or four years are needed to stabilize the situation; and only then does growth begin to occur. This year we will decline further, and if we are able to stop the decline, then about five years will be required merely for stabilization (i.e., five years of remaining at the level to which we have declined), and only then will growth begin.

Our lugubrious calculations boiled down to the following: We want to live better, but there are objective laws of development. In accordance with these laws, the country will need about 10 years just to return to that level at which everything began. And there is much to be desired.

What is it which serves as currency in the Kuzbass? Is it dollars, marks, vodka? No, you have not guessed the answer. What has become currency here are the coupons for imported consumer goods—coupons which are obtained by barter.

Marching in the vanguard are the "drunken mines." It is hardly necessary to explain that they are the last bastion of persons who have been driven out of every other place for abuses or malfeasances. Inefficient and backward, they have taken upon themselves the name "Gortop" [City Fuel], and their coal goes to provide heat for the city [i.e., Kemerovo]. They have subordinated themselves not to the powerful Union-level Ministry of the Coal Industry, but rather to the weaker RSFSR Ministry of the Fuel Industry. Seizing upon the moment when the reformers went on the offensive, the "drunken mines" broke loose and converted to a leasing arrangement.

Aside from the ministry and having fulfilled their state requisition, these mines went into the foreign market; they have shipped coal to Malta and to Japan. How this looks on a country-wide or world-wide scale has already been stated, but for the miners themselves it seems very attractive indeed. The ruble is valued at a rate which is four times higher (at 80 kopecks, whereas for others it is valued at 20 kopecks). Having obtained the coupons, a person can buy refrigerators, sewing machines, and consumer goods. Let me inform the women about a secret: there are coupons there for llama coats and bras. These mines have not gone out on strike.

Wages here are 200 rubles a month higher than at other mines. How did this come about? They have obtained an accounting price of 28 rubles for their coal, while the other mines obtain 15-17 rubles. And the state subsidy for the entire Kuzbass amounts to a total of three billion rubles. Therefore, it is to the detriment of their neighbors, but to their own benefit.

I do not say these things by way of reproach, but rather to explain the matter at hand. The average wage for a miner in the Kuzbass amounts to 370-400 rubles a month, plus 30 percent as a regional coefficient. Prior to the strike this was 15 percent. Of course, that is too little for such work, especially if we bear in mind that currency here is not money, but rather coupons. And the latter cannot be sold; you can either squander them on drink or throw them away. What the miners do primarily is to spend them on drink. I have not heard of anyone throwing them away.

The lease-type collectives have introduced the entire city to temptation: they have evoked envy, speculation in coupons and goods, as well as other accompanying phenomena.

I do not know what a good freedom should be like. Not a ridiculous one, but a good one. Nor am I convinced that the regime of coupons is better than the old regime.

In order to get an interview started, I would frequently ask people somewhat idle or seemingly frivolous types of questions, for example:

"Between what and what is the main contradiction nowadays?"

"Between labor and capital," one interviewee replied.

"And who has the power now, do you think?"

Here are some answers from the Workers' Committee:

"The communists."

"It is hard to say; I cannot choose."

"Nobody has power; it's a kind of anarchy."

"The CPSU."

I asked the same question in the CPSU Obkom, and here are some of their answers:

"The economic managers. The party's power has already been smashed to bits."

I posed the same question to the economic managers and received the following answer:

"We are beseeching the city soviet to take the power from us, but they will not do it. Previously, I, as a mine director, used to be invited to the gorkom every week, but nowadays I have not been called to the city soviet even once in eight months."

Nevertheless, it is the economic managers who do have the power. They have the funds, the money, the coupons, and all the levers with which to influence the workers. One such manager is building a brickyard—that means that he is going to start up housing construction. Another is waiting for state funds. And in everything else the situation is the same. That is, the pieces of power have

been stretched and extended from the top story to the middle ones. But we cannot yet speak of any power belong to the working people; they do not yet have even a whiff of it. The workers do not yet have the organizational structures for this; they lack goals, programs, and leaders.

RSFSR Medical Personnel Planning Strike

91US0288A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 8 Feb 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by M. Chernyshov: "But What About the Hippocratic Oath?—Russian Doctors Prepare to Go on Strike"]

[Text] The situation with medicine, as is well-known, is poor throughout the entire country, but the Russian Federation clearly stands out among the rest of the republics. The condition of Russian health care today is characterized by one single word—breakdown.

In the medical "table of ranks," Russia occupies the lowest lines in such indicators as average life span of men and women. And, in contrast, it numbers among the leaders in infant mortality and trauma. Moreover, it is beginning to move up to a "forward position" even in areas that never played a noticeable role in Russian daily life such as, for example, drug addiction.

Let us consider these figures: Three-quarters of the Russian schoolboys cannot be categorized as healthy children. What is the reason for this? Underlying this is unbalanced nourishment, poor housing, and poorly heated schools...

But what about the health care workers themselves? More than 300,000 doctors, as statistics indicate, work under unfavorable conditions, and about 160,000 are in need of housing. Wages in the industry are 43 percent lower than the average in the national economy, and it constitutes 178 rubles. And this is after new wage conditions were introduced last year that were stipulated by the Council of Ministers by a resolution of 1986.

Someone at one time proposed the thesis that health care is not a production sphere, inasmuch as it does not participate in the creation of national income. The thesis is countered with the simplest examples. Let us say that a flu epidemic put several hundred workers out of commission at some automobile plant. It is easy to calculate the number of unassembled automobiles that will be the result. If timely prophylactic measures are introduced that do not permit influenza at the plant and ensure the normal working of the assembly line, this will be exactly the specific contribution of medicine to the national income in this case.

Last year, as statistics show, the provision of the population of the RSFSR with hospital and outpatient clinical establishments, doctors, and middle level medical personnel increased somewhat. However, the material-technical base of health care establishments remains very

weak, especially in rural localities. As never before, the problem of providing Russian health care with medicinal means has become acute... Anton Pavlovich Chekhov, writing in his time about the difficulties with medicine in the districts, told about the fact that doctors, because of a lack of medicines, prescribed simple chalk for impoverished patients: There is no harm, and it sometimes helps in a purely psychological sense. But now, there is even a shortage of this chalk. In general and on the whole, today's medical system is supplied with only 20 percent of the required medicines, and to put it more simply—there is enough medicine for one out of five patients.

Here are more figures: Loss of work time because of temporary work incapacity last year in the republic was about 700 million man-days; that is, an average of 10 days per person...

And what kinds of sicknesses were these? Common colds, radiculitis, traumas... Who gets sick more than anyone else? Miners, motor vehicle and tractor builders, textile workers...

It is under these conditions among the workers of Russian health care that the idea of a strike came up and is growing stronger and stronger. The centers of dissatisfaction arose in different places, and, in particular, in the city of Zelenograd near Moscow. Medical doctors there demanded the abolition of compulsory free duty and double pay for work on Sunday. When these demands were analyzed, it was found that there already is an appropriate decree on this score going back to 1986, but that at that time the "old" trade unions tried to see that it remained on paper. In a situation of rally democracy in Zelenograd, it was decided not to wait for benefits from the center, but to double the wages of medical personnel at the expense of the local budget. The decision was approved, but the wages, actually, were not raised. And, indeed, where in fact will the municipal budget get the resources?

Somewhat later, the Russian Council of Ministers was instructed in a 10-day period to prepare a decree on urgent measures to improve matters in health care in the 1990-1991 period. There was discussion, in particular, about the purchase of medicines, instruments, and equipment... But the preparation of the decree has dragged on many months.

Today the demands of the workers of Russian health care who are preparing to strike have taken on a finished form. It comes down to the fact that no less than six percent of the gross national income will have to be allocated from the budget of the republic this year for health care needs. The strike committee also demands that the scope of wages of the workers of the industry be increased to the average for the national economy and that taxes on medical establishments and enterprises be lifted until such a period that the economy stabilizes.

Conditions were also drawn up concerning the creation of a system of "social buffers," prices for medicines, and so forth.

The Russian Council of Ministers, by adopting an appropriate decree on 17 January 1991, satisfied part of these demands. For example, additional paid days to annual leave and a 10-percent supplement to the position pay for certain categories of workers were established, the right of priority "assignment of living accommodations" was granted, and several other privileges were introduced.

Alas, this decision did not satisfy the strike committees.

"Today the Russian budget for health care needs," says A.V. Kuznetsov, the chairman of the Russian coordinating committee, "constitutes 18.6 billion rubles [R]. This money clearly will not be enough either to increase wages, or to compensate for those additional expenditures that hospitals bear in connection with an increase in prices for electricity, gas, and food products. To increase wages, and we believe that its average level should be R320, in our calculations, additional appropriations in the amount of R4.7 billion are required. For hospital needs, an additional R15 billion should be allocated. In sum, the budget should be twice as high as that which was approved. Of course, we understand that the Russian Government is hardly likely to find such money now. But something can be done at the expense of the republic budget, and something, at the expense of local resources..."

"I do not agree in principle with such a position," objects O.I. Belchenko, chairman of the Moscow strike committee. "Wages should be increased in much greater amounts. Moscow's budget on health care now is approved in the sum of R1.2 billion. It should be doubled."

Preparation for the strike is now in full swing. From 11 to 16 February, for example, it was decided to conduct so-called unity of action days everywhere: rallies and demonstrations. A preliminary strike is planned in Moscow on 14 February. It will last for two and a half hours, and, in the opinion of the strike committee, practically all medical establishments and enterprises will take part, except for ambulance and emergency assistance services. If a compromise is not found between the organs of authority and the strikers, an all-Russian strike is planned for 20 February.

"How will all of this happen?" asks O.I. Belchenko. "What will you do, turn off the oxygen for patients, stop the medicine droppers, and remove people from the operating tables?"

"No, of course not. We will give people emergency help. But we will refuse the reception of scheduled patients. On those days, we will not, for example, perform abortions and conduct laboratory research, analyses, X-rays..."

"Do you not think that people with means will find the money for a personal physician, medicine without a pharmacist, and an operation outside a striking hospital, and that the strike will hit most of all those who are in need of help and charity to the greatest extent?"

"We are tired of such demagoguery. We, doctors, are also people."

RSFSR's Silayev on Financing Culture

91UN0885A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 6, 9 Feb 91 p 3

[Interview with Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers Ivan Silayev, by O. Pivovarov; place and date not given: "To Borrow Ideas From Life Itself"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

[Pivovarov] Now, finally, our defense budget figure—77 billion rubles [R]—has been made public. Some researchers believe that in reality it is higher. In particular, a publication in NEVA magazine issue No. 10 last year gives a figure of R300 billion. Is the conversion of the military budget possible? What are the prospects for reallocating these expenditures to the needs of culture, education, and health care?

[Silayev] This is a question of a different type. You see, I would not state that we should remove this budget category entirely. But I am in favor of energetic cuts in the armaments purchases. We have a lot of it. Especially in the critical situation we are in now.

However, there is the industry of the military-industrial complex, with its most powerful intellectual and economic potential. There are people who work there. Out of R46 billion that go, I think, into financing this branch, a considerable part goes for salaries. Let us say, this amount is cut by half. Who suffers? A man and his family. On top of that, we may face the situation that workers at some factories—which will not make a single tank or a plane this year—will have to be paid their salaries anyway, for nothing. They need a transition period to set up a different kind of production. As to reallocating military expenditures into culture, I think, we should take a different approach—the same as the West has long been using. There, contributions to culture, education, and health care are tax-free.

[Pivovarov] You mean reduced taxation?

[Silayev] No, I mean such contributions should be totally tax-free. Let us say somebody contributed a certain sum to the budget of the Bolshoi or Malyy theater, or a creative union; then he is not subject to taxation. This is profitable. If an entrepreneur makes a superprofit, he loses a large part of it: The tax will claim a considerable part of his income. In contrast, he, in a way, earns money on charitable activities. That is why it is so important for the defense enterprises to get on their feet as quickly as

possible and to start making good profit. Then they will start making their contributions to culture.

[Pivovarov] This is truly good news for the culture figures.

[Silayev] This is the principle of our policy. The whole world works like this. Yes, they have long had a market. The market lives by its own laws, which are sometimes harsh. But has the Milan La Scala theater been disadvantaged by this? Has it been sold at an auction? Nothing of the kind. It is flourishing now just as it has been flourishing before. Because, in addition to direct state investments—increased manifold with each coming year—it is necessary to create favorable conditions for those who are ready for charitable contributions. Our culture is in particular need for not only moral, but more substantial support as well. For instance, some health care had its own sponsors not too long time ago. Some directors of defense enterprises built good polyclinics and hospitals for their workers. But how many theaters were built? You can count them on your fingers. So far our main "support" for the culture is a dragged out, decades-long torturous repair and renovation of what our predecessors built in the last century or in the beginning of this one.

[Pivovarov] The beginning of the 20th century is called "the silver age" of Russian art. But society at that time had made a truly golden contribution to culture. Through the efforts of merchants, industrialists, and nobility, unique buildings for theaters, libraries, museums, and folk houses had been built. Can the Russian Government continue such an enlightened period?

[Silayev] We do not have a clearly defined strategic program. We have intentions. They are registered in our work plans and reflected in the budget. I think what is important here is not a "grandiose" design. We have had enough "projects of the century" in the past. They surely existed, but were they carried through? Therefore we need to search for a different approach. We should not wait for the design to be passed to us from above, but take the ideas from life itself. For that, perhaps, we need to change our relationship with creative unions, and through them change the cultural situation in the Russian cities for the better. The unions, in turn, could—while retaining their creative potential—become our public helpers; they could acquire new functions and come to feel themselves true builders of Russian culture. The general principle that is probably at work here is: The further away from the center, the more attention is needed. Right? Perhaps, it is not entirely along the lines of our conversation, but I want to mention the example of the Peasants' Union. We knew perfectly well that for the countryside's rebirth it would not be enough to have a law and good intentions: Money is needed. There was R1 billion allocated in the budget for this purpose. We could do it this way: Give the money to the Ministry of Agriculture, which would decide whom to support and whom not to support financially. We did it differently:

We are giving this money to the farmers, without strings attached. Let it be their start-up capital. We have no doubt that it will be put to use. Should we not choose the same direction for the rebirth of culture? I undertake an obligation for the government of Russia to be ready, next year, to give certain capital to those who are concerned with Russian culture. This investment may be used for the restoration and building of cultural centers, theater buildings, and libraries. Who knows, maybe next year there will be not only the Peasants, but a Culture Union as well! The existing creative unions will also get truly interested in such work.

[Pivovarov] Russia is going in the direction of varied forms of ownership. Is, in your opinion, the de-state-ization of culture possible? For instance, can a joint-stock company buy out from the state some theater, or the actors become the owners?

[Silayev] We are talking about a private theater, is that correct?

[Pivovarov] Among other things, yes. In the old days, Russia had not only enterprise theaters, but also actors' cooperatives.

[Silayev] I understand. Categorical judgments are dangerous today. Life changes so fast that once in a while one catches himself with this thought: I should not have objected to something so strenuously. Still, with all the changeability and mobility of the new thinking, there are things that can not change. The leading theaters should remain under the protection of the state and be supported by it. This policy, as I understand, is common in the West as well. Or, for instance, we hear this kind of conversation: Let us put this unprofitable theater up for sale. Let it have new owners, private ones. I would tend to be wary of such offers. Private troupes are a different matter, perhaps.

[Pivovarov] They already exist.

[Silayev] Well, can one, let us say, have a private church?

[Pivovarov] More likely a chapel.

[Silayev] A chapel would be for a personal use. Then it is more individual than private property. I think that to use culture as a source of profit is amoral. In my opinion, there is a triangle: education, health care, and culture. They should be put outside of commerce. It should not be exploited by the ruble or by any other, even convertible, currency.

[Pivovarov] The market has already put a noose around the neck of the so-called fourth power—the press. Even such a giant as IZVESTIYA may turn out to be unprofitable. Cultural publications are in a truly tragic situation. You are right—true culture and commerce are incompatible. But there is a chance that those publications that sow "the reason, the good, and the eternal" may disappear from the book market. They may be replaced by erotic, pornographic speculations and pulp publications. Does the government of Russia plan to

establish preferential tax treatment and reasonable prices for paper and printing for those who continue the policy of cultural enlightenment of the people?

[Silayev] I think it needs to be done. Of course, such publications will not be competitive at the market price; therefore, the state should underwrite some of their expenses. I completely agree that those who are concerned with the moral health of the nation need protection. We should collectively take a stand against this wave of bad taste and something even more dangerous—the tidal wave of moral perversion that is about to overturn our society.

[Pivovarov] The Supreme Soviet established new printed organs—ROSSIYA and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA—while the Council of Ministers is beginning to publish ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI. Do not you have a desire to start a publication devoted to issues of our republic's multinational culture?

[Silayev] I would support such an idea. If there are enthusiasts, I am ready to meet with them. At the very least, we will find paper for this purpose.

[Passage omitted]

[Pivovarov] Since you took your current post, a new structure has emerged in the Council of Ministers. You established a press center. What was the reason for this?

[Silayev] It has been our long-standing habit to have this opinion among the higher leadership: We see everything, we understand everything, and we know what to do. I think this is a fallacious judgment. It is hard to evaluate the real state of affairs without a dialog—through the mass media, or, better still, direct, live dialog. Without this it is hard to avoid mistakes, although nobody is safe from those. There will still be mistakes in the future. What is important, however, is this: Having discovered that a mistake has been made, one should correct it as soon as possible, and to admit that it has, indeed, happened. Without an interaction with all population layers, without information on what they think of this or that government action, without the nourishment of new ideas, in less than a year one will find himself isolated from real life and will go in the different direction.

Tatarstan Poll On Independence, RSFSR Ties

91UN0915B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 7 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by B. Dubin, employee of the All-Union Center for Public Opinion Studies, under the rubric "Public Opinion": "About Sovereignty"]

[Text] Last December the All-Union Center for Public Opinion Studies conducted a public opinion poll in Tatarstan; a representative sample of 1,115 respondents was used.

Of the more than 3.5 million residents in the republic 48.5 percent are Tatars, and 43 percent are Russians.

Three quarters of the former and 39.5 percent of the latter support republic sovereignty. However, one should not jump to the conclusion that there is some kind of "nationalities confrontation"—the crux of the matter lies elsewhere. The declaration of independence is far more actively supported, for instance, by residents of rural areas, and by the less educated strata of the population. The opposing points of view here are held not by different nationalities, but by groups that differ according to their position in society, and their place in the complex social process.

As a whole, the republic population trusts the Supreme Soviet of Russia the most (30 percent fully trust it while 12 percent mostly distrust it). This is the only instance of a positive balance: All other institutions of power, from the president to the local soviets, are on average distrusted by the people.

However, while pinning their hopes on Russia, the population is still certain that the real power in the republic today lies more with all-Union structures and the republic leadership than with the parliament of Russia. This is precisely what constitutes the main conflict in the current social situation in the republic.

On the whole, the majority of the population (51 percent) is for the republic remaining a part of the Russian Federation. However, among Russians this position is supported by 70 percent, while the majority of Tatars support other options: 46 percent are for the status of a Union republic within the USSR structure, and 24 percent are for being an independent state. Recent statements by Tatarstan Supreme Soviet Chairman M. Shaymiyev in IZVESTIYA clearly show that the Tatar leadership also supports republic membership in the Union.

Various groups offer differing opinions on who supports Tatarstan as an independent republic today. Almost two thirds of the Tatar population believe that the initiative here comes from the "broad popular masses" and the "all Tatar population," while almost three quarters of Russians see this as an "initiative of the 'party-bureaucratic apparatus' and 'Tatar nationalists.'" (By "nationalists" they mean not the ethnic origin, but a chosen social stance).

Both the CPSU in the republic, and the bloc of various nationalist movements—the Tatar Public Center (TPC)—enjoy the most support in rural areas. The Tatar Public Center enjoys the trust of every fifth Tatar, on average. Among the Russians, 57 percent of the population is outside of politics, and the degree of trust even towards the most popular Democratic Party of Russia is relatively low (13.5 percent).

This is reflected, of course, in the selection of figures of authority. Less educated and informed groups more often support the "slate," in which Tatarstan's official leadership and most radical leaders of nationalist movements are represented: F. Bayramova (TPC), M. Shaymiyev, Council of Ministers Chairman M. Sabirov,

M. Mulyukov (TPC), and P. Idiatullin, first secretary of the CPSU republic committee. Better educated groups place their trust in figures of other, more democratic stances.

On the whole, the position of forces in relation to each other is understandable. It is hard to expect a political "center" in a republic where the standard of living of the majority of the population is below average. The political action field is squeezed between the top party-state leadership and supporters of the nationalist idea. They join forces on a common social base—less skilled and more "peripheral" population strata. The "trump card" in the game with the Union center, which from the very beginnings of the Soviet power always eagerly supported such movements in the autonomies (compare it with today's Georgia or Crimea), is the fact that 80 percent of industrial enterprises of the republic are under Union jurisdiction. The aim of this "unity" against the political program of the Russian leadership is also sufficiently clear. It is also easy to imagine what this flirtation may result in for the better prepared part of the population: As of now, 21.5 percent of college educated people, 23 percent of Kazan residents, and 26 percent of Russians already believe that if the supporters of the nationalist idea win, Russians will have to leave the area where most of them were born. The only guarantee of a peaceful development of the situation may be joint actions by the democratic forces in the republic and Russia, depoliticization of the Tatarstan economy, and shedding the monopoly of the official-state structures from the public life.

Western Republics

Hurenko Discusses Union Vote, Parliament

91UN0931A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
8 Feb 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with S.I. Hurenko, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Central Committee, by P. Vlasov on Ukrainian Television on 4 February 1991: "A High Degree of Responsibility Is the Demand of the Times"]

[Excerpts] [Vlasov] Stanislav Ivanovich, in our program "Current Camera" we have just broadcast information about the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee statement in regard to the upcoming referendum on the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Could you comment on this document?

[Hurenko] I would like right away to underscore the following. We are talking about a process that has never been used here—a political referendum, something that will reveal true public opinion. The main point, I think, is in the fact that this first referendum will ask a question of—without any exaggeration—vital importance, vital

significance. Because, after all, the question is whether our Union, the renewed Union, the renewed federation, is to be or not to be.

Lobbying both "for" and "against" the Union is already going on in the republic. To be objective, those who are "against" are more active, so, probably, we will have to clarify a few things at that meeting.

It is clear from the materials of its 28th congress that the Communist Party of the Ukraine stands for the preservation of the Union, and the Central Committee statement was formulated along the lines of this policy.

Why are we for the Union today?

First of all, it follows from the historical aspect. We live today in a country that has developed over many centuries as a multinational state. The consequences of a potential disintegration of this state should not be underestimated. They may appear inconsequential to some people, but only at first glance.

Our state has a certain standing in the world. This standing determines its influence on the destiny not only of the peoples of our country but also of the processes taking place in the world as a whole—both political and economic. These are interconnected now. If this state disintegrates, I would not dare to forecast the consequences today. I want once again to emphasize that this will affect not only the people who live on the territory on the USSR. Therefore, we are talking about historic responsibility. It weighs on every one of us, on everyone who will participate in the referendum.

We already have enough examples of how policies directed at secession from the Soviet Union lead to bitter consequences. I do not want to go into this subject in detail now, but I could refer to, for instance, Georgia, which has flatly stated its separation from the Union, and the events in the Baltics. In all these places there are conflicts, and these conflicts bring human casualties. World history shows that secession of this or that country, this or that territory from an established entity, especially in the atmosphere of separatist moods, never proceeds without some fallout.

Besides, we should, of course, think about the economic future. For instance, leaflets are being distributed now stating that the Ukraine has such potential that it can exist comfortably regardless of cooperation with other republics. First, you cannot just stay in bed and live off your own fat. Second, there are a lot of untruths in these leaflets. The truth is that it is impossible for any republic, including ours, to exist without a full-fledged and equal-footing economic exchange with either the Union or other countries.

Unbiased people know today that we do not have anything to offer on the world market. Take, for example, an item recently shown on the Central Television program "Vremya." It said that there are 42,000 tons of Donetsk coal sitting in Singapore because the

intended buyer refuses to accept it. So now this coal is just sitting there, which is costing millions of dollars. Nobody wants it, and they say that nobody will take it now. This, by the way, is a message to those who incite Donetsk coal miners, telling them that their coal can be sold for \$100 a ton. They have tried to sell it for \$40, and now nobody wants it for \$4.

So, the world market is not sitting and waiting for us. We need to get our own economy up to speed. Therefore, to tear up all economic ties and throw ourselves into the maelstrom of the world market economy is, I think, simply irresponsible. This is also something we take into account when we advocate preservation of the Union.

I hope that among our viewers are some who work in the production sphere. These people, especially those who work in enterprises under Union jurisdiction, are now feeling the break-up of these economic links painfully and acutely, because it is already leading them to the brink of unemployment. This is also the result of some republics' and regions' attempts to establish their sovereignty on their own and to pull themselves out of established economic ties.

Then, finally, this important aspect—the new responsibility and new functions which the government and the whole people will have to undertake if the Ukraine leaves the Union—just like that, simply walks out. Such matters as defense capabilities and maintaining its own army, for instance. We are talking, I will say straight away, about billions. Next: What do we do with the nuclear weapons that are located on the territory of our republic? Do we move them out or distribute them into 15 shares? These are, again, not just our concerns; these are concerns of the whole world.

Therefore I believe that we need to approach the referendum with a great deal of deliberation and weigh everything carefully. In our opinion, both economic and political factors point in favor of the preservation of the Soviet Union, and the referendum should say something about the preservation of the renewed federation of our republics.

Wrapping up my reply to this question, I would also like to point out that it is hard to find a family today that would not have family or friendship ties with representatives of other peoples, other nations, including those that live here, in the Ukraine. This is also something to think about. (Passage omitted)

[Vlasov] Stanislav Ivanovich, the work of the republics' Supreme Soviets has an immediate effect on the stabilization of situation in the country as a whole. The third session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet has just started. In your opinion, what corrections in its work should be made, based on the experience of the previous two sessions, and what are your expectations in regard to the third session?

[Hurenko] It is true, the session has just started, and the deputies only worked for two hours last Friday at the

plenary session; nevertheless, yesterday some of your colleagues already declared on the "Promen" that there is a parliamentary crisis. Well, not a full-fledged crisis as we used to have before, but a little one, a sort of "mini-crisis." No decisions have been made, they say, there is again a confrontation. This is also, I will tell you, a specific position, which our viewer and listener is gradually getting used to.

As a Ukrainian people's deputy from the Ivankivskiy electoral district, where the people who perhaps suffered more than anybody else in the republic from the Chernobyl disaster live, I would like to say this. Again, I emphasize: This is my personal opinion as a people's deputy.

The third session of the Supreme Soviet today has every reason for fruitful and constructive work. I dare to make this statement because of an event that took place two hours ago. I am talking about the completion of the joint session of many Supreme Soviet commissions that deliberated the draft laws on the status of the zone affected by (Chernobyl) and the status of the people who were injured participating in the liquidation of the disaster fallout. This is a package of laws that includes a sufficiently scientifically proven concept. Leaving aside the laws, the drafts of which have been published, I want to note that this session was attended by representatives of all political forces that are present in the parliament today. In my opinion, they cooperated quite well in their work aimed at bringing these laws for Supreme Soviet consideration.

Therefore I believe, based on the experience of the previous sessions where such important laws as for instance on the priority socioeconomic development of rural areas have been adopted, that there is every reason for the current session to work as fruitfully.

I would also like to say that although the session has barely started, we, the parliamentary majority, are already receiving from some media (not those that are distributed through the Soyuzpechat [Main Administration for Press Distribution] but those that are sold in underground street crossings) reproaches that border on crude cursing. Actually, not just reproaches, but elementary lies. It has been almost a year, and now again the fable is being circulated that communist majority members got into the parliament illegally or by other similar means. All of this, I repeat, is lies, and, of course, it will die off. But it is calculated to produce an effect under which some of the deputies will hesitate, and others will again get involved in nonsensical political fights.

We, the majority, are planning exactly this—work. And we call on all our deputy colleagues in the Supreme Soviet: Let us work together on the laws that the Ukrainian people so eagerly await from us. Let us with these laws mark the way to a market economy, under which we will have no unemployment. Let us finally jointly agree on the concrete means of introducing a market. I am certain that it will be useful not only for us but that it will

finally permit our government to work and our people to have some clear perspective.

I feel it is necessary to underscore that all of us should avoid excessive politization of the Supreme Soviet. We have more or less decided on our intentions, and all of us spoke out on the potential destiny and future of the Supreme Soviet. With the exception of a very small number of deputies, everybody agrees that at this point the Supreme Soviet should continue to work and not be disbanded. Otherwise, who knows what will come out of it, but it will not be stability. So let us work.

[Vlasov] We have already touched to a certain degree on the current sociopolitical situation in the republic. Here is the next question. What do you see as the way out of the crisis phenomena, and how would you go about overcoming them, reducing tensions, and in general defusing the existing situation?

[Hurenko] I think that the number one priority now—and we, in the Communist Party of Ukraine Central Committee see it as our main task—is orientation toward concrete actions. Six years of perestroika have passed, or it will be six years soon. One can already hear many voices, including some from very high podiums, saying that perestroika is over, perestroika has failed. Some talk about a "rollback," some about a "breather," in short, whatever. I think the point is that lately rally-like passions have burned out somewhat, including in the Ukraine. Now we see something behind the slogans—now that they have become worn out, weatherbeaten, and some even somewhat soiled: Those who did not have a concrete program, still, unfortunately, do not have one. One can only regret now that the latest of such "events"—an attempt to unite the self-proclaimed democratic forces (at the congress of these forces in Kharkov)—was also largely based on the calls to work as an antithesis. Let us, they say, be the antipodes of the ruling party, the communists, and antipodes of the existing programs. This will not bring anything qualitatively new. What we need now is simply to work. We have a concrete program. The Ukrainian government has it; it needs to be given an opportunity to work, and to work now. Our Supreme Soviet has already laid the groundwork for, let us say, specific measures for the rebirth of the rural areas. For me, this is a very important law, and not only for me but for all those who care about our republic's destiny. When we revive the rural areas, give people an opportunity to work fruitfully, as masters; when we ensure equality of all forms of property, but without pressure; when people become able to dispose of the fruits of their labor at their own discretion—only then can any government, any party hope for something. Unless we do all of this, any talk about the well-being of the people is empty talk.

We already have some beginnings, laid out by the Supreme Soviet—the Land Code, which is, by the way, to my knowledge among the most comprehensive in the Soviet Union. That is, we can start working in this area. The 1991 plan, a rough draft plan, if I can use such a

word, that was approved by the Supreme Soviet also indicated the channeling of both expenditures and capital investment precisely toward the development of rural areas.

So, we have the first steps, but now we have to go further. We have to go further in other areas of the economy, step by step, and we have to work persistently and pragmatically on the task of supporting our economy.

Neither should we forget, even for a minute, that no economy can substitute for culture. I am not a supporter of the idea that all slogans should be replaced by only a slogan for national revival. Especially considering that lately we have been witnessing these slogans being bent in some places. I cannot help but mention here the fact that some publications, and rather big ones at that, are beginning to carry, together with the theme of national revival, reproofs—first subtle, as if accidental, and then more energetic—against Russians. There are already proposals at quite a high level of representation to adopt a law on migration. Then how much time do we have until we say "Ukraine is for Ukrainians," or, maybe, even "the Ukraine above all?" I am against such an approach; but at the same time I am for the development of spirituality, the revival of culture, and the preservation of the language and literature. Alas, we really are behind in this development! This is also a very important sphere of activity, and it requires state support, of which there is not much now.

To sum up, I want to say that at this moment, in my opinion and in the opinion of my communist comrades in the Central Committee, there are two priorities. One is the development of rural areas, and the other is supporting the youth, bringing up a physically and spiritually healthy new generation. These are the areas into which we should channel the resources we have. These are the two directions in which both our lawmakers and our government would be wise to go. And we, through the communists in the soviets and the government, will be carrying out exactly this policy.

[Vlasov] Stanislav Ivanovich, may I ask you a question that, I think, you absolutely do not expect? We, television journalists and journalists in general, are often quite justly accused of not covering enough or deeply enough the work of party organizations, in particular, the primary ones. If you, for instance, faced this task: produce material on a positive experience, or on the shortcomings in the work of a party organization, I mean a primary one. Where would you start, where would you put the accent, and how would you complete it?

[Hurenko] I would start by sending without any advance warning two or three teams of television journalists to party meetings, and make a report on these meetings. This would yield interesting material that would show that primary party organizations are now actively searching for constructive ways and practical steps out of

the crisis. You would see that people are beginning to hold their heads high. This is where, I think, I would start.

Second, I would go to a city party committee in a city like Kiev, or some other, and show these city committees in the new circumstances. They now consist of literally two or three dozen people, and they got a lot of fresh blood, many new, interesting people who are searching for themselves, for their place in party work... And then I would end, probably, by inviting here, to the studio, several rayon party committee secretaries, from the city and rural areas, and would conduct a "roundtable" with them.

This would be difficult, because many of them have so many boiling issues, but I would be patient, conduct this "roundtable," and then would put together a 15- to 20-minute segment from this. Then I would invite, also without warning, a Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee secretary to view it.

[Vlasov] For instance, you.

[Hurenko] Yes, I would have agreed to participate in such a program in any possible way. So, I would invite a Central Committee secretary and arrange for a dialogue with an "open line" telephone. I think that would be interesting. It would have also, to a certain degree, given a boost to our comrades who now work in difficult circumstances but have all the reason not to "hope without hope" but hope, on the contrary, that our efforts will bring real results. In the end, every unprejudiced person will be able to see that today the Communist Party of the Ukraine thinks of nothing other than being useful to the people and being at their service in these difficult times.

Several Views of Situation in Lvov

91UN0939A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 7, 20 Feb 91 p 5

[Article by Sergey Kiselev, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA staff correspondent for the Ukraine SSR, and Aleksandr Sabov, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondent: "Love and Arguments: What Is Happening in Western Ukraine?"]

[Excerpts] A year ago, in March, in all three oblasts of Galichina—Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, and Ternopol—the power in the oblast and most city and local soviets had been taken by the representatives of Ukrainian popular movement—Rukh [Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroyka] and affiliated with it political parties. Today this is the largest region in the country where the former ruling party is in opposition. An old advertising kiosk in the center of Lvov, which had lived for the past 10 years the boring life of cinema and theater posters, suddenly exploded with news, and bloomed with printed and handwritten proclamations.

Some of them are already outdated, but no one is in a hurry to remove them—for instance, the series of photos on the dismantling of the Lenin monument. This monument used to stand in the public garden in front of the Opera house, literally a few tens of meters away from the advertising kiosk. A veritable human sea had spilled into the square on that September day. The sea was noisy and stormy, but, in the end, had not overflowed its boundaries, reflecting the simple truth that the new authorities' decision was also the decision of the majority of voters. Next to the photos is a newspaper clipping that tells the legend of the blue-and-yellow flag. The blue is the color of the sky, and the yellow of the grain fields, the eternal symbol of the Ukrainian land; these symbols had been born here, in its Western outskirts. The Lvov home guard went to the Grunwald Battle in 1410 under the blue banner with the image of a lion leaning against a rock. It goes even further back in history: A golden lion on the blue background was the crest of the dukes of Romanovich, the founders of the Duchy of Galitsia and the city of Lvov. So, by what right, asks the author of the article, do the people who do not feel the kinship with their own people, stubbornly call this traditional Ukrainian symbolism the "symbols of Petlyura?" [passage omitted]

FROM THE NEW GALITSKIY CHRONICLES

Stepan KHMARA, Ukraine people's deputy from Lvov Oblast

We were not able to interview him in person—S. Khmara is temporarily stripped of his deputy immunity and is under arrest. Only the court will be able to investigate objectively the incident that took place on the morning of 7 November in the underground crossing on Kreshchatik in Kiev. A group of people spent a whole night there in order to, in the morning, block the way of the military parade or of the holiday demonstration. Here Deputy Khmara got into a conflict situation with an "unknown citizen," who, upon checking, turned out to be Militia Colonel I. Grigoryev. The pending S. Khmara trial has inflamed the already complicated political climate in Ukraine to the limit. Advertising kiosks in Lvov are literally overflowing with appeals in his defense.

Here is "the interview from behind the bars," as this genre was dubbed by a new Lvov newspaper, ZA VILNU UKRAINU, (6 December):

"Communists are deliberately twisting and misinterpreting the democrats, including myself, saying that we are, allegedly, calling for reprisals against them. No. I have always called, am calling, and will be calling—as long as I live and as long as the totalitarian system exists—for the removal of the CPSU from the state-political arena. Without it democracy is impossible, as well as the building of a democratic, independent great power of Ukraine. But we need to achieve it in a lawful, civilized way."

Bohdan HORYN, Ukrainian people's deputy, chairman of the Lvov branch of Ukrainian Republican Party (URP)

"Among new political parties already registered in the republic, URP is, both structurally and numerically, most noticeable. It has 7,000 members, but its true influence is best judged by its representation in elected power organs: 10 deputies in the parliament and about 40 in local soviets in Western Ukraine."

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] Is URP a part of Rukh? Are there differences in your platforms?

"No, we only coordinate our actions with Rukh, without being its collective member. Our party already declared itself—in May 1990—in favor of an independent assembly-based Ukrainian State. At that time Rukh still supported perestroika and a renewed Soviet federation, of which the Ukraine would be a part. However, half a year later Rukh also spoke in favor of Ukraine's secession from the USSR and threw away the limited perestroika mottoes. So, our positions are coming closer."

"Back at the time when the declaration of Ukrainian state sovereignty was adopted by our parliament, an agreement was reached that the issue of whether to sign a Union treaty would be postponed until the new Republic constitution is adopted. Since it will necessarily contain the clause on the multiparty structure, new elections will be in order. I am an optimist: I believe that in no more than one year the very first session of the new parliament will pronounce the Ukraine a subject of international law."

Markiyan IVASHCHYSHYN, student of the polytechnic institute's school for civil engineering, chairman of Lvov Student Brotherhood

"There are 600 of us in the 'Brotherhood,' but I think we are the only force in Lvov capable of leading its 46,000 students and 120,000 school students. It is not accidental that we received 180,000 rubles in contributions. Now we are trying to decide how to put this money to best use. We decided to open our student publishing house."

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] Why?

"Look at it this way: Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Union] has come to an inglorious end—thank God, we have been able at least to take over this room. This is it! The youth is no longer interested in it. On the other side of the spectrum is the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth, which openly advocates the neo-Bandera ideas, that is, they are literally dragging the youth back to 1939. We are trying to fill the vacuum. The goal is a true democracy, not wild swings from one form of totalitarianism to another."

Vyacheslav SECRETARYUK, Lvov Communist Party of Ukraine Obkom [oblast party committee] first secretary

"There are 95,000 members in the oblast party organization, that is, we have lost about a quarter of our membership during the last years. But now we are

consolidating our forces, although there is a true anti-communist hysteria going on around us. There is a great deal of our fault in it, too! On what grounds, for instance, in the republic parliament the opposition—which has about one-third of the seats—has more than half of the seats in the commissions and committees? We have been flirting too much with these new forces, and now they do not want to play with us. Now they are forming some committees of civic accord, saying that this is a contingency in case of the introduction of martial law..."

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] And what about Communists—are they against them?

"They are not invited to participate in these committees. Look, Rukh is already petitioning for the rehabilitation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurrection Army. These were fighters against Stalinism, their argument goes. Well, it is partially true. But the same Bandera troops killed over 30,000 people in this area. So what do you do now—order the families of the victims to bring flowers to the graves of the killers, even if those, in turn, were victims of Stalinist repressions? Why bring out old enmities from the past when what people need is amity?"

Vyacheslav CHORNOVIL, chairman of the Lvov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, Ukrainian people's deputy

His office is one floor above and directly over the one of Comrade Secretaryuk, but the contrast is striking in everything, starting with a coat rack, where, as is known, the reception starts. And the public! The people who come here are dressed exclusively in country garb or in gray babushkas; the way they address each other comes straight out of the past—"Mr." and "Mrs."—and the only visitor with a necktie and a folder under his arm looks like he simply got off on the wrong floor. Mr. Chairman of the Council [published in Ukrainian and in regional] (15 years in labor camps regime, 180 days of hunger strikes, a journalist, a stoker, a PEN [Poets, Playwrights, Essayists, Editors, and Novelists Club] member, whose name Academician Sakharov had put among those with whom he wanted to share his Nobel Peace Prize) has just sent a protest against the arrest of S. Khmara to the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. Without renouncing his deputy powers, he said that he personally "finds it ethically reprehensible to enter the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet's meeting hall that has been desecrated by the use of force."

"Instead of sitting there and waiting for Seaman Zheleznyak to appear, it is better to work here, with my voters, to prevent his arrival. Especially considering that our partocracy, having recovered from the first shock, clearly started an offensive against the leftist democratic forces. We have recently blown the disinformation by the POSTFACTUM correspondent that militarized exercises of "riflemen bands" are ostensibly being conducted in Galichian forests. The agency admitted its fault and has dismissed its contributor who turned out to

be a staff correspondent of one of the Lvov party newspapers. But the canard has already gone all over the country! This is how they prepare the public opinion to accept extraordinary measures, the introduction of the martial law—which, I have no doubt, is a dream for those one floor below...”

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] Are there forces to the left of you in Galichia, Mr. Vyacheslav?

“By God, I long ago became a centrist, especially since I took this office! I keep tirelessly saying and repeating: Democracy does not mean that instead of dismantled leaders of one kind we should immediately put on the pedestal leaders of another kind. I will give you this example: There are a total of 147 monuments to Lenin in Lvov Oblast. Only 14 of those are original works and have appropriate permission to stand where they are. Who has thoughtlessly multiplied the talentless monuments to Marxism-Leninism? During the dismantling of the Lenin monument in Lvov it was discovered that among materials used for its construction were grave-stones. Is it possible that such blasphemy could coexist with creativity, let alone with idealistic beliefs? Now we are accused of discrediting these ideals by the right, which is trying to lean on the army, the state security organs, and the law enforcement organs in their attempt to protect these ideals. On the left, no less dangerous is the ultraradical phraseology that makes young people's heads spin so easily. That is why we started to create committees for civic accord, charging them with the task of being arbiters in the political arguments or, if necessary, to repel provocations. Similar committees are emerging in the neighboring oblasts of Galichina. We are searching for new forms of contact and cooperation with them. Perhaps, we will establish a Galichian assembly as an organ for coordination the actions of the three oblasts.”

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] That is, you are leaning towards the Galichian autonomy?

“No, God forbid, no! Our local party apparatus is beset with such ideas, though. Look what is happening in the Ukraine. In Donbass they are talking about resurrection of the Donetsk-Krivorog republic. In Odessa, Nikolayev, and Kherson they are drafting some kind of Novorossiya republic. Crimea has already declared its right to autonomy. There is talk about Transcarpathian and Bukovina “sovereignty...” Our party apparatus is ready to tear the Ukrainian blanket into small pieces, as long as they could keep their power and privileges. We cannot allow this to happen! I think that the best structure for the Ukraine would be a federative unification of all its historic provinces fashioned after the federation of lands in FRG.”

“We have been told, more than once, that the overwhelming majority of Galichina residents will vote against signing the Union treaty, while the Ukraine as a whole will vote “for.” What happens in this case—the split?”

“First, I doubt very much that the entire Ukraine will say “yes” to the Union treaty. There is factual evidence that the eastern region of the republic does follow the western ones, although with a lag of about six months. The Galichians will probably be in favor of leaving the Union, but will be just as resolutely against the split of the Ukraine...”

Well, we have listened to all sides—or almost all. So what is happening in the Western Ukraine, which, it seems, is being increasingly followed by the central and even eastern oblasts of the republic?

Permit us, too, to claim a corner on that old kiosk for advertisements and proclamations in the center of Lvov.

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Proclamation

The authors of this proclamation feel themselves directly related to the processes of current Ukrainian history. One of us (S.K.) is a Russian; he was born and lives in Kiev, thereby representing 11 million of his compatriots in the Ukraine. The other (A.S.) is a Ukrainian, born in the Carpathians, who lives and works in Moscow, thereby representing 10 million Ukrainians dispersed among the Russians.

But if in Russia my compatriots (A.S.) all speak Russian, alas, millions of my compatriots in the Ukraine (I am not exaggerating—S.K.) have never bothered to immerse themselves in the language and culture of the people among whom they live. One of the most shameful phenomena of the 1960-1970's was the Russification of the Ukrainian culture, actively imposed by the Ukrainians themselves, first of all those from the ranks of the party apparatus. The 1979 census registered that about 4 million people renounced their native language. And here Chairman of Lvov Oblast Soviet V. Chornovil is right: It is specifically where there are large concentrations of such Russian-speaking population that the projects of independent Ukrainian lands-oblasts are promoted especially hard.

But here comes the main question: Will the future Ukraine be in the Union or out of it? Despite the sharp split between the political forces in the republic parliament, its deputy corps in December practically unanimously rejected the draft of the Union treaty sent from “above,” but as unanimously decided to take to the All-Ukrainian referendum the new concept of the treaty developed “below.” The declaration of Ukrainian sovereignty, adopted by its parliament last year, is regarded by some deputies—the majority—as the base document for signing a new Union treaty and the design of the new Ukrainian constitution, and by some—the minority—as the first step towards being an independent power.

However, on both sides the intolerance towards each other sometimes takes the form of a dangerous civic standoff. We mean the gasoline truck brought from Ivano-Frankovsk for the Kiev celebrations, where, the threat

was, it would be exploded in front of the Supreme Soviet building. This is on the one hand. On the other—alas, there are more and more verified facts of the “red hundreds” [published in Ukrainian] beating up opposition deputies—especially the ones from “Galichina”—on Ukrainian roads. The message seems to be: You have deceived your own voters, but leave ours alone!

Should we look for the truth in the fist fights?

“Love the Ukraine as you love the fountain of life, as you love the sun, the grass, and the waters; love it in the happy times and in the moment of joy, and love it in the time of adversity...” Volodimir Sosyura wrote this verse in 1944—in a year of wartime adversity. Seven years later (!) PRAVDA published a nameless editorial titled “Against Ideological Perversions in Literature.” The poet’s call to his compatriots—“Love Ukraine!”—was labeled a hymn to Ukrainian nationalism...

Here, unwittingly, historical parallels come to mind. “One should read Ukrainian history with a tranquilizer at hand,” wrote V. Vinnichenko—Ukrainian political figure and historian, whose name has been buried in restricted access archives for nearly 70 years—in his diary. The only time one does not need a tranquilizer is for reading the prehistoric period of the Ukraine—Russia (we take this expression from the Rukh leader, poet Ivan Drach)—it turns out that our common prehistoric motherland has avoided the feared ice; it has come to its edge and stopped. But how much ice has subsequent history piled on it!

It was only in 1904 that the All-Russia Academy of Sciences recognized Malorossiya’s right to its own language; and only in 1912, did Austrian-Polish Rusins for the first time get the right to be officially called “Ukrainians.” For so many centuries this part of the Ukraine was dreaming of a new reunification, pinning its hopes on the “older brother!” And it came in 1939. He was met with bread and salt, with flowers, and with the tears of happiness. But it took only a few months before covered vans started roaring through the deep of the nights, taking whole families away...

The “storm petrel of revolution” rejected the proposal to translate his novel “Mother” into Ukrainian—why? Do Malorossiyans not understand Russian? Until now, there are 5.5 books in Russian and only 1.5 in Ukrainian per each resident of the republic—this is how passionately we love it. In the 1970’s our ideology czar Mikhail Suslov did not permit the start of publication of the Shevchenko encyclopedia, and “Shevchenko Evenings” all over the republic were being dispersed under the pretext that they were the gatherings of covert nationalists. It came to even removing three Ukrainian letters from the typewriters “Yatran” and “Ukraina”... as a violation of the All-Union state standard!

We have heard that it is dangerous to speak Russian on the streets of Kiev or Lvov, that Russians will be “kicked out.” It is not true! We do not know of a single document of local or supreme authorities that violates the dignity of people of another nation, or their civil rights. At the same

time just imagine for yourself, the citizens of Lvov, that by some miracle those who in the previous century were called the instigators and to whom, first and foremost, the Carpathian kray owes its national awakening, that these people, who had themselves had heated arguments about the “primacy” of Russian or Ukrainian language, would suddenly find themselves at your rallies of today, come over to your newspaper displays and news kiosks. In the last century they would only have seen the ghost of Communism wondering around Europe—we know more about it now, but the Ukraine is not the only place where sharp arguments are going on on this subject. Would they not be concerned now with such persistent identification of this ghost with “Moscow,” “Russia,” “Moscow serfs,” and “Russophiles?” Is not a considerable part of national dislike a part of these ideological arguments? The desire for independence—“up to secession!”—only agrees with democracy when it is free from nationalist suspicions and enmity.

Union Leader on Crimean Situation

91UN07704 Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with V.D. Arbuzov, chairman of the Council of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the Crimea by N. Mokrishchev, in the Crimean Oblast; date not given: “The Crimea on the Eve of a Referendum”]

[Text] On 20 January, the Council of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the Crimea (FNPK) adopted a resolution on the attitude toward an all-oblast referendum—on the state status of the peoples populating the peninsula. Having expressed their solidarity with the deputies of the oblast soviet, the trade union leaders called on their membership to take part in the voting and vote in favor of restoring the Crimean ASSR.

Chairman of FNPK Council V.D. Arbuzov answered questions concerning this.

[Mokrishchev] Valeriy Dmitriyevich, why specifically a referendum rather than some other way?

[Arbuzov] A debate on the status of the Crimea has revealed a multitude of views and various attitudes. Their polarization is becoming a serious destabilizing factor; aggravated ethnic problems have exacerbated the situation to the limit. Any decision by a session of the oblast soviet would have unavoidably caused the dissatisfaction of one segment or another of the Crimean population. Only the people themselves may and should determine the future of the Crimea. A referendum, a popular vote, is the most democratic form of showing the will of the people.

To be sure, there was one more legal avenue—to approach the parliament of the Ukraine with a request to restore the Crimean ASSR on behalf of a soviet session. This is precisely what Chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet L.M. Kravchuk, who took part in the November session of the oblast soviet last year, proposed. However, the deputies did not embark on this

avenue, seemingly the most acceptable one. Events in the Supreme Soviet of the republic in the fall gave substantial grounds for doubts: The Ukrainian parliament was supposed to make an amendment to the Constitution providing for an opportunity to create autonomous entities within the republic; however, the parliament rejected a proposal of the Crimea residents concerning such an amendment.

Here is one more significant detail: A decision made by referendum is final. Had the creation of the ASSR been proclaimed by a session of the oblast soviet this would have contravened the USSR and Ukrainian SSR Constitutions and could have resulted in a sort of semblance of the "Gagauz" or "Dnestr" scenarios.

[Mokrishchev] So, can any oblast hold a referendum and become a republic in order to upgrade its status?

[Arbuzov] The issue cannot be raised in this manner. Unlike, say, in Khmel'nitskiy or Sumy Oblasts, **statehood has already existed** here in the form of an ASSR, which was abolished in an iniquitous manner. This is why ambitions are not the issue but rather the absolutely legitimate grounds for doing historical justice. Hence the content of the ballot. This is how the question is worded: "Are you in favor of restoring the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a USSR subject and a party to the Union treaty?" There are only two variants of the answer: "Yes" and "No."

[Mokrishchev] Let me word the issue in a different manner then: The abolition of the Crimean ASSR was associated with the deportation of the Crimean Tatars. Is this to say that the Crimean ASSR was their national autonomous entity?

[Arbuzov] A study of historical documents testifies to the multinational or international nature of the Crimean autonomous entity. The very fact of existence of ethnic rayons, for example, Tatar, Ukrainian, German, Jewish, and ethnic rural soviets does not fit the autonomy of a single nation. Or else let us look at the statistics of the ethnic composition of population. Here is the data: As of 1 January 1930, 325,000 Russian, 196,300 Tatars, about 80,000 Ukrainians, and slightly less than 50,000 Jews and Germans each, as well as Greeks, Armenians, Bulgarians, Krymchaks, Karaites, and others resided in the Crimea. At present, the following live in the Crimea: 1.63 million Russians, 626,000 Ukrainians, 50,000 Belorussians, and by now more than 105,000 Crimean Tatars (their total number in the country is about 330,000).

Therefore, the restoration of the ASSR cannot be based on the priority of any one nation. At issue may only be a **combination of the national and international** principles in the same territory, with equal opportunities guaranteed for the development of all peoples, regardless of their numerical strength.

[Mokrishchev] A multitude of letters have been coming to the editorial offices of newspapers and local and

central organs of power. In these letters, individual citizens and entire organizations state their reluctance to answer only "yes" or "no" on referendum ballots, wanting to state their point of view as well. For example, communications workers from Alushta have expressed their desire to secede from the Ukraine; they believe that the Crimean peninsula should be an all-Union health resort area with the status of a Union republic. Could the questions on the ballot be asked differently, without restricting it to a laconic "yes" or "no?"

[Arbuzov] No, they could not because this would have meant an attempt to change the territory of a sovereign state, the Ukrainian SSR, and would have given the parliament of the republic and the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee an opportunity to legitimately ban the holding of the Crimean referendum. This is point one. Secondly, I would like to note a correction that the passage of time is making: The process of reducing the difference between autonomous and Union republics is under way; the autonomous republics are becoming coequal parties to the Union treaty.

[Mokrishchev] However, the air is literally thick with this question: Will the Crimean SSR be within Russia or the Ukraine? Why is this question not on the ballot?

[Arbuzov] Undoubtedly, the 1954 decision on transferring the Crimea from Russia to the Ukraine deserves a most impartial political evaluation. However, this transfer was legitimized not only by the Supreme Soviet of the Union, but also by the Supreme Soviets of Russia and the Ukraine, that is, at an interrepublic level. Obviously, the issue of the Crimea may be reconsidered either on the initiative of the RSFSR with the consent of the Ukraine, or at the request of the Ukraine, or by the USSR Supreme Soviet with the consent of both republics. In addition, a treaty between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR signed in late November of last year secured the mutual recognition of the inviolability of currently existing borders between the republics. Therefore, we should proceed toward autonomy **along a constitutional path** because any other path will be associated with separatism, which is based on irresponsibility.

[Mokrishchev] However, the very alternative "Russia or the Ukraine" is not a matter of chance?

[Arbuzov] Indeed, it is not a matter of chance. As I see it, two circumstances that, incidentally, are not associated with the year 1954, give grounds for it. The first circumstance: In the Crimea, they viewed as unacceptable the situation that is being fueled by the Ukrainian Republican Party, the democratic wing of Rukh, and Narodnaya Rada in the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine, that is, an appeal for the Ukraine to not sign the Union Treaty. Given this scenario, an autonomous republic has a right to make a determination on its own. Incidentally, it is precisely for this reason that our oblast Trade Union Federation has refrained from joining the Federation of the Ukrainian Trade Unions. Secondly, the law "On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR," which suggests a

wholesale Ukrainization of all the peoples of the Crimea, has aroused much censure. Let me recall that the status of an autonomous republic makes it possible for us to adopt our own law on languages in such a situation.

Finally, in the event the Crimean ASSR is restored, it will structure its relations with the Ukraine, Russia, and other republics on a bilateral, mutually advantageous basis as a party to the Union treaty. It may be supposed that the notion of territorial affiliation with regard to the Crimea will lose its meaning as the union is renewed.

[Mokrishchev] One final question. Why did the council of your federation need to adopt a special resolution on the stand of the trade unions on the referendum?

[Arbuzov] First of all, for the considerations that I have already stated in part in the course of our conversation. The issue of bringing harmony to interethnic relations in the Crimea has now become foremost, and the trade union organizations cannot remain indifferent. Not all of us take the same view of the referendum. Thus, the leaders of the Crimean-Tatar national movement have been urging the Crimean Tatars to boycott the referendum. If the views of the leaders of this movement prevail among the people, ethnic and general civic notions will be thus confused, and an actual step toward nationalism will be taken. I believe that this would be a demonstration of adherence to the idea of "the primacy of the indigenous nation." However, it is impossible to create a "national state" in the Crimea without infringing on the rights of citizens of other nationalities.

Only the Crimean ASSR on an international basis, as a subject of a renewed federation and a party to the Union treaty, will ensure the complete equality and free development of all the peoples populating our Crimean land. This is why the FNPK calls on all members of trade unions to take part in the first popular referendum in the history of the Crimea on 20 January.

Caucasus

RSFSR Deputy Deplores Georgian Nationalism

91US0291A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 9 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by M. Tsikhiyev, producer, people's deputy of the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Honored Artist of the RSFSR, and member of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee: "Will They Defend or Sell Out?"]

[Text] We have gotten used to a lot of things over the last several years. To the enumeration of regions where declared and undeclared civil war is going on; to the unprecedented statements and to the still more unprecedented actions of the latter-day leaders of these regions.

"God, forgive them, for they know not what they do," was said two millennia ago. As is known, insights came

later, and each time humanity paid too high a price for them. But if the experience of the past would have added reason...

Is it really possible that, given the history of our country, we are doomed to a late enlightenment, and that our people will have to pay a bloody tribute only so that the loud mouths today in parliaments and on public squares understand what's what and look truth in the face. A truth that some stubbornly do not heed. A truth that others are not capable of heeding. A truth that still others deliberately spurn, so that—God forbid!—others do not see it. In the end, a truth that the first, second, or third are in no hurry to look in the eyes. But it is necessary to hurry, because sooner or later we will have to look. But then only through eyes filled with blood.

For that which is approaching us in the north and south of the country in quite specific republics is nothing other than common fascism with all of its inhuman essence.

I want to call things by their true names. We have had enough of pretending that nothing in particular is happening.

A half century ago in the center of Europe things also started out with appeals that are not unlike those slogans that can be heard today—"Lithuania only for Lithuanians" and "Georgia only for Georgians." Things also got started then with the sense of superiority of one nation over another. And today their spiritual successors do not hesitate to put residence and language qualifications into effect, and their southern brothers loudly declare: "Ossetians always were and will be our slaves!" They are already thinking about depriving nonindigenous people of the right to have more than two children in a family.

And has South Ossetia not already become a real ghetto, suffocating in the ring of an economic blockade, cut off from the external world, deprived of radio, newspapers, gas, water, electric power and fuel, heat and foodstuffs, and medicines, and cordoned off on all sides by pickets of armed militants. For the time being, they are only shooting at the feet of those people who dare to come out of their houses—this is the order of the government of Georgia. For the time being, they only chase people who dare to drive out on the street into water up to their waist in the winter, and they keep them there for hours, from time to time shooting over their heads with assault rifles.

But in the evening they break into the houses of Ossetians, looting. In the villages of Kekhvi and Otrevi they took away motor vehicles and drove them away. In the village of Aviyevi they took away 13 head of cattle. In the village of Yeredvi they took food products. In the village of Artsevi, milk that was intended for Tskhinvali kindergartens. I mention only events of three days in South Ossetia—23-25 December of last year. But this is happening every day for the second month now. Called to arms by a speech of Zviad Gamsakhurdia on Georgian television, it cannot be denied that the young men from the national guard feel their "patriotic" duty deeply...

Using the full blockade of the autonomous oblast, the mass media of the Republic of Georgia launched a wide-scale anti-Ossetian nationalistic campaign. Thousands of people driven to exultation are ready to invade the state of emergency area. Georgian television is being particularly successful in fomenting hysteria, stirring up the whole population of the republic against the Ossetians. The designation "South Ossetia" disappeared from newspapers, journals, and radio and television long before the decision of the session of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet concerning the abolition of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. The idea of its abolition was spread long ago among the Georgian nationalists, and all that was needed was an excuse...

It was provided by the South Ossetian Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies decision of 20 September last year to increase the status of its state organization and by the elections that were held afterward. I—like many Ossetians, it can be said an overwhelming majority of the Ossetian people—do not justify this act, which was made not without pressure on the part of the informal movements. Our people fully and unconditionally support the provision of the ukase of the USSR president dated 7 January of this year: "On Certain Legislative Acts Adopted in December 1990 in the Georgian SSR," and that part of them concerning the incompetent decisions of the South Ossetia deputy session. But we also understand that an attempt was made to defend themselves against the hopelessness that is impending for the Ossetian people in Georgia.

But was this step, even if it was a mistake, enough of a reason to cross out with one stroke the blood, fraternal, economic, cultural, and spiritual ties that for more than a thousand years bound the Ossetian and Georgian people, to strike at the hearts and families of tens and hundreds of thousands of people, and to declare Ossetians enemies of the Georgian people? Especially since on 18 January the session of the people's deputies of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast supported the ukase of the USSR president and approved it for strict implementation.

I saw leaflets on the streets of Tbilisi that called on people of non-Georgian nationality, including local Ossetians, to fight against rebellious Ossetians. In addition, it was emphasized, they said, that who is not with us is against us, and let him leave Georgia. The very same Ossetians who refuse to support Georgia will still go to assault Tskhinvali with women and children in front of the Georgian columns. "We will do this with force!" It should not be surprising after this that among those who declared a hunger strike against the ukase of the USSR president were also Ossetians who live outside the boundaries of South Ossetia and who are doing this (by their admission) under threat of physical reprisal against their families, and that, under the muzzle of assault rifles, signatures are appearing against the existence of a South Ossetian autonomy.

It is not only the Ossetians who are feeling the pressure of discrimination in Georgia today, but also those Abkhazians and Armenians who are leaving Georgia by the thousands, Azerbaijanis who are leaving places they occupied for a long time, and representatives of other people who lived here for centuries.

Recently, more than 15,000 persons of Ossetian nationality left Georgia, mainly to North Ossetia. On the whole, the number of Ossetians who were forced at different times to leave Georgia as a result of a discriminatory policy conducted against them has already exceeded 80,000 persons. Persons numbering 160,000 of Ossetian nationality have ended up in the role of temporary residents in Georgia.

Today the Georgian parliament adopted a decision that is unprecedented in the history of the civilized world—an entire people has been deprived of its own statehood.

This picture is painfully familiar to Ossetians of the older generation. The new leadership of Georgia believes itself to be the successor in every way of the government of the so-called democratic Georgia of the times of Zhordaniya.

History has come full circle... And, finally, what is behind all of this, what hidden driving forces are determining the confrontation that is still erroneously given an interethnic character? I appeal to my colleagues in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation headed by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. I make so bold as to assert that the confrontation in South Ossetia is so much a Russian problem that it is impossible to imagine a greater one. It is understandable that the parliament of Russia, dropping all matters, anxiously discussed the events in the Baltics, but how can it be explained that you, Boris Nikolayevich, and your colleagues, for three tragic days and nights of bloody events in South Ossetia did not mention or express your opinion about the reprisals against a people that is small in number? The population of South Ossetia today, as then in 1920, does not share separatist feelings and the extreme aspirations of the Georgian nationalists. Having once and for all made their historic choice—to be together with Russia—the Ossetian people were loyal to Russia in the days of its victories and troubles, and will remain loyal to it forever, no matter what the cost.

No temporary rulers have been authorized to interfere with this choice.

I frankly feel sorry for those of my colleagues from the parliament of the Russian Federation who speak now in the role of defenders, not knowing whom they are defending...

It is time today for everyone to understand that a people small in number needs more than only horizontal ties between regions, republics, and nations that are still in the country's structure. As a condition and as a guarantee of their national existence, they also need vertical authoritative structures of relations in the country, and

they need a common principle that would also guard their interests. This is why the people of South Ossetia, condemning the activities of the Georgian government, support the Assembly of Mountain People of the North Caucasus. This is why the All-Union Association of National-State and National-Territorial Organizations and Peoples, who do not have their own statehood, severely condemn the measures instituted in Georgia against the population of South Ossetia.

But where are you, the ardent defenders of democracy? Or can you still not discern savage nationalism at all? Have you still really not understood that there are definite forces that are interested in the conflict spilling across the Caucasian mountain range and spreading initially into North Ossetia and afterward even farther, if not to all of the Caucasus then at least to its northern part?

Why does no one demand an answer from Issa Kostoyev, RSFSR people's deputy from Checheno-Ingushetiya, as to who authorized him to say at a session of the Georgian Supreme Soviet that the Georgians and the Ingush have a common enemy—the Ossetians... Georgian militants have long since set up close contacts with nationalistic and informal movements of various regions of the country, and it is difficult to foresee from precisely which direction a perfidious shot will be fired into the back of our barely emerging democracy...

...These connections once again let us know implicitly that it is not the Georgian people who are to blame for what is happening... Because there are very many Georgians alongside us today in South and North Ossetia who share together with the Ossetians the pain of what is happening. They, as do we, condemn separatism and extremism and, not being frightened by their militants, are raising their voices in defense of the Ossetian people.

We know the Georgian people from time immemorial to be a wise, good, and sincere people. I have enough tears to shed for both the Ossetians and Georgians who have perished, because one and the other are our children.

But I trust the reason of the Georgian people, and I trust the reason of those of my Georgian friends, colleagues, and comrades with whom long years of good contacts brought us together.

I had not finished writing the last sentence when I was informed by telephone that the situation in South Ossetia was getting extremely hot and that all the militant subunits are pulling up toward its borders...

Violence in South Ossetia Continues

91US0234A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 26 Feb 91 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Shchedrin: "They Are Taking Hostages"]

[Text] A three-day lull which was registered in South Ossetia after 20 February ended in the situation in the

region deteriorating again. Neither mutual disarmament nor a beginning of negotiations between the opposing sides occurred.

The editorial office was informed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] press center that armed clashes, mutual hostage taking, and other extremist actions resumed on 24 February.

There were more casualties. According to preliminary data, unknown persons killed four people, including a militia employee, and wounded eight people in the village of Aznevi, Znaurskiy Rayon. Shots were fired from automatic weapons. A Zhiguli car was found in the vicinity of the above village with two more bodies inside. Five grenades, two rocket projectiles, seven firearms, and ammunition were confiscated at the location of the incident.

Positions of the USSR MVD units came under fire three times in the past day. The fire caused no casualties.

New features of the wave of violent actions which is sweeping South Ossetia are emerging. The opposing sides resort increasingly often to taking hostages, which merely causes an unfavorable response.

According to information given by G. Kvantaliani, commandant of the state-of-emergency region, the Ossetian side took two groups of hostages of five and 12 people.

One more report: A convoy of trucks carrying national-economy freight en route from Dzhava was stopped in the village of Kurta by employees of the Georgian militia and armed civilians. Ammunition was found in several vehicles in the course of freight inspection. This fact was used as a pretext for taking 30 Ossetians hostage.

Georgian Decree on Credentials Commission

91US0248C Tbilisi *ZARYA VOSTOKA* in Russian
21 Dec 90 p 1

["Decree of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet on the Transformation of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Credentials Commission Into a Single Permanent Credentials Commission and a Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Commission on Deputy's Ethics"]

[Text] The Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet decrees:

To transform the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Credentials Commission into a single Permanent Credentials Commission and a Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet commission on deputy's ethics.

[Signed] Z. Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet

[Dated] Tbilisi, 20 December 1990

Central Asia

Kirghiz President at Osh on Past, Future

91US0311A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 15 Jan 91 p 2

[Unattributed report: "To Act Together in a Well-Considered and Reliable Manner: The Speech of the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, A. Akayev, at a Session of the Osh Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies"; usage of "Kirghiz," "Kyrgyz," and "Kyrgyzstan" as published]

[Text] Our dialogue, which I hope will be frank, sincere, and honest, cannot be conducted in isolation from the problems that are worrying our entire country and all our republics. We are living in one of the most difficult periods of our history. I have already compared the winter of 1991 to the cruel winter of 1941. In both cases, it could have been a question of the life and fate of the country, and of its future. Then there was a military crisis, now it is an economic crisis, but the scale of social tension is just as great.

I am sometimes struck by the serenity in which we live. Burdened with our own everyday cares we do not see what is happening outside the windows of our apartments, outside our own oblast or rayon. We do not sense the susurrations of the storms that are literally shaking the world around us.

I say this because it is possible to understand the state of affairs in Osh Oblast and to define ways to extricate ourselves from the critical situation only in the context of the state of affairs in the republic and in the Union as a whole.

It would be an unforgivable mistake to disavow the entire past. But our inability to think critically about this past, and the position of nonparticipation assumed by each of us toward what was and toward what must be done, are also a tragic mistake.

It must be admitted honestly that we in the republic have never achieved even the average standards of a developed society in terms of living standard. Almost 1.5 million people have a total monthly income of less than 75 rubles [R], that is, are on the poverty line. Within the republic we can count 140,000 unofficially unemployed persons, of whom three-fourths are young people under 30. The inability to solve the housing problem and provide preschool facilities for children has become a chronic ill. Essentially there is no effective public health system. Working and living conditions for most of the population, particularly the rural population, are such that it might be a question of a line behind which destruction of the gene fund of our people and their physical, intellectual, and moral degradation are inevitable.

An unprecedented increase in prices and extreme confusion in money circulation are being observed, and the

situation in the consumer market has deteriorated sharply. Against the backdrop of an absolute decline in the scales of production, the queues in half-empty stores, which are humiliating for human dignity, have in our times become the usual sorry picture.

Our political legacy is paradoxical. On the one hand we have as the main conduit of political standards the party apparatus, in which there is no requirement for the intellectual or managerial potential essential for our transformations. On the other hand, we have the domination of that apparatus in political life, uncontrolled by the party or the people, together with ideological monopoly, political demagoguery, and political sanctimony and hypocrisy.

We have an imperfect mechanism of political power that suppresses any kind of opposition and blocks any kind of initiative unless sanctioned from above. This includes the dominance of carbon-copy forms of activity, and even carbon copies of soviet power.

Over the past 10 years crime has almost doubled. The black market, which is assuming increasing scale and intensity, has been virtually legalized. Organized crime is gaining strength.

We have been convinced that we have been building socialism, but in fact in terms of many indicators the republic is at the level of a developing country. And our problems are in many ways similar.

Thus, we have a crisis of ideology, a crisis of statehood, an economic crisis, and a political crisis. We must recognize that unless we resolve and reveal the primary cause of the crisis, we shall be forced constantly to reproduce new problems and new crises whose consequences may be extremely destructive both for the country as a whole and for the individual republics and for peoples large and small. And if we think about our future and our children's future, then we have no solution other than to solve the problems ourselves and for ourselves to find a way to extricate ourselves from crisis. It goes without saying, as part of a renewed Union.

So what is the road along which we should now move? I think that we have just one road, namely, the road of building the kind of society in which equality of the individual and collective interests is achieved, in which there would be de facto and de jure equality of all forms of ownership, in which "the free development of each person is a condition for the free development of all."

There is no doubt the road to this kind of society will be hard and long. But for all of us, one thing should be clear, namely, that a republic rocked by economic, national, and parochial discord, cannot have a future, cannot have reliable partners in either the sphere of economics or politics.

The next issue I must deal with is the reasons for the tragic events in Osh. It seems to me that we must distinguish three main groups of reasons.

The First Group. These are problems of an economic and social nature. We are manifestly underestimating the social and economic sources of the tragedy at Osh. Essentially, for many years there was one-sided development of the oblast's economy. On the one hand, industry was developed in limited spaces, in small towns and settlements, where we saw a concentration of extractive and processing sectors (the cities of Mayli-Say, Tash-Kumyr, Kadamdzay, Sulyutka, and others). True, these are mainly enterprises of all-Union industry and all-Union subordination, and in the interests of objectivity it must be said that their production interests did push development of the social sphere in the oblast into second place. And here, I think, we must ask both the republic leaders and the oblast leaders why they were unconcerned about your problems and assumed the stance of an observer on the side.

On the other hand, most of the population was employed in agricultural production, where heavy manual labor dominated, and there was a monopoly of two kinds of crops—cotton and tobacco. Essentially only these crops were being grown in the oblast and they were at once the main source of its problems and the main sphere of employment for the population. This all had to reflect on the relationships between the main population groups and between the urban and rural populations, and had to lead to distortions in cadre policy. All the problems of an economic nature were deepened by the unresolved social tasks: The chronic shortages of housing and cultural and public health facilities and the poor development of the social infrastructure created great tension in relations between the urban and rural populations and between different ethnic groupings. I consider the high level of unemployment for young people not engaged in socially useful work to be one of the main reasons for destabilization. How could we have just sat on our hands when a hundred thousand young people were looking for work, when their energy, unfortunately, was being used for by no means the best form of employment. Add to this the fact that in Osh more than 12,000 families were on the waiting list for apartments.

I would like particularly to emphasize that unemployment among the population and unresolved social problems create around large cities a zone of high social tension.

When I was preparing for my meeting with you I naturally asked that appropriate statistics be prepared. On the basis of a corresponding statistical analysis I would like to show the dynamics of the economic and social processes in the oblast, and consider the successes and failures together with you.

When I received these figures and when my aides started to wed them to more or less objective indicators, it turned out that they by no means reflect the true state of affairs.

I think that this is a striking indicator of the illusory prosperity in which the oblast has lived for many years.

You will agree that the most gloomy real life is many times better than a sweet dream of social self-deception.

The Second Group. These are problems pertaining to cadre policy and ideology. In my opinion, behind the outward prosperity in the state of affairs in the oblast and the triumphal reports and red banners is hidden a cancerous tumor of cadre degeneration. It was precisely in those long years of stagnation that there was an immeasurable enrichment of the representatives of the nomenklatura, trade, law enforcement organs—all those who stood at the center of power and handled distribution. At the same time, the simple workers and peasants did not enjoy even the most elementary social safeguards. Bitter though it is to admit it, we must acknowledge that a stratification of society took place according to property and social position, a stratification into poor and rich, empowered and unempowered, the disenfranchised and those possessing all power. In the days when those tragic events took place in Osh, the degenerate cadres were objectively unable to handle or control the situation. Moreover, these people often helped to inflame passions and kindle interethnic dissension. And so the tragic finale was a natural thing.

The Third Group. This is the deformed, one-sided understanding of the role of any nation, and its exclusivity. It includes the low level of standards in interethnic relations. Under conditions in which political processes and pluralism of political trends are being activated, we could have expected an outburst of national self-awareness in the form of informal associations and movements. However, those processes could not be controlled by the oblast leadership, and, moreover, they were underestimated and not predicted. Even though there were many examples in the country of the tragic consequences to which lack of concern can lead in this matter. Instead of actively influencing the processes involved in establishment of the informal associations and movements, the leadership pursued an extremely inconsistent and contradictory policy, now banning these movements, now offering them full political action. It was not happenstance that given the diverse ethnic makeup of the population in the oblast, these processes objectively contained within themselves the seeds of future interethnic conflicts.

In concluding my remarks about the events in Osh it is necessary to answer two questions, namely, what must be done in order to eliminate the consequences of what has happened? And, what must be done in order to prevent a repetition of this nightmare?

In the most general sense, we may distinguish first of all an entire set of rapid response measures, a kind of political surgery, so to speak. They include making those to blame liable, both those who have committed very serious crimes and those who voluntarily or involuntarily have furthered them. This includes compensation

for damages caused to people upon whom great grief has been visited and who have lost those near and dear to them, whose houses have been burned, and whose property has been destroyed and stolen. Naturally, we cannot return the dead to life. But we are obligated to show a profound and sincere understanding, sympathy, compassion, and humaneness, and provide compensation for property losses.

Quick response measures include decisive restructuring of work with the informal movements and associations, and establishment of permanent businesslike cooperation with authoritative representatives of the various ethnic communities and groups. They also include problems associated with a qualitatively new level of activity by law enforcement agencies.

Interethnic relations represent a cross-section of all other social relations—economic, social, cultural, political. They change in line with changes in the economy, politics, culture, and everyday life. And, in this connection, I must repeat myself on the subject of political therapy for interethnic tension. It will require much time and effort within the general channel of our economic and cultural work.

From the very first days after I took up the post of president, letters have been arriving from Osh Oblast. They have expressed dissatisfaction with the socioeconomic, scientific and technical, and cultural development of the south of the republic compared to the northern regions. Attention is drawn to the inadequate representation of the people from the south in the republic's leading organs. Special emphasis is laid on the lagging in the fields of science, education, and culture.

There is but one reason for this lagging. The republic leadership is to blame. If we pose the question thus, then let us remember who they were, these leaders who have brought about the situation in the south.

Perhaps it was Abdykadyr Orozbekov, who worked as chairman of the Central Executive Committee from 1926 to 1936? For it was during his time that the republic was established.

Or perhaps it was Iskhak Razzakov, who made an outstanding contribution to development in all spheres of life in Kyrgyzstan? For 11 years (1950-1961), he was first secretary of the Republic Communist Party Central Committee.

Or was it the legendary Torobay Kulatov, who in 1938 was the chairman of the Council of People's Commissioners, and from 1945 for a period of 33 years was chairman of the Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium? Or Abdy Suyerkulov, who was chairman of the Council of Ministers during the 1950's?

It was specifically during the time of I. Razzakov, T. Kulatov, and A. Suyerkulov that the Academy of Sciences, the Kirghiz State University, and our other higher educational and cultural institutions were founded. It

was specifically in the time of I. Razzakov, T. Kulatov, and A. Suyerkulov that our first academicians and corresponding members and professors and docents were elected. So just think for yourselves who deserves the credit for the number of academicians in the north and in the south.

We recognize the enormous role that these exceptional people played in the history of our republic as they led economic and cultural development for almost 50 years.

And indeed, representatives of the south of Kyrgyzstan are playing a by no means insignificant role in our republic's political leadership. For many years Absamat Masaliyevich has been engaged in leading work and since 1985 has been the first secretary of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee. Or take our other esteemed leaders: Ulugbek Kozhomzharovich Chinaliyev, has for five years been heading the party organization in the capital—the industrial, scientific, educational, and cultural center. But why does he not offer support for cultural development in the south? Amanbay Zhunusovich Zhunusov, Central Committee secretary for agriculture. Mamat Maripovich Aybalayev, first deputy chairman of the Republic State Planning Committee. Why are they not working together to eliminate the structural disproportions in the economy in the southern region and the one-sided development of agriculture? And what about our esteemed ministers, comrades A. Toktosartov and B. Ismailov? What is preventing them from resolving cultural and public health problems in their own region?

These are your cadres, comrades. Let them not engage in political demagoguery, but rather let them work. And let them give proper attention, not with words but with deeds, to development of the south of the republic. I would not dare to be presumptuous, but since I am president of the academy I have been able to open a scientific research institute for you.

I am simply astonished that those who are fighting for the interests of the south of the republic are making no reference to the Communist Party Central Committee Bureau, which for more than five years has been working under the leadership of A. Masaliyev, but are turning for support to the Presidential Council, which has been operating for only five weeks.

But it would be incorrect to believe that the reason for the inadequate development of science, culture, and education in the south of the republic is the inattention of the central organs of power to its needs.

The reason is deeper and it is hidden in the structural disproportions of the economy. There is no social sphere in the countryside; it has not been developed. Agriculture is based on a monocultural system, and produces mainly cotton and tobacco. With this kind of economic structure we shall be constantly reproducing social and political conflicts.

Some of the measures to resolve these problems have been noted in my first message to the Republic Supreme Soviet. They include priority development of the countryside, providing incentive for all small-scale forms of farming, and the creation of industrial development zones in rural localities.

It is essential to develop science and education. We are working in this direction. The Southern Kyrgyz Training-and-Scientific Center has been set up here in Osh. The center is now made up of the following:

- the academy Scientific Research Institute for the Comprehensive Utilization of Natural Resources in the Region, with 17 scientific laboratories, in which 180 people work;
- a college of technology—a new kind of higher educational institution that is designed to train our engineering and economic cadres. Doctor of Economic Sciences Pirmat Kupuyevich Kupuyev, who is a native of Naukat, has been appointed director;
- a boarding school lyceum for gifted children;
- an international school for managers.

There is no other such training-and-scientific association either in Kyrgyzstan or the neighboring republics.

We intend in the long term to expand the network of higher and secondary specialized educational establishments. We are also planning, as it becomes necessary and possible, to open several more scientific institutes and on that basis organize a South Kyrgyz branch of the Republic Academy of Sciences. The question of converting the pedagogical institute at the university to a medical faculty is being examined.

In this connection I would like to note the following. Like you, I am aware of the sorry condition of this institute. Who should be concerned about it? All the time you are demanding that we open institutes for you, but you cannot even maintain what you already have. Think about this, please.

The written appeal from Comrade M. Borbugulov cannot be left unanswered.

His letter contains a proposal to split the republic into two regions—north and south—by means of underpinning this proposal in the Constitution of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. It is also proposed that equal representation be established for the two regions in all organs of state power and management at all levels.

In addition, he proposes that two independent republics—the South Kyrgyz Republic and the North Kyrgyz Republic—be proclaimed, with their subsequent unification in a federation.

Driven by his own emotions, the author of the letter also calls for the proclamation of South Kirghiziya as an independent republic, as part of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic or some other state.

I would have approached this with some understanding, even by today's benchmarks of ultraradicalism, if his starting point had been as a young "Green."

But what is this gray-haired old gentleman inciting us to do? To split the Kyrgyz people, to split our history, to move along a dead-end path of development. Such a step might lead to tragic consequences for our entire people.

We are seeking union with other peoples, but he is proposing that we divide our people. Such parochial sentiments have a tendency to spread also among the smaller formations—rayons and villages, tribes and clans. History is filled with examples of tribalism leading to the disappearance of entire states and peoples from the geographical map. It is incomprehensible what moves a man when he proposes such monstrous "recipes."

We must live together, and together resolve difficult problems; there is no other road for the Kyrgyz people. This must be stated to you quite definitely. We shall ourselves fight decisively against manifestations of separatism, and against any kind of attempts to achieve regional divisions. And I hope for the support of the people and for your support, dear comrades.

* * *

A few words about cadres. The policy of perestroika has given us true democracy. But we are quite often starting to abuse it. And in terms of the cadre issue, we elect and want to have only our own local leader. And this kind of approach is observed at all levels—oblast and rayon, and the level of local economies. But all cadres must be selected for their business qualities.

Surely it is right, is it not, that construction of the entire cascade of the hydroelectric power station on the Naryn River should be led by Comrade K. Khuriyev from the Caucasus? Or that construction in the oblast is being done by Russian USSR people's deputy Yu.G. Gorbunov? Is it a bad thing that the training-and-scientific center is being led by Professor A. Dzhamanbayev, who hails from the north of the republic? Many such examples could be cited. Are these people going to carry off what they are creating? Perhaps, on the contrary, where we see a shortage of local cadres we should invite more specialists from other regions, and indeed from other republics, and perhaps even from abroad.

* * *

Another aspect is that they are writing that the Institute for the Comprehensive Utilization of Natural Resources established under the South Kyrgyz Training and Scientific Center has allegedly "become a place of refuge for persons banished from Frunze city for various reasons." Let us take a look at the people who head the scientific laboratories at the institute. They include Dzhapar Tekenov, five minutes away from being a doctor

of sciences, invited by the Frunze Polytechnical Institute, a native of Suzak. There is Doctor of Technical Sciences Professor Mukhamed Tashaliyevich Mamasaidov, invited from the Academy of Sciences as a major expert on mineral recovery and processing, who was born in Aravan. The young and promising scientist Alimzhan Tashbolotov from the Fergana Polytechnical Institute, a native of Kurshab, for whom we have organized a laboratory. Or that same Professor A. Dzhamanbayev, whom you elected as a republic people's deputy and member of the party oblast committee. These are "those banished from the capital city" who we have chosen literally "from the leavings."

These letters and the collections of signatures beneath them are being organized precisely at the moment when we need stability as much as we need bread.

Comrade deputies, the over wintering of cattle is now taking place, and it is a complicated one, and in some places early lambing has started. And what of those who have suffered from the earthquake? They must be our priority concern. In this situation, should we distract the people from their vitally important business? I believe that this would be impermissible and criminal. A small group of people representing the still resisting but discredited command administrative system is engaged in organizing this separatism according to region, and writing various kinds of letters and telegrams and collecting signatures.

Under the conditions prevailing in the state of emergency still imposed in Osh Oblast, these and other actions are regarded as sabotage, and steps must be taken adequate to the status of the state of emergency.

Apropos the question of the alleged policy of protectionism with respect to representatives from the northern regions of the republic, I would like to draw your attention to the following. Dear comrades, cadres are not only being promoted but are promoting themselves. Very often this process is not being regulated from above, but is taking place according to its own internal rules. Because of the different historical circumstances in the different regions of the republic, each has its own traditions in its political platform, its own level of culture and education. This should not be altered by any kind of decisions of the moment. Let me state very candidly that you can scarcely cite any fact showing that any representative from the north of the republic has been given preference over a representative from the south, regardless of his business qualities.

The issue here is something else. Vigorous action is needed to generate an upsurge in the general level of culture and education in the south, and we are on that road and going down it. Creation of the technological college, which we have already discussed here, is only a first step on this road.

The U.S. Sydykov affair deserves special attention.

On 15 December 1990, I signed an ukase dismissing him from his post as chairman of the Osh Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies. This ukase was greeted with general approval and a positive response both within the republic and beyond. The fact is that U.S. Sydykov is well known, not only in the republic but throughout the Union, and even in countries abroad. And, very unfortunately, he is known not only for his own positive activity, but also in connection with the tragic events in Osh, which, as has been rightly noted in the press, were in scale greater than dozens of Sumgait. In fact those events stand in one of the first places in the sorrowful ranks of bloody interethnic conflicts in recent years in our country, and indeed throughout the world. And this is what is amazing. In all cases, except for the events in Osh, as a rule the political leaders involved in the interethnic conflicts, regardless of the degree of their guilt, have resigned. In many cases, as, for example, the former first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, Patiashvili, at their own initiative. They have all been seized by a sense of political responsibility and political self-criticism. As far as U.S. Sydykov is concerned, possessing total political power in the oblast, he showed himself to be an unprecedented model of total loss of any sense either of self-criticism or responsibility.

Think about it for yourselves. In line with the Constitution of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the presidential ukase dismissing U.S. Sydykov needs no kind of confirmation on the part of the oblast soviet. The ukase went into force from the moment of its publication and could be appealed only in the oblast soviet. Until the matter of this appeal was reviewed by a session of the oblast soviet, U.S. Sydykov did not retain any rights as soviet chairman. He had to yield up his powers immediately to his deputy. And how did he conduct himself? He refused to comply with the ukase of the president of the republic, and entered into conflict with the republic state authorities, thus threatening a new spiral in the social tension and new tragic events. In short, he once again convincingly confirmed his total lack of the qualities needed in a political leader, his lack of political standards, and lack of any sense of state discipline.

In his statement to the session of the oblast soviet, in refutation of the ukase U.S. Sydykov made reference to two factors: first, its actual lack of justification, and second, the violation of laws on the status of a deputy.

With respect to actual lack of justification for the ukase: U.S. Sydykov's incompetence and his impotence in preventing the tragic events and in eliminating their consequences were established both by the official investigations and by a great deal of evidence reflected on the pages of the central press. This evidence was not refuted by the court or in any other legal manner, and there can be no doubt as to its reliability. Neither is it a question of impermissible populism and flirting with the informal movements, nor of failing to react to signals from the organs of state security (which U.S. Sydykov called

"ponies that no one needs"), nor of a facile approach to the allocation of land or loss of control over events, nor anything else.

U.S. Sydykov makes reference to violation of Article 36 of the USSR law: "On the Status of USSR People's Deputies," specifically that as a USSR people's deputy he cannot be released from his service obligations without the agreement of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In this connection, I would like to cite from Article 36, Clause 1 of this law: "During the period of his powers, a USSR people's deputy may not be dismissed from his work at an enterprise, establishment, or organization at the initiative of the administration without the agreement of the USSR Supreme Soviet." It is obvious that the president, as head of a sovereign state, can in no way be placed in the category of the administration of an enterprise or particular organization, and naturally has no need of any kind of agreement from any other organ outside the republic in order to exercise the powers given to him by the people of the Republic and the Constitution of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

I must also deal with one more issue which, it seems to me, is of great political importance. A planned campaign of criticism of the president of the republic has recently been conducted on the pages of a number of the local newspapers. It seems to me that the main thought in this campaign is to destabilize the situation in the Republic. It is all being done under the slogan of expanded democracy and affirmation of pluralism in the political life of the republic. But democracy is a summary category that includes both freedom and responsibility. The greater the freedom, the greater the responsibility; that is one of the principles of democracy. Violation of this principle leads to permissiveness, anarchy, and political frenzy. Attacks on the head of state and abuse directed against the state authorities and the state achievements of the nation are not permitted in any state, let alone a civilized state. You understand that this is not a matter of personalities, but of the principles involved in the normal functioning of democratic rule-of-law state.

It is extremely symptomatic that this entire political witches' sabbath on the pages of the local party press is taking place with the tacit consent of the oblast leadership and the republic party organization. That same leadership that reacted in the toughest and most decisive way to any critical statement directed at it by the central press.

I would like my statement to be received with a proper degree of seriousness. As a wish for political cooperation, as a wish to observe the elementary standards of political ethics. In this case, I am driven by one aim, one interest, one desire: namely, not to further complicate the desire for unity and mutual activity for the people of our republic.

Now, the subject of the prospects for the building of a rule-of-law state. I would like to share with you the plans for this. I see the prospects in this sphere of public life in our republic and in Osh Oblast as follows: First, in strengthening statehood and consolidating centralized state control at all territorial levels; second, in developing the broadest opportunities for local self-government and local initiative; third, in raising the level of professionalism in management; fourth, in publishing legislative enactments aimed at providing every possible kind of safeguard for the rights, freedoms, and interests of the republic's citizens (economic, cultural, political); fifth, and last, in creating the kind of state organs and the kind of state apparatus that would carry out in a worthy manner the function of safeguarding the interests of citizens.

Dear comrades, I started by comparing our serious, critical situation today with the winter of 1941. In doing this I wanted to underscore all the complexity and drama of real life today. However, when we turn to the events of 1941, we should also at the same time be reaffirmed with a great optimism. The fact is that in those difficult moments of history, because of certain sociological laws, a very great energy was generated in our people and they were imbued with great strength, and outstanding personalities appeared. In such cases, the cause culminates in victory. I believe deeply in our talented people, in the people of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, in you, dear people of Osh.

I am sure that if we work together, if the republic state authorities and the oblast self-government work together, our present alarms of winter will be replaced with a spring of great successes.

There is an organizational matter on the agenda for the session. I hope that you will elect to the post of chairman of the oblast soviet he who is most worthy among you, from your own milieu. I am ready to confirm him.

Thank you for your attention.

Turkmen SSR Law on Prophylactic Measures Against AIDS

91US0308A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 28 Jan 91 p 2

[Law of the Turkmen SSR on Preventive Measures Against AIDS, promulgated in Ashkhabad on 10 Jan 91]

[Text] **Article 1.** Citizens of the TuSSR and other citizens of the USSR, together with citizens of foreign countries and persons without citizenship, are guaranteed the right to undergo medical testing for evidence of the immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) virus under conditions of anonymity. Institutions of public health and their treatment facilities are responsible to ensure the security of such testing for medical personnel as well as for persons examined.

Article 2. Persons who have undergone medical testing in accordance with the provisions of this law, if there is evidence of the AIDS virus, shall be informed in writing by the public health authorities of the necessity for taking proper precautions to prevent the spread of this disease and of criminal liability for deliberately placing others at risk.

Article 3. Citizens of the TuSSR and other citizens of the USSR, as well as citizens of foreign countries and persons without citizenship residing in the TuSSR on a permanent or temporary basis, pursuant to a decision by the public health authorities, shall be required to undergo medical testing if there is reason to believe that they have been infected with the AIDS virus.

Persons identified as having this infection shall be placed under quarantine for preventive purposes.

Regulations pertaining to medical testing and quarantine shall be determined by the TuSSR Ministry of Public Health in accordance with the provisions of this law. They shall be published, and should be brought to public attention.

Article 4. Persons who in the judgment of public health authorities are required to appear for purposes of medical testing or quarantine control shall report to these authorities upon written notification.

TuSSR citizens and other citizens of the USSR, together with those without citizenship residing in TuSSR territory, who without sufficient reason fail to report, as required, for purposes of medical certification or quarantine shall be turned over to the medical authorities with the help of persons employed at public health institutions or if necessary by the local militia.

In the event of a disagreement with the decision taken by the health authorities, the decision may be appealed before higher-ranking health authorities or in court.

Article 5. Citizens of foreign countries and persons without citizenship who avoid medical certification or quarantine control requirements are subject to deportation from the USSR pursuant to Article 31, Sec. 1, Par. 2 of the "Legal Provisions for Foreign Citizens in the USSR," dated 24 June 1981.

Diplomatic personnel of foreign diplomatic missions and consulates, as well as others enjoying diplomatic privileges in the TuSSR, may be tested for the AIDS virus only with their permission. The TuSSR Ministry of Public Health concurs with the TuSSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Economic Relations in proposing that these persons voluntarily undergo testing.

Article 6. The deliberate subjection of one person by another to the danger of contagion or the infection of another with the AIDS virus by a person who is aware of having the disease shall entail criminal liability.

Medical personnel and others who in the course of performing their duties become aware of information pertaining to testing for the AIDS virus and the results obtained are required to maintain the confidentiality of this information.

TuSSR citizens and other citizens of the USSR, as well as persons without citizenship who reside permanently in the TuSSR, if they become infected with the AIDS virus, are entitled to medical and social welfare assistance. They shall be provided with round-trip travel free of charge to the place of treatment as well as a free convalescent leave for treatment on an outpatient basis. Parents or surrogate parents shall be entitled to stay with hospitalized children (under the age of 14) and to be relieved from work with payment of benefits during this period for reasons of temporary incapacitation.

Additional benefits may be established by legislative acts of the TuSSR for persons with AIDS or infected with the AIDS virus.

Any infringements upon the rights of such persons, including involuntary discharge from work or denial of job opportunity, of medical treatment, of education, or of child care in pre-school institutions, is prohibited, and any restriction upon the legal interests of such persons may be made only on the grounds that they have AIDS or are carriers of the AIDS virus. Similarly, no infringement of the lawful interests of relatives or persons closely associated with an infected person with respect to housing or any other rights shall be tolerated.

Article 9. TuSSR citizens and other citizens of the USSR whose infection occurred as a result of medical intervention shall be provided with pensions in accordance with procedures determined by the laws of the USSR and the TuSSR.

Article 10. Infection of medical or pharmaceutical workers with the AIDS virus in the performance of their assigned duties shall be classified as an occupational illness.

Article 11. In accordance with Fundamental Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on Measures Against AIDS, if any other rules than those which are contained in Soviet legislation on the prevention of AIDS should be established in international agreements entered into by the USSR, the rules of the international agreement shall take precedence.

This same order of precedence shall apply with respect to TuSSR legislation if the TuSSR should participate in an international treaty in which other rules are established than those provided for by TuSSR legislation on measures against AIDS.

Article 12. The law of the TuSSR entitled: "On Preventive Measures Against AIDS" shall enter into force on the day of its publication.

S. Niyazov, President of the Turkmen SSR

Congress of Soviet Assyrians Formed

91US03074 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 91
Second Edition p 8

[Article by A. Bogdanov: "Congress of Soviet Assyrians Formed"]

[Text] **Who are they, the Soviet Assyrians? The once powerful and historically renown Assyrian Empire ceased to exist by the end of the seventh century B.C., following military onslaughts by Babylonians and "Medes" [as Greek writers mistakenly called the Sythians]. Despite 25 centuries without a nation of their own, however, the Assyrians have forgotten neither their language nor their cultural traditions and illustrious history.**

In making Russia their homeland, certain groups of Assyrians found an opportunity to labor in peace and to revive their language and culture. During the early years of Soviet power, among enclaves of Assyrians in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and in the Ukraine, as well as in Stavropol Kray and Krasnodar Kray (where the well-known village of Urmiya is located), schools were opened with instruction in the native tongue as well as in Russian. Teachers for these schools were trained in the Armavir Pedagogical Training School and in the Leningrad Institute of History, Philosophy, and Literature.

In the 1930's Assyrian cultural and educational societies became active in Moscow, Leningrad, Yerevan, and Tbilisi, with affiliated branches in other cities. Books by Russian and Soviet writers, including the works of Lenin, were translated into Assyrian. The all-Union newspaper KOKHVA D'MADYNKHA (Star of the

East) was published. The year 1938, however, witnessed a cancellation of all that had been achieved previously. The newspaper was shut down, the schools and cultural societies were abolished, and the intelligensia was destroyed.

Assyrians today are widely dispersed with no densely populated or self-governed residential areas. In recent years, however, they have experienced a marked revival of national consciousness. Cultural societies and Sunday schools have made their appearance in many parts of the country. Widely recognized in our country and abroad is the Assyrian Semiramida Club in Leningrad and the Khayadta Association in Moscow, and there are many more. The first issue of the journal ATRA (Motherland) has been published in Leningrad.

Recently, the first conference of Soviet Assyrians was held in Moscow, drawing delegations of a people residing in our country that have a history 30 centuries old. Among the central topics of discussion at the conference was the situation that has developed for Soviet Assyrians as a result of the increasingly strained relations between nationalities in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. The role and place of Soviet Assyrians in the international movement was also discussed. The conference served to unite the diverse societies of Soviet Assyrians represented at the USSR Congress of Assyrians.

V. Kolomanov, a principal organizer of the Assyrian movement in the USSR, was unanimously elected president of the Congress of Soviet Assyrians.

The conference resolved to hold a festival of culture and to found a newspaper in the native language. It also decided to convene an All-Union Assyrian Congress in 1991.

Internal Affairs Minister Pugo on Crime

91UN0932A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 91
Second Edition p 6

[Interview with Boris Pugo, USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, by PRAVDA correspondents G. Ovcharenko and A. Chernenko; place and date not given: "Boris Pugo: 'Ours Remains the People's Militia'"]

[Text] According to Internal Service Colonel Vladimir Yanchenkov, spokesman at a press conference which was held at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs yesterday, no fewer than 170 Soviet and foreign journalists were in attendance.

This is a characteristic reflecting the acute and at times anxious interest which our society takes in the status of crime. On the other hand, the figure of the new minister and his political identity cause quite understandable curiosity. However, a short, businesslike press conference is incapable of furnishing answers to such questions. As we see it, a conversation may help us accomplish this—in essence, the first interview by Boris Pugo, which was given during a pause in his extraordinarily tight working schedule.

[Correspondent] Boris Karlovich, prior to our meeting, we looked at the latest summary reports which the ministry operations room receives. Frankly, they do not inspire optimism... However, this is purely an emotional perception. How do you personally view the crime situation?

[Pugo] With the same degree of alarm. However, my anxiety may be more acute. The results of the year's operation of the internal affairs organs have now been summed up. Trends are apparent, and they are unambiguous. Crime continues to be on the rise. The criminal underworld is regrouping its forces, becoming increasingly arrogant, and displaying refined cruelty. These are not emotions. I maintain this on the basis of statistical data. I would like to anticipate the probable response of readers: Well, the new minister is "intimidating." No. In 1990, the number of reported crimes exceeded 2,786,000. The growth rate amounted to 13.4 percent.

Perhaps several years ago not one of us could have thought how serious a threat emanates from inside, rather than from outside, our own society as it goes through a profound crisis. There is a set of crises in the socio-economic, political, and moral spheres, as well as in the area of constitutional guarantees for the legal defense of the interests of individuals. Nationalist extremism alone has claimed hundreds of human lives already. I would not be telling the whole truth if I failed to mention one more catalyst for legal nihilism (and, therefore, an increase in violations of the law). Unfortunately, "the war of laws" and the opposition of legislative and executive institutes at various levels make their presence known.

[Correspondent] Undoubtedly, the militia has to work under more difficult conditions at present than it used to. However, the widespread opinion is that the militia itself in the last 10 to 15 years has become, let us say, weaker, and that its standard of professionalism has declined.

[Pugo] I would not make an assessment that unequivocal. Nonetheless, we cannot but admit that for decades militia employees were kept under pressure by never-ending reorganizations and modernizations. The goal was to keep adapting Ministry of Internal Affairs organs to the administrative command system and keep them serving its interests. Hence the difficulties in democratic restructuring, transformation, and renewal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs organization, and in increasing the efficiency of its crime-fighting efforts.

New forms of pressure have now appeared—political pressure (at times, simply that of dirty politics), moral pressure whereby they try to portray the militia and Ministry of Internal Affairs troops as "enemies of democracy" and "the fist of a dictator." The aforementioned "war of laws" makes things equally complicated. This is an absolutely paradoxical and altogether inconceivable situation. Judge for yourselves: What can even a highly professional employee do if he gets conflicting orders from the different offices of his superiors? All of this is happening against the background of a powerful, virtually cresting wave of crime which is supraterritorial and, blasphemous as this may sound, "interethnic."

[Correspondent] The socio-political underpinnings which you are talking about are undoubtedly there. However, this is one side of the coin. Crises have always caused abrupt increases in crime. However, there also is another aspect. The crisis generates unfavorable trends in the law-enforcement system itself. Can we say that at present the organs of internal affairs are capable of fighting crime effectively?

[Pugo] My firm conviction is that, the number of random individuals notwithstanding, the bulk of the Ministry of Internal Affairs organs are capable of considerably increasing their professional effectiveness in fighting crime within the framework of our law-enforcement system. It is all the more so because recently greater attention on the part of the state and society to the needs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs organs has been apparent. For example, last year alone we took delivery of means of transportation, equipment, and assets worth 3.4 billion rubles. Additional outlays for the financial support of personnel exceeded 1 billion. On 12 February, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a resolution on substantially increasing pay again, effective 1 March. Payments and compensation in lieu of ration issues, for skill grades, and special conditions of service will be introduced. Procedures for grade-based pay and income tax withholding which are the same as in the Soviet Army have been established.

[Correspondent] Still, as far as we know, the material-technical potential of crime at times exceeds the corresponding potential of the militia...

[Pugo] I am compelled to agree with this. This is why facts which testify to less attention being paid to our needs on the part of a number of ministries, establishments, organizations, and enterprises particularly put us on our guard. Thus, on 11 October of last year the USSR Council of Ministers, in urgent measures to reinforce the rule of law and legal order, set a certain level of deliveries of technical assets. As early as the beginning of this year, a failure to meet 15 percent of the contracts signed emerged. The associations of the Gorkiy Automotive Works, the Ulyanovsk Automotive Works, and the Automotive Works imeni Lenin Komsomol are refusing to sign contracts for the delivery of the necessary amounts of spare parts for motor vehicles. Coordination of contracts for the manufacture of bullet-proof vests is being delayed. Rush orders are not being accepted by some plants in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. We are still awaiting the adoption of laws "On the Soviet Militia," "On the USSR Internal Troops," and on operations and crime-detection activities.

The militiamen are still awaiting a lot of "what has been promised" against the background of global political shocks. One needs high political, social, and ethical endurance in order to work conscientiously under difficult circumstances.

[Correspondent] This makes the position of those who persistently seek a split and antagonism within the ranks of the militia itself and attempt to drag it apart into "ethnic quarters" all that much harder to understand.

[Pugo] It seems to me that these forces objectively operate in the interest of the criminal underworld, whether they intend to or not. Criminal elements are uniting, whereas they want to disunite the forces of law-enforcement organs. Certainly, we will not agree to this.

At the same time, we cannot fail to take into account the realities of the day, changes in the USSR Constitution, the expansion of the confines of republic independence, and the declarations of sovereignty they have adopted. Proceeding from these state and political realities, all of us have come to the conclusion that a renewed, modernized system and structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are necessary.

[Correspondent] Boris Karlovich, what should the basis be for mutual relations between the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the republic Ministries of Internal Affairs? What changes should be made in the structure and status of the internal affairs organs?

[Pugo] I am convinced that an integrated system of internal affairs organs should be preserved—together, of course, with a clear-cut delineation of the rights and obligations of the center and the republics. Thus, as I see

it, the jurisdiction of the republic organs should include providing public security and legal order, preventing, detecting and investigating crimes, correcting and reeducating convicts, guarding facilities of the national economy, and ensuring property rights, fire safety, and traffic safety. Recently, the issue of municipal, or more precisely, local militia, has been discussed. It would be best for the republics to resolve this issue themselves.

[Correspondent] However, would it perhaps be erroneous to believe that each republic belonging to the Union may accomplish the entire set of crime-fighting tasks independently and autonomously?

[Pugo] Of course. Contemporary trends in the structure and dynamics of crime and the supraterritorial nature of many types of crime necessitate the delegation of a number of powers by the republics to the Union (USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs). First of all, it is feasible to unify at precisely the Union level efforts to develop all-state programs for combating crime, detecting and investigating crimes of an interrepublic, interethnic, and international scope, and operational servicing of the particularly significant facilities reporting to the Union, maintaining public order and providing security under a state of emergency and during major accidents and catastrophes. Commanding the internal troops and carrying out programs of material and technical supplies calls for unity and centralization. A unified system of information and analysis, reference and information resources, registers of current search and crime records should operate in common interest. It is feasible to unify the training of research and instruction cadres and specialists with superior skills on the scale of our country.

In all likelihood, it will be necessary to set up flexible federal structures, including those built on a vertical principle, which will vigorously interact with republic organs and will always be capable of giving them highly professional help. It is planned to have within the structure of the Union ministry blocks of criminal militia services, as well as public order, investigation, internal troops, and logistics services and headquarters subdivisions.

As far as general management issues are concerned, the intention is to clearly delineate functions, which will rule out petty tutelage and substitution. In the course of this, coordinated, concerted efforts and interaction presuppose definitely including the ministers of republics in the composition of the collegium of the all-Union ministry.

As you would understand, this is not the final construct. Necessary specifications and final decisions may be made after the Union treaty is signed. I would only like to recall that the liquidation of the Union-republic Ministry of Internal Affairs system in the first half of the 1960's resulted in seriously weakening crime control. Let us not repeat the mistakes of past years.

[Correspondent] Frankly, Boris Karlovich, these are radical proposals. However, we would like to have specifics on whether all of them fit within the framework of the draft Union treaty.

[Pugo] The Ministry of Internal Affairs Collegium believes that it is necessary to make certain additions and refinements in the article "Union Powers" of the draft Union treaty.

At any rate, the following should be envisaged: coordinated general management, coordination of operations and implementation of measures coordinated with the republics and aimed at safeguarding the rule of law, rights and freedoms of citizens, protection of property, public security and public order, and combating crime; solving and investigating crimes in the federal jurisdiction; leadership of the internal troops.

[Correspondent] What do you mean by "Union jurisdiction?"

[Pugo] Solving and investigating crimes affecting all-Union and interrepublic interests associated with violations of ethnic and racial equal rights, organized crime, major accidents and disasters, corruption, currency counterfeiting, banditry, and the drug business...

[Correspondent] Previously, we referred to the militia as the people's militia. This meant that it not only protected the people but also drew on the people's help.

[Pugo] The militia definitely remains the people's militia at present as well; it safeguards the interests of citizens. However, as far as the help of the people is concerned... It appears to me that the work of public-legal organizations is being unjustifiably wound down in our country. We need workers' militia support detachments and voluntary people's detachments at present as well, or more precisely, especially at present. Of course, we should search for new forms and methods of operating them and rewarding them, taking the situation into account. The militia cannot be effective in the absence of ties to the people—this is an axiom rather than beautiful words. Unfortunately, we sometimes burn priceless social experience in the heat of political struggles...

[Correspondent] Our final question which is, perhaps, not quite proper: Do you, Boris Karlovich, believe in your abilities?

[Pugo] The very fact that I agreed when I was nominated to this position indicates that I believe in both the potential of the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and my opportunities.

Threat From Organized Crime Viewed

91UN0891A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 12 Feb 91 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Organized Crime in the USSR May Become the Initiator of the Country's Disintegration"]

[Text] Moscow—On 8 February, Aleksandr Gurov, chief of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Administration for Fighting Organized Crime, stated: "We need to have a powerful administration with a vertical line of command like the U.S. FBI." In his opinion, the actions of organized criminal groups in the USSR are becoming increasingly dangerous. Powerful criminal organizations with strict hierarchical subordination already exist in our country; some of them consist of between 1,500 and 3,000 members and operate in virtually all large cities of the country. Aleksandr Gurov believes that it is impossible to eliminate these organizations because at present it is not the causes of their development that are being combated but rather the consequences. Aleksandr Gurov stated at a meeting of the "roundtable" of representatives of USSR law enforcement organs, the USSR League of Independent Scientists, and the NOVOSTI Information Agency: "Organized crime in the USSR is particularly dangerous because it paralyzes legal economy, ventures into politics, and has ethnic peculiarities."

On 8 February, Vyacheslav Potemkin, president of the USSR League of Independent Scientists and candidate of technical sciences, stated that organized crime in the USSR may become the cause of disintegration of the Union. He believes that the accumulation of tremendous capital by certain circles which strive to preserve their wealth by means of destroying the Union is one of the main causes of the emergence of organized crime in the USSR. He made this statement during a meeting of the "roundtable" of representatives of the USSR law enforcement organs, the USSR League of Independent Scientists, and the NOVOSTI Information Agency on the topic "Legal Order in the USSR Today and Tomorrow."

Rise of Parties, Criminal Activity Linked

91UN0912A Moscow *SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA*
in Russian 15 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by TASS observer Yu. Vorobyevskiy for *SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA*: "Professionals of Ambition"]

[Text] The seeds of pluralism have produced startling shoots. Some people are proposing raising Soviet society's morale by participation in a victorious war against Iraq, some are demanding freedom for sexual minorities, some are intent on "smashing the monster Benafet—the golden Jewish idol," and some, stroking a "Nicholas" beard, are dragging to the revolution monument a bundle of wire entanglements. But it is others who are more interesting. Those involved in more serious business. Those who are counting the money they have acquired and biding their time....

All these ideas and their exponents figure in the reference encyclopedia "Russia: Parties, Associations, Unions, Clubs." Incorporating data on more than 1,000

public associations, this volume was prepared by the extradepartmental Institute of Mass Political Movements [ETTs].

Let us leaf through it.... There are here nine "revivals," 10 "pamyats," and a heap of organizations whose names are a combination of the 10 words: "democratic," "socialist," "Christian," "anarchist".... When the versions are exhausted, the following is possible even: "Anarcho-Communist Social Democratic Party Faction."

The handsome volume, published in an edition of 50,000 copies, is interesting, of course, not as a concentration of political exotica and extraordinary cases. It will help journalists, particularly, to understand what represents a serious movement, what, a cheap game of personal ambition. After all, IZVESTIYA, for example, so persistently publicized one party that its numbers have grown from two to 70 (not thousands!). This was what N. Krotov, director of the Institute of Mass Public Movements, said.

Under the conditions of political liberalization a digest for the "enlightenment of the authorities" is needed also. After all, in accordance with the Public Associations Act, their registration has already begun.

The press has already reported, incidentally, that applications are being made sluggishly. This comes as no surprise to the compilers of the encyclopedia. After all, the initial minimum numbers for registration are 5,000 persons, but to judge by the data of the reference, only three (!) parties in Russia, aside from the CPSU, have the necessary number of members: the Democratic, Christian Democratic, and Social Democratic.

So it is now the right time for the rest to think about unification or the recruitment of new supporters. Not losing them is also a problem, however. The majority of movements, N. Krotov believes, has attracted people merely by designation of an enemy—down with totalitarianism, an inefficient economy, and so forth. The majority agrees to live in a sovereign democratic republic. But many political platforms evoke the question: Could you not be somewhat more specific? Populism can unite a crowd in a square, but by no means a stable group of people. When the programs are made more specific, however, splits are inevitable.

In its first program the Democratic Union, for example, urged a multiparty system and a multistructural economy. The CPSU, as the governing party, realized these aims. What next? The Democratic Union does not know, it would seem. And at a recent forum voices speaking about its self-disbandment were heard.

...Is it, then, worth discussing microscopic "parties," of, literally, bed-bug size, that do not have serious programs? The more so in that, following the fever of the recent elections, many of them have somehow dried up and are showing no signs of life.

It is! The digest allows us to discern an interesting alignment. There are two main vectors of the public movements. "Democratic" and "communist." Judging by the encyclopedia, the second force is greater ("patriots" are sometimes consolidated with it). Why, then, at the past elections in Moscow and Leningrad did the "democrats" score such a convincing victory?

I will stress, among other factors, just one. As one who took part in the election struggle, I may say that the "bugs" who are now imperceptible were at that time very active. As if they had sucked in fresh blood! And, truly: Sucked by national entrepreneurs from the working people, it was supplied continuously along the financial capillaries to small groups of "democratic" activists. They were quickly surrounded by sympathizers disposed for a fee to daub rivals' leaflets with uniform vileness. It is fitting to recall the advice given by A. Tarasov in the newspaper KOMMERSANT. He called on his cooperative friends to subsidize "Democratic Russia."

And the help from overseas granted by parties of the same name! The compilers of the digest know of many such instances, and each seeks a sponsor where he may.

Generally, the impermissibility of material support for candidates declared by the Election Act proved a fiction. Organizations under the jurisdiction of the state had no special opportunities here, it is true. Soviet businessmen gambling under the conditions of economic limitlessness, on the other hand—as many as they pleased. The equal opportunities of the candidates amounted merely to the carefully observed equal size of the heads on posters.

Now, even going by the facts published in the press, the cooperative movement, interweaving with shadow economy operators, has acquired a taste for lobbying. Reliance on the favors of a bribed department head is no longer enough for it. In addition, this is too costly. According to data of the USSR Procuracy Research Institute, the mafia spends on bribery two-thirds of the money it earns. Capital would like to determine prices itself and simultaneously operate on a larger scale. It now needs to be able to lean on the legislative authorities and public opinion.

Is the stream of publications concerning the benefits to be derived from legalization of the shadow economy any surprise? Is the continued sobbing in connection with the demise of the "500 days" program any surprise? After all, it permitted foreign companies to open ruble accounts in the USSR and create 100-percent foreign-owned enterprises here. Just imagine what expansion there could be for 140 billion rubles [R]! And how much joy this would bring our compradors!

It is said that the deal fell through.... Come on! Similar ones, only far less in terms of scale, are being realized with might and main with the permission of the Russian Government.

A country in which liberalization of the economy is being taken to absurd lengths is an ideal laundry for world black capital. It was with good reason that the transaction concerning the "sale" of our rubles was concluded with a person on Interpol's wanted list.

...We digressed for a purpose. Such is the economic background of the political performance. The large numbers of organizations trying now to become parties are not only a Vanity Fair. Some of them are seeds providentially sown in the country's political field in the hope of an anticipated warming of Soviet-criminal world relations.

Many would like to have official structures. Including those that have unofficial structures. The criminal world. We would recall A. Nevzorov's report to the effect that literally dozens of persons have changed to deputy's seats of the Leningrad City Soviet from camp plank beds. And we are by no means talking about "fighters against totalitarianism."

The press has already reported much that is astonishing concerning the leaders of political movements. V. Terekhov, for example, member of the Democratic Union Coordinating Council, has served time for larceny. One wonders whether many of those like him have severed their former connections.

According to figures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Research Institute, there are in the country approximately 10,000 criminal formations with up to a quarter of a million members. The social base of black capital is great also: The criminalized stratum constitutes no less than 15 percent of the population. And the financial support! According to the estimates of a number of scholars, as a result of the liberalization of the economy its shadow sector has accumulated R500 billion in money and valuables.

The creation of "tame" parties is entirely within the means of our mafiosi.

Nonetheless, the pushing of the interests of the shadow economy is encountering the opposition of the majority. Consequently, they cannot be carried through democratically even under conditions of journalistic brainwashing. A putsch is needed. Figuratively speaking, it would replace the red flag on the flag staff of our statehood with a black one—the Jolly Roger.

Such a putsch requires a boost. It is not that far off, possibly. This January, according to data of scientists of the ETTS concern, our industry manufactured just half of last January's volume. Two more months like this, and complete collapse awaits the economy (this is clear to specialists). The ice age in the economy is already engendering primitive anticommunism. Remaining totalitarian to a considerable extent, social consciousness is rushing into its embrace. Which of today's modest movements would then be advanced as ruling parties? Some people could, most likely, already be whispering: "This is the party!" This is not to overstate the case. In

any event, a compiler of the digest "Russia: Parties, Associations, Unions, Clubs" told me that he, an intellectual who had customarily abused the CPSU, had amended his views after this work. The Communists, he said, have at least in their program documents formulated good and just things, which cannot be said about their opponents. The mere course of the constituent congresses and lobby talk say a great deal....

Questions posed by researchers of the extradepartmental ETTS corporation arise: What might be the consequences of liberalization where there is no "civil society?" Can the flabby muscles of amorphous democracy resist a "black putsch?"

It is necessary for a start to most thoroughly investigate the financial aspect of the activity of the public organizations. Permissiveness is becoming freedom for rogues. Given a weakening of state power, it is fraught with the danger of totalitarianism. We should have been taught something by the dubious experience of the cooperatives subsequently perfected by the practice of joint ventures, which virtually are not under Soviet jurisdiction!

Political liberalism has become economic liberalism, and the shadow economy, which has emerged into the light of day, is being concentrated before our very eyes in shadow policy. A strange cycle!

...The pluralism of political forms concealing the absence of the creative principle puts us on our guard. And not only because of the incompetence of figures incapable of offering constructive programs. Most of all because many "professionals of ambition" have no need of them, evidently. A "black" coup scenario could be their programs.

Work of Latvian Customs Department Detailed

91UN09564 Riga ATMODA in English No 11,
31 Jan 91 p 8

[Article by Karlis Freibergs, "Awakening" editor-in-chief: "Latvia Sets Up Customs Border"]

[Text] In an effort to curb illegal trade and protect its economy, Latvia established 12 customs checkpoints along its 500-kilometre eastern frontier with Russia and Belorussia on 1 October. By 1 November, 10 customs posts had also been set up along the 300-kilometre northern border with Estonia and 20 along the southern 500-kilometre frontier with Lithuania. All other roads leading in and out of Latvia have been closed to vehicular traffic. This sweeping measure follows widespread complaints by Latvian residents that products of which there is a shortage in the republic are being illegally exported. Lithuania and Estonia have also taken similar steps for the same reasons.

Altogether, some 700 customs agents will be working for the recently established Customs Department, which is responsible to the Latvian Council of Ministers. Agents have been authorized to stop and search both private

and transport vehicles leaving the republic. The latter may bring out such restricted products as food, clothing, building materials, appliances and electronics upon applying to the Licensing Department for an export license. Vehicles without a license are turned back at the border. In addition, there is a similar list of 49 different items which private citizens are forbidden to bring out of Latvia, or may only carry in restricted amounts.

Armed Resistance

Latvian customs officials have been empowered to confiscate illegal and undeclared goods, and theoretically have the right to bear arms. However, as Aivars Salins, head of the Customs Department explained, arms "are still a monopoly" of the army, militia and KGB. "We have no place to obtain them." During their first three weeks of duty on the "Eastern Front," as Salins whimsically termed the frontier with Russia and Byelorussia, unarmed customs officials patrolled the border on their own. Numerous reports of verbal and physical harassment "by people who don't recognize or understand us," soon followed.

Chief Customs Inspector Uldis Neibergs, who oversaw the establishment of several checkpoints, asserts that he and his colleagues have had "machine guns and pistols struck into our ribs" on more than one occasion and have been forced to let the offending parties through "to avoid bloodshed." "Thank God there haven't been any casualties," exclaimed Salins. Neither Neibergs nor Salins excluded the possibility that elements of organized crime, which has become a festering problem throughout the Soviet Union, were involved. Neibergs and other customs officials also told of numerous attempts at bribery.

Incidents of defiance have been rarer at the Estonian and Lithuanian frontiers, possibly because both republics have implemented controls of their own and agreed to collaborate with Latvia in patrolling their common borders. Lithuanian customs posts are manned by cadres of the new Lithuanian Department of National Defense. Estonian border guards, for their part, are protected by armed militiamen. As one Estonian affirmed, "a machine gun is a convincing deterrent."

Since the end of October, Latvia has also sent armed militia officers to its border checkpoints. Both Latvian and Estonian customs agents have thus found themselves in the paradoxical situation of being protected by cadres, who at present still receive their salaries from Moscow. Nevertheless, neither the Latvians nor the Estonians interviewed expressed any complaints. As Salins explained: "The militia is, after all, a military organization... If an individual is opposed to the idea of Latvian independence, but receives an order to protect such and such an establishment, he leaves his convictions at home and does his duty... As far as I know, there has been no conflict between the militia and our customs agents." Neibergs also expressed satisfaction with the militia's performance: "One must not judge a man by his

uniform. Such commendable people of the kind we have been working with here are hard to find anywhere. These men are clearly interested in protecting our republic's economy." The posting of militiamen at the customs checkpoints has apparently led to a decrease in hostile incidents, but these have not altogether disappeared. "There have been some light shootouts with armed men, but so far there have been no casualties on either side," stated Salins.

Customs officers also control trains, planes and ships leaving Latvia for other republics. "Our largest problem is with the huge volume of freight which is brought out by rail," Salins explained, "but we are doing what we can." Train passengers are checked on a selective basis before embarking and during the trip to the border, where the agents disembark. People travelling by plane and by ship are also selectively screened before departure time.

Strapped for Cash

The effectiveness of the Customs Department is hindered, however, by the lack of available resources. Besides being unable to procure arms, Salins has also had difficulty obtaining uniforms for his staff. Initially, he had managed to purchase army uniforms from the military, "but now that they know who we are, they won't sell us any more." These uniforms have already been put to use. Customs officers can be distinguished from Soviet army cadres by the crest with the Latvian flag and the word *MUITA* (customs), sewn onto the left sleeve just below the shoulder. The caps bear the Latvian coat of arms instead of the Soviet red star. Oak leaves or gold stars adorn the shoulder blades, instead of the letters *CA* (the abbreviation for *Sovietskaya Armiya*). "The government has ordered some uniforms from Sweden, but in the meantime, we are making use of whatever we can get our hands on," said Neibergs.

This was clearly evident at Ainazi, 800 metres from the Estonian border, where customs agents were using a former automobile inspection booth to carry out their duties. "What else can we do?" exclaimed Neibergs. "We have to be innovative." At the border itself, the Estonians, for their part, were operating from a railway car which had been recently transported there. "Our problems are similar to the Latvians'," declared a border guard from the nearby town of Parnu. While the Estonians had managed to set up a heavy steel barrier which could be raised and lowered, the Latvians had yet to receive theirs. "We are still waiting," explained Neibergs. "We have been promised one as well, but having recently arrived from a checkpoint at the Belorussian border near Kraslava, I can tell you that conditions are even worse there. We were practically sleeping in shacks filled with straw."

The lack of space at various checkpoints has also deterred Latvian customs agents from seizing articles from private vehicles. "Today we could have confiscated a fridge," said Neibergs, "but we had no place to put it."

so we had to turn the driver back." At Ainazi there was also confusion as to the procedure for turning confiscated items over to the Customs Department. Conceivable, if this system were better organized, the Department could sustain itself through revenue from seized articles and even provide the government with extra cash, instead of looking to it for funds.

Customs agents get paid 10 percent of the value of all confiscated goods, a material incentive which supplements their 190-ruble monthly salary. Those with previous experience in other law-enforcement agencies such as the militia, army or Soviet customs, receive 260 rubles, and inspectors are paid 350 rubles. Salins revealed that he himself was employed for 17 years as a Soviet customs officer at port of Riga, before assuming his present post as head of the Latvian Customs Department.

One disquieting fact that arose from conversations with Neiberger and Salins was that unlike the Estonia border guards, who had to go through a two-week training course before being sent to their posts, Latvian customs agents without previous law-enforcement experience had not received any formal instruction. "That is unfortunately a dream of the future," stated Salins. "We try to recruit people who are morally, physically and intellectually suitable for this kind of work. But basically, they are receiving their training on the job," said Neiberger. But, he added, "even more important than training is conviction. The most important thing is that our men be honest and that their goal be the reestablishment of Latvian independence." Although the customs agents recruited may indeed be conscientious and dedicated to their work, one cannot help but note that, for safety's sake, it is perhaps just as well that they remain unarmed for the moment.

A Step Toward Independence?

So far, Soviet authorities have not interfered with Baltic customs operations. But it is clear that these would not be able to take place without the tacit consent of Moscow. The army, for one, still operates with impunity. Although military vehicles are inspected, customs officers have no choice but to let arms shipments pass through freely. Army bases are also off limits, and thus, military air transportation cannot be verified. Furthermore, all incoming and outgoing "international" traffic (with such countries as Sweden, Finland and Denmark) is still controlled by Soviet customs agents and border guards. Only "interior" outgoing traffic (to other republics such as Estonia, Lithuania and Russia) is screened by Baltic customs officers.

Besides being an economic measure, the establishment of customs borders may be interpreted as a symbolic assertion of the Baltic States' desire to once again operate as independent republics. Romans Ozols, a young customs officer who had just returned from his obligatory two-year term in the Soviet army, emphatically stated that "I came to work here not for the salary,

but simply because I view Latvian customs as the first real step in regaining our independence, and only for that reason." Nevertheless, it remains quite clear that the Baltic nations, at least for the time being, are still de facto very much a part of the Soviet Union.

Moscow Trafficking Networks, Supply Routes Outlined

91WD04834 Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Feb 91 p 8

[Article by TRUD special correspondent V. Belykh: "We Raise the Problem: The Deadly Transit"]

[Text] None of the passersby on Oktyabrskaya Ulitsa in Moscow on that gloomy February day paid any attention to the quick arrest of a fairly ordinary-looking young person. But for him, the chairman of a Riga cooperative, such an unexpected turn of events promised nothing good. For in the baggage of the Latvian guest were hidden TT and Parabellum pistols and cartridges for them. He had brought the weapons and ammunition to the capital to sell them to the hit men of one of the Azeri clans of drug traffickers...

It is difficult to discuss the drug business. Of all the criminal enterprises it is the farthest underground. Yet it is usually not difficult to find a rank-and-file member of the drug mafia—a smalltime dealer...

The Moscow-area village of Pekhorka. A little bridge across a picturesque stream. A winding highway and an unexpectedly large number of vehicles from the most diverse cities along the roadsides. Their passengers, nervously look along the roads, quietly talking with one another. The waiting is tiring but necessary. For this is one of the places where drugs can be bought fairly easily: poppy straw, koknar, anasha. The dealers have also appeared here—boys from gypsy families. They do not approach everyone, they are keenly aware of suspicious clients. They efficiently collect the money and bring out the packets of dope. If they are caught in the act, they rely on their young age: How can you punish a child? But it was here that workers of the bureau for fighting drugs arrested five bandits from Western Georgia and a local dealer in the act. About two kilograms of drugs, bags for packaging it, and fire arms were confiscated from them...

Incidentally, one certainly need not leave Moscow to find drugs. People "in the know" go to the Agdam, Kolkhida, and Guriya cafes, they visit the Mozhayskiy and Varshavskiy motels, there are open-air markets in front of the Belgrade, Bucharest, and Leipzig stores... One can get "grass" in the Peking and Sofia restaurants. But the real centers for trade in all kinds of dope in the capital are the numerous markets. For example, the Cheremushkinskiy...

There is a motley crowd milling around under the market dome. But this does not distract the drug addict. He knows the ones he needs by sight and he confidently strolls over to one of the bored, sloppily dressed brunettes. They have a brief conversation and the person who wants the drugs is

taken to a big fellow who stands at a distance yawning from time to time. His job is merely to take the money and send the drug addict along to the next person in the chain. And he tells him the location of the "stash"—one of the primitive secret storehouses in the bushes, beyond the waste water pipes and curb blocks, right in the snow drift where the packages of dope were hidden earlier in the morning. This sales system makes the sellers practically invulnerable. Because officially none of them really has anything to do with the drugs and if there is an arrest they can easily come out smelling like a rose. And if the person wanting to get "high" tries to find the "stash" by himself or tries in some other way to deceive the dealers, a fairly large guard surrounds him. It deals quickly and harshly with all violators...

Moscow does not produce its own drugs. Seventy-five percent of the traders in this terrible commodity come from outside. They ship the dope through secret channels from Kazakhstan, Turkmenia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and the Ukraine...

The main positions in the capital's drug business are held by clans from Azerbaijan. Most of the methadone comes through them to Moscow and to other cities as well.

The delivery route is still not completely clear. Batches of the powder are sent to Azerbaijan. It must be mixed with distilled water and placed in one- and five-millimeter ampules. And that is all there is to its production. It is set up inside enterprises and in camouflaged laboratories. Because an immense number of people are involved in the drug business: workers, who process the "dope" to its commercial form, the suppliers of the ampules, workers of law enforcement organs who protect the criminal business, representatives of the local authorities, and auxiliary wheeler dealers...

Thus gradually entire small towns come under the influence of the drug mafia bosses. The most remarkable of them is a woman fairly well along in years who has control over production, the dealers in Moscow, and many police and procuracy workers. They frequently help her deal with unwelcome and uncooperative subordinates, simply by sending them to jail on a rape charge.

But here the methadone is, prepared for consumption and packaged. Now the batches of it are sent to the places where they are sold. Heavy trucks are usually used for interurban shipments. About a thousand ampules are concealed in one truck. It is practically impossible to find the secret cargoes in the trucks which are loaded with fruits and vegetables.

The delivery system is arranged in such a way that there is no need to arrange underground drug warehouses in the local areas. The commodity goes directly "to the people" from the transportation, divided up and sent through small channels. It is extremely difficult to intercept it. And the dealers who are caught by the police prefer to remain silent. Everyone can remember a recent

case in which a fairly large "wholesaler" was arrested for 10 days on some pretext. The next day after his release he...committed suicide.

Clans of countrymen and kinsmen long ago divided the main places for drug sales up among themselves. In the Cheremushka market in Moscow there are dealers from Lenkoran and in the Warsaw Motel—from Gyandzhi, and at the flower market by the Kashirskay metro stop natives of Agdam trade in dope... And it is like that at all points on the map of Moscow.

But it would be naive to think of the drug mafia within the narrow clan framework today. At that same Cheremushka market Azeri drug dealers are protected by ruffians from the "Sunshine brigade" who receive pay in drugs and money. And commercial operations involving large batches of drugs are pushed by the Muscovite Nikolay Ivanovich. The Danilovskiy market—here the dealers are forced to pay a cut to the legal thief Guram. And it is not only methadone from Azerbaijan that is "put up for sale." Drugs made of poppies and marijuana are shipped from the Ukraine, Kuybyshev Oblast, Central Asia, and Uzbekistan, and they also supply the capital with morphine.

The strict monopoly makes it possible to raise prices uniformly. In Moscow today an ampoule of methadone (five milligrams) goes for 300-350 rubles ((R)), a glass of poppy straw costs up to R200, and a match box of anasha, depending on the quality, from R25 to R100. Profits in the drug business are growing in a geometrical progression. They are sufficient to pay for the services of numerous assistants and for the incomparable bribes and for the maintenance of quasiformal armed groupings and for the further development of the terrible industry...

The foundations of a real drug mafia have been formed in the past three years in our country, deep inside the crime world. With its kings, well-arranged connections, sources of raw material and sales markets. There is also a strict vertical hierarchy, a clear cut distribution of roles, established zones of influence of various groupings...

"The only thing saving us today is the incomparable shortage," says the chief of the interregional division of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs for fighting drug trafficking, Valentin Roshchin. "For it is possible to obtain excessive profits by speculating in anything you wish—from color television sets to underwear. And many wheeler dealers of the crime world still prefer to invest their money in "clean business." But only the situation will change (for it cannot go on like this forever), and the machinations with drugs will be their only means of obtaining a high and guaranteed income. The economic situation will change and the ruble will acquire some real weight and a flood of imported drugs will come rushing to us. The prerequisites for this exist. Now quite a few of our drugs come from Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. And we

must not forget that we have the most immense raw material base for producing hashish, marijuana, and heroin.

In the FRG for 60,000 registered drug addicts there are 3,000 police specializing in this problem. The ratio is approximately the same in other countries. But in our country, according to official figures, there are about 1.5 million drug users (many specialists think there are 10 times more than this) and there are no more than 2,000 internal affairs workers fighting against drug trafficking. For the whole country! Moreover, the legal status of the workers is completely confused. For example, according to the law, both the dealers and the drug addicts who buy their product are held criminally liable. And even if the buyer has given legal testimony his cooperation does not save him from a trial. Therefore, he remains silent. And the testimony of the arresting officers also is considered to be insufficient.

As of today, the turnover in these subdivisions is among the highest. It takes two or three years to train full-fledged specialists in fighting drugs and it is precisely in this amount of time that the operative, having taken all the torment he can, tries to change to another job.

"The drug traffickers have long had vigorous, strong connections within the country. In essence, these are unified organizations that know no republic boundaries," says the chief of the administration for fighting drug trafficking of the GUUR ((Main Criminal Investigation Administration)) of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Aleksandr Sergeyev. "In order to organize serious activity against them we have created seven specialized interregional departments of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs with subdivisions in 39 cities of the country. So far they include 205 people. In just a couple of weeks, in contact with the local organs, they have cut off 45 interregional channels for distributing drugs, exposed 71 groups of dealers, and reported 341 crimes involving drugs. In parallel, they have discovered 314 murders, rapes, burglaries, muggings, and robberies as well as cases of extortion..."

We understand quite well that today, now that interpublic relations have been so aggravated, we must handle things as delicately as possible. And things were going well. We had already planned to create a unified data bank for our new service, to station workers abroad, and to conduct new large-scale operations when quite unexpectedly, by an order of the RSFSR deputy minister of internal affairs, A. Dunayev, the activity of the interregional departments for fighting drug trafficking on the territory of the RSFSR was practically halted and the workers previously stationed there had to be sent back to where they came from.

It is difficult to comment on the differences of the representatives of the two ministries—Russian and Union. But in the final analysis the drug mafia is threatening both "left" and "right" and "liberals" and

"conservatives"... And there is no such thing as a sovereign and free country in which the people live in constant fear of encroaching crime.

Uzbek Police Officials on Drug Trade Rise in Surkhandarya

91WD0363A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 14 Dec 90 p 4

[Interview with Major Abdulaziz Kuldashev and Lieutenants Zafar Muzaffarov and Urat Saribayev, members of counternarcotic task force of Surkhandarya Internal Affairs Administration, by Aleksandr Poduzov, member of the administration's press group: "The Drug Trade: A Surkhandarya Phenomenon"]

[Text] The latest data on the state of the drug trade in Surkhandarya testify that the oblast has become one of the main centers in the Central Asian region for the cultivation and sale of narcotic drugs.

Our contributing correspondent, member of the press group of the Surkhandarya Internal Affairs Administration Aleksandr Poduzov, spoke with Major Abdulaziz Kuldashev and Lieutenants Zafar Muzaffarov and Urat Saribayev, members of the counternarcotic task force of the Surkhandarya Internal Affairs Administration.

[Poduzov] What is the reason for the "drug phenomenon" in Surkhandarya?

[Task force members] Surkhandarya has extremely favorable climatic and geographic conditions for raising and harvesting drug crops. This is why it has attracted the attention of dealers in the shadow economy, motivating them to invest money in the development of the drug trade in the oblast. The high quality of the drugs grown in our oblast is acknowledged by drug users. The existence of nearly inaccessible sites, the topographical diversity, the favorable weather, and the relatively low levels of population density and employment increase the opportunities to raise drug crops, particularly opium poppies and Indian hemp.

Besides this, opium poppies can be grown in Surkhandarya almost year-round. Until recently, experts believed that the main season for growing and harvesting opium poppies lasted from April through June, but the latest discoveries of drug plantations in our oblast proved that the season lasts much longer—7 or 8 months, right up to the beginning of November—and they can be grown almost year-round in hothouses or other artificial media.

The profits from the criminal trade are calculated not in thousands of rubles or even in tens of thousands, but in hundreds of thousands.

To avoid making unsubstantiated statements, let us give you an example. The 65 hectares of drug crops, mainly opium poppies, destroyed by internal affairs organs in the oblast last year could have yielded drugs

worth over 30 million rubles at blackmarket prices. Therefore, the drug dealers' game is certainly worth the candle.

Here is another detail. A few years ago the price of a gram of opium in our region was 30-40 rubles. Today it can reach 100-150 rubles. The fact that drug prices in the European part of the country and the Transcaucasus range from 200 to 500 rubles point up another reason for the "Surkhandarya phenomenon."

Is it any wonder that "guests" from other parts of the country have been coming here more often to "go shopping"? Furthermore, they are wholesalers, buying in bulk. The differences in drug prices suggest that there is a bigger supply of drugs in our oblast than anywhere else and that the "goods" are more accessible to the "customers."

The chance of acquiring drugs coming into the country through various channels from abroad cannot be overlooked either. Citizen Khatskevich, who was holding 22 kilograms of raw opium when he was arrested, is one example.

[Poduzov] Does this mean that the oblast is full of criminal gangs dealing in drugs? How would you assess the criminal atmosphere in Surkhandarya?

[Task force members] There is no need for panic or for the conclusion that these different groups constitute a "drug mafia," but we must be realistic and take an objective look at the processes that could have a serious effect on life in the oblast and in the region as a whole in the future.

Today there is only one alternative to the Surkhandarya drug phenomenon—prevention.

Here are the results of just one phase of Operation "Black Poppy-90." Investigations and searches during the first 5 months of the year turned up 16 cases of the sale of drugs, drug possession, and drug den management. Around 300 militiamen and a helicopter conducted operations to search out drug crops. They discovered 155 plantings of opium poppies and 4 of Indian hemp. The total area planted to drugs exceeded 77,000 square meters. The helicopter "hunt" turned up 66 fields in the mountains, which were then destroyed.

Investigations revealed that opium poppies were also being planted in some parts of Surkhandarya Oblast by such prominent individuals as the director of a public catering establishment, the deputy director of an asphalt concrete plant, and other administrators.

Last year, incidentally, was marked by a drug-related homicide. The remains of an unknown individual were found on the grounds of the Babotag tree farm in Shurchinskiy Rayon in June. Investigations established the dead man's identity. He was Citizen Dzhakhua, a resident of the Georgian SSR. Yuzbayev Buri, a man from Sariasyskiy Rayon who committed the murder,

was arrested in August of the same year. The investigation revealed that Dzhakhua, who had come here to buy 30,000 rubles' worth of drugs, was killed with a sawed-off shotgun.

[Poduzov] Should a special militia division be engaged in the struggle against the drug trade? Is it possible that the situation has been exaggerated and is not as bad as it has been described?

[Task force members] As a professional militiaman, I would warn against the underestimation of drug addiction. It is not only raising the crime rate in the country, but is also causing the moral degradation of the society. In view of the country's present difficulties and the possibility of flushing criminal capital out of the cooperative and private sectors, drug addiction could give rise to a qualitatively new phenomenon of massive scales—a drug trade which would quickly make the transition to a drug mafia. Underestimation will lead from so-called "simple homicides" to "contract crimes." This process must be stopped, and the sooner the public realizes this, the more effectively it can be combated. Unfortunately, what we are seeing today is the opposite: The public and the administrators of local organizations have taken a casual, and sometimes irresponsible, approach to this matter. Local administrators have been advised of the need to inform law enforcement agencies of all incidents of drug use and cultivation. Fully 85 percent of all cases of drug addiction, however, were discovered by our task force, and not by them.

Medical examinations of drug addicts are still one of the big problems reducing the effectiveness of our work. There are only three centers in the oblast for the qualified examination of drug users: the drug treatment center in Termez and the hospitals in Denau and Shargun. This means that internal affairs organs have to transport suspects over distances of 100-200 kilometers to document incidents of drug use. The problem is compounded by the militia's shortage of vehicles. The opening of the drug analysis laboratory in Termez took a great deal of trouble. We hope that oblast health department personnel will assist us in this work and allocate the necessary premises in each rayon for these needs. All of this would do much to facilitate the struggle against drug addiction in the oblast.

In Lieu of an Afterword

Here are just a few statistics

According to the Criminal Investigations Administration of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the area of poppy and hemp plantings discovered this summer in the republic was 10 times as large as last year's.

There are 11,500 chronic addicts registered with the drug treatment service of the republic Ministry of Health.

Experts have pointed out that the use of some drugs—hashish and koknar—is not considered to be an illness in Central Asia, but a tradition or even part of the culture.

Here is just one more statistic—up to 8,000 militiamen take part in Operation "Black Poppy" each year.

These two armies are prepared to rush into battle at the beginning of spring with a persistence worthy of a more peaceful cause.

What will this war do to us?

Press Conference on CPSU Budget

91UN0945A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 91
Union Edition p 2

[G. Alimov report: "Does the CPSU Retain Its Privileges?"]

[Text] A meeting between N. Kruchina, administrator of the CPSU Central Committee, and Soviet and foreign journalists was held on 20 February in the CPSU Central Committee Press Center. The Administration of Affairs was, according to Nikolay Yefimovich himself, performing this unusual role for the first time, meeting publicly with representatives of the mass media.

The CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs handles all questions of the financial and material and technical support of the party and its administrative system. According to N. Kruchina, big changes are now occurring in its activity. They have been dictated by what is happening in society, the changes in the CPSU itself and the democratization characteristic of the party today. It is recognized that the CPSU budget is being formed in a complex financial situation. The change in the scale of the payment of party dues, when 50 percent of monies remains in the primary organizations, the increase in the number of those "in arrears," and communists' abandonment of the party have complicated the financial situation. But the biggest losses, according to N. Kruchina, have occurred in connection with the change in the situation involving the publication of newspapers, journals, and brochures.... The process in which certain newspapers and journals are changing their status and leaving the system of party publishing houses is not yet over. "We have lost many publications, highly profitable ones, in the main," V. Filimonov, spokesman for the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs, declared. At the time the budget was being put together the party was financing 3,583 district and city newspapers, 213 of them purely party papers. Under the new conditions they all require subsidies. From which monies is the CPSU reimbursing this and other expenditure? N. Kruchina replied as follows: The party has for many years been forming a financial reserve, which totals 4.9 billion rubles [R]. It is these resources that are covering all losses: R600 million, for example, being the result of the change in the scale of the payment of dues, R120 million which have formed on account of the change in the numbers of the CPSU

Despite the fact that measures are being taken to reduce spending on the support of the administrative system of the Central Committee and the kray, oblast, city, and district party committees (R500-550 million have been obtained here), the present market conditions nonetheless require new spending, and it will obviously grow

In accordance with a decision of the 28th CPSU Congress, a stock-taking of party property is now under way. "It is unique with us," N. Kruchina observed. "The party has no plants and factories, the property consists of

buildings and structures belonging to the party committees." Their value is put at R133 billion, R763 million being the "budget" of the Administration of Affairs. In the charge of local party authorities, however, are 5,254 administrative buildings. As the journalists were told, 3,700 of them were built entirely from party resources, approximately 1,000 with their partial participation, about 200 have been handed over to house the party administrative system, and 337 buildings are leased.

Have the privileges of the party administrative system been preserved? N. Kruchina's response to this question was brief: "We often have attributed to us what we do not have." At one time party officials were in terms of level of wages, he said, in 45th place in the country. In the "budget" of the party Central Committee Administration of Affairs currently are 23 sanatoriums and recreation centers. They are valued at R447 million. They were all built from party funds. The share of other organizations in the construction of certain facilities, according to N. Kruchina, constitutes only 4.7 percent.

The question of recreation and treatment along the lines of interparty exchange was raised at the meeting also. N. Kruchina reported that such relations are maintained with more than 200 foreign parties. A form of such exchange is travel for recreation and treatment. Such groups are made up, as a rule, of workers and members of elective bodies. All international ties are supported at party expense. Some 160 persons (82 of them party officials) visited 16 countries along these lines in 1990. For comparison N. Kruchina presented the following figure: 544 persons traveled for recreation and treatment in 1989. Some 600 party officials from 127 countries visited the Union for recreation and treatment in 1990.

As far as provision of the CPSU with currency resources is concerned, then, as follows from N. Kruchina's statement, it is done at the customary rate of exchange, and the currency situation for the party is the same as throughout the economy. The CPSU has been allocated no foreign currency for this year. The CPSU's currency resources are formed, in the main, from the contributions of specialists working overseas.

Judging by many indications, in order to support full-fledged party activity the CPSU will seek new forms of economic activity. "But we have no experience as yet," N. Kruchina said. "we are only learning and are just at the start of the road. We will enter the market, like everyone else. All is complex and costly, of course, but there is no other way."

New Head of Journalists Union Sets Goals

91UN09184 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 91
Second Edition p 3

[Interview with Eduard Sagalavev, chairman of the new journalists union, by S. Oganyan: "Opposition to Ignorance and Evil. A meeting with the chairman of the new, confederative-based USSR Union of Journalists, Eduard Sagalavev"]

[Text] Election of a chairman took place, as was planned, on the final day of the 8th Congress of the Union of Journalists, but nobody had "planned" E. Sagalayev as chairman. But if you recall who this Eduard Sagalayev is, if you do not forget that he is a popular television journalist, the author of a series of memorable programs on Central Television [TsT], that this is a publicist with his own political position, then his selection will no longer seem so sudden. Such a person is able take over as head of our union. And he has taken over.

Our conversation with Eduard, a sharp and interesting conversation partner and my good friend, began, as is customary, with congratulations.

[Oganyan] I understand, Eduard, that right after your election, when you still have not "settled into the job," it is difficult to talk about anything concrete. But, nevertheless, how do you look upon the new Union of Journalists?

[Sagalayev] In general, like all my colleagues, I have more than a few ideas about the future of the Union of Journalists. I have always considered that it should be a wise, competent defender, a kind of arbiter, an objective spokesman of public opinion. It should be a creative union of professionals, incorporating within itself a large number of view points, capable of making sense of and expressing the positions of our entire writing and photographic brotherhood.

A confederative-based union of journalists will have to embody in its activities the principles of coexistence of republics, autonomies, sovereignties, and points of view, down to some that are personal and specific. We must create a new model of mutual relationships within our creative union, the kind of model that can become a guidepost for other public organizations.

In a word, I am for the kind of union that will be able authoritatively and consistently to defend glasnost and its principles and interests, to protect the Law on the Press.

[Oganyan] Yet, as has also been reported in the newspapers, you will now be leaving Central Television, true, for a different reason...

[Sagalayev] It is good that you brought up this report. The fact is that I have never had any intention of leaving but they "moved me out," moreover not by a decision of the leadership but by the stroke of a flippant journalistic pen. Incidentally, there are many similar false reports in the press today. And I am grateful to you that today, in this interview, I have an opportunity to "amplify" the report in "Komsomolka" [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA], a paper that I deeply esteem, where it was said that I am leaving for a Russian channel. The paper quotes Central TV commentator Sergey Lomakin. But Lomakin denies it. I could not have said this, he told me, because I do not have any such information. So there, I myself am very well disposed toward the idea of the

existence of an independent television channel for Russia, but this, of course, does not mean that I urgently need to get a job there.

[Oganyan] And, nevertheless, you are leaving. Fate has sharply changed your plans...

[Sagalayev] I hope that also in my new position I will not change my credo and, as formerly, will strive to struggle for culture, justice, knowledge, and good. At the same time I want to emphasize: This struggle also applies to me, myself, to overcoming my own shortcomings.

The union has an enormous field of activity ahead: It is necessary to defend the victories of glasnost, to protect our readers, viewers, and listeners from lies and tendentiousness, and, sometimes, even instigation in the statements of journalists; it is necessary to protect the journalists themselves from moral and physical terror, to guarantee their human and professional rights. I hope to see to it that our union has a completely different degree of authority and possibilities.

Yes, I am leaving television. But I would not want to leave television entirely, to lose my creative face. I want always to stay in good form. I hope that I will be able, at least sometimes, to have my own show and to use everything in my power to support the idea of establishing a "TV of the 21st Century" channel.

[Oganyan] It will be difficult for you to leave. I have in view that it is not simple to put an end to a whole period of one's life, and not the worst one at that. What have you been working on recently? And what is this channel "TV of the 21st Century," about which, speaking frankly, I am not hearing for the first time?

[Sagalayev] My position at Central Television, alas, now my final one, was as general director of the fourth channel. Besides this, they recently elected me president of the Union of Cable and Broadcast Television Organizations. The latter sounds, perhaps, high-flown, but, believe me, warranted.

And the idea of a "TV of the 21st Century" flows organically from what for years has been accumulating in the depths of Central Television and what world experience provides. And, strictly speaking, it is not I who is the author of this idea, but the present educational program, which laid the basis for our educational television.

[Oganyan] What moved you? Were these ideas evoked by the radical changes that are taking place in society, to which the level of educational TV is no longer able to correspond?

[Sagalayev] Absolutely, by the changes—and not only in our society. Everywhere in the world, educational, popular-scientific, instructional, and artistic television—this in the direct sense is the most costly and the most prestigious TV. It is being made by the best specialists, using the best equipment, on the best film. Thanks to it expensive expeditions to the most inaccessible corners of

the earth are being undertaken. Of course, for this, money is needed, and not a little.

[Oganyan] And here it is difficult to count on the state budget, which, with regard to art and culture, follows a policy of residual financing...

[Sagalayev] This policy finds its logical extension within television. The largest monies are being put into entertainment programs, then into political ones, and only what remains goes to educational broadcasts... This is an injustice that I intend to correct, to turn the fourth channel into full-value artistic and educational TV, to encompass not the present 12 percent of the country's territory, but to reach an all-union audience.

[Oganyan] "I like the vastness of our plans..." But where to get the funds? Look for sponsors, for patrons? Is this even possible?

[Sagalayev] Both sponsors and patrons will appear in time. Meanwhile, it would be possible to try to activate, as we still love to say, reserves. For example, collaboration with that same cable TV. But the main thing is the idea of creating a "TV of the 21st Century" association. And my dream is that its guardians will be first of all public organizations which, in their activities, support the ideas of charity and learning...

[Oganyan] Do you also include the Union of Journalists among such organizations?

[Sagalayev] Of course. But if we are talking in general about television, about possibilities of establishing new television companies or about regulating the life of cable TV, of republic television centers, then it is necessary to civilize this entire sphere and, for this, corresponding laws should be passed. But, as you know, we still do not have a law on television in the country. It is only being developed.

[Oganyan] The absence of such a law has an effect not only on the manners of entrepreneurs, especially video pirates, but, possibly, also on the actions of television's leadership...

[Sagalayev] I understand what you have in mind. More correctly, whom. Leonid Petrovich Kravchenko, right? It would be a violation of professional ethics to criticize one's own leadership in public. This rule is adhered to everywhere in the world. And if I am prepared to speak out in this regard, then this is not at all because I am no longer subordinate to Kravchenko—now, already, as chairman of the all-union television and radio company.

Strictly speaking, my attitude toward his initiatives have never been a secret. I cannot agree with certain methods of his work. If there are grievances toward "Vzglyad," present them and, in a word, jointly with the authors, seek an acceptable concept. But why shut down the broadcast?

I share the desire to increase the volume of artistic transmissions. But, for this, it is necessary to attract the best films and programs.

I have expressed my views in meetings and collegiums. But what is now going on around Kravchenko himself—this is no longer criticism. This is a campaign aimed at his destruction. As a personality, I am against this. It is possible to criticize him, not to agree. It is possible, I understand, not to love him. But why, I ask, drive a person to a heart attack, to poorly thought-out actions under the influence of emotions? It would be more reasonable to look into the processes that are taking place in the political life of the country, and in journalism, including television. Those who think that, if Kravchenko would leave, life would change and television would be transformed, are deluding themselves. Reasons and consequences should not be confused...

[Oganyan] Be that as it may, today Kravchenko is perceived by many as a metaphor for certain processes that appear alarming...

[Sagalayev] Do you know what I cannot agree with? With how Kravchenko views pluralism. He cites the existence of Leningrad television and of the Moscow program and of transmissions from sessions of the Russian Supreme Soviet as being proof of pluralism on TV. Here I do not agree with him, but with you—I consider that there simply should be another television [network].

But, at the same time, I want to make one important stipulation. If these two televisions become a blind tool in the competition of two leaders—Gorbachev and Yeltsin, then I am against such a network. And I am afraid that precisely this will occur.

What is happening with journalists? Indeed, these are members of the intelligentsia, they should be no less aggressive than the political leaders, should not yield to them in terms of wisdom. But, by their actions, they are once again demonstrating that it is not without reason that they call our profession the second oldest. They are willingly giving themselves up into the hands of the politicians and political intriguers. This is what scares me.

[Oganyan] Totalitarianism—it assumes various aspects, even if decked out in the most attractive clothing. It still sits within us.

[Sagalayev] We must learn to exist normally, must accustom ourselves to the political culture of a pluralistic press. We still have to overcome our partiality to shameless campaigns, to persecuting our opponent. We do not know how to converse; we are taught to denounce and uncover enemies. And you ask yourself the question: And can it be that the civil war did not end? Will we finally take a step toward a civil society, to a civil world?

[Oganyan] I think you will agree with me that today the conditions for civil peace still have not been fully prepared.

Economically, society, in my opinion, does not provide the grounds for such a transition, for such a step.

[Sagalayev] We have already talked about the problems of creating artistic and educational broadcasting, which is called upon to affirm the highest human values. Believe me, I understand excellently that we will not achieve this as long as our country does not develop a market economy. A society in which not only material blessings, but also items of vital necessity are severely rationed, are distributed on the basis of coupons, a society that is, let us say it directly, half-starving, cannot permit itself the luxury of human intercourse. It is not strong enough for this.

When they were confirming me for my position, one of the members of the collegium, a person whom I have admired and do admire, warned: You know Sagalayev well; aren't you afraid that a fourth channel will become a mouthpiece for the opposition? Yes, I agreed, this will be a mouthpiece of the opposition—of the opposition to ignorance, evil, obscurantism, to all the darkness that has accumulated in human souls, in our lives, to everything that hinders us from being normal people.

I have no doubt that publication of our conversation in PRAVDA will produce bewilderment on the part of some: Sagalayev is making a play to the right, is playing to the party apparatus. But why? Indeed, I would say the same thing for another newspaper. I read with interest ROSSIYA, MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI, but also not the least PRAVDA. Does a preference for one or another newspaper really mean a change of citizenship? And is it not rather better to be citizens of one state, in which, thank God, newspapers of the most varied directions are published. This is how it is done throughout the entire civilized world.

Why in the presence of different viewpoints must we reach for submachine guns? Do we want to live or die? The former is more difficult, but also has more virtue. We must cure ourselves of totalitarianism. It is precisely in this that I see the most important task now facing me, and also facing the chairman of the country's Union of Journalists.

Latvian Periodical Publication Problems

91UN0958B Riga BALTISKJOYE VREMYA in Russian
No 8, 4 Feb 91 p 4

[Article by N. Kabanov: "An Independent Printing Facility: Not Before Summer?"]

[Text] Many of our readers will probably be interested in the current situation with respect to the publication of periodicals in the republic. The chairman of the Preses Nams joint stock company, Kazimir Dundurs, agreed to comment on this:

Now, of course, we cannot speak about the normal operation of a joint stock company, about any profits, shares, and so forth. For us the most important question

is the question of survival: How soon will we be able to create an alternative independent printing base—for the capabilities of small printing facilities are not great and they are not able to satisfy our needs. Today we already have a full agreement with Swedish firms for the delivery of rotary offset printers.

Subscribers to the popular publications ZVAIGZNE, LIESMA, and AVOTS are upset. Unfortunately, if the alternative printing base is created by summer, which is what we are counting on, the magazines will manage to put out two issues at best.

Naturally, the government is continuing to pay the wages of all the journalists and printing workers who have left the House of the Press.

[Kabanov] We learned how correct that Mr. Dundurs' statement was when we telephoned several republic publications.

AVOTS, Vilnis Birins:

We were paid a compensation of 66 rubles for the price increases. They promised to give us an advance for January as well. We will not receive any more than that—the magazine is a corporate body and in principle the government is not obliged to pay us any money—we consider ourselves to be independent...

ZEME, Atvars Zile:

So far—absolutely nothing. When I approached Dundurs and started talking about compensation, he responded: "Are you kidding? That does not apply to you!" I am now conducting negotiations with our organization, the Union of Agricultural Workers, and asking them to discuss the situation in the Council of Ministers.

FEMIDA, Imant Lastovskis:

Everything is going normally for us; we received our full wages for December and January and we will probably get them for February as well. It is another matter that the magazine has been refused subsidies from the founders and we might go bankrupt.

Publishing Houses Hold Moscow Exhibit

91UN0916C Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 13 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by D. Gerasimov: "A Roll-Call of Publishing Houses"]

[Text] Moscow—The Exhibition of Accomplishments of the National Economy, which for a long time has not impressed Muscovites and visitors to the capital city with accomplishments of the national economy, has suddenly been transformed and has become livelier, an unusual condition here, at this time. The exhibit, "New Publishing Houses," which opened here on 12 February is the reason.

An abundance of periodicals, whose number increases with every passing day, and the amount of other printed matter make visiting this exhibit a very tempting proposition. After all, the goal of the exhibit is to put in order information about the publishing houses which exist in our country by presenting the best copies of their products in an exhibition hall.

Statistics indicate that 281 publishing houses are in operation in the USSR right now. Thirty of them were set up in 1990: the adoption of the Law on Book Printing will make it possible to further increase their number.

Books about Russia, Russian spiritual culture, and Russian history are particularly notable. The fact that new publishing houses address these topics is gratifying. A volume of "Notes on Russia" is displayed in an exhibition case with proud significance. The novel by the remarkable Russian writer, V. Pikul, "In the Backwaters of the Great Empire" published by the All Moscow joint enterprise evokes beautiful historic and artistic images in one's memory. "Destiny of Russia" by M. Berdyayev stands next to the publication "Essays on Russian Culture." Karamzin's "History of the State of Russia" published by the IKPA Soviet-Finnish publishing house looks at you from the upper shelves. Hundreds of color pictures adorn the album "Life of the Russian Orthodox Church."

The exhibition will be open until 10 March.

AZIYA-PRESS Editor Describes News Agency

91UN0916B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 12 Jan 91 p 3

[Article by Igor Tobolnov, editor in chief of the AZIYA-PRESS agency, under the rubric "Fact-Event-Commentary": "AZIYA-PRESS Pays KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA a Visit"]

[Text] Two questions stand out among the many with which our colleagues and friends bombard us, the employees of the agency: How do you manage to obtain information from across the republic, and of whom are you independent?

Taking advantage of this occasion, I will try to answer these questions in this forum provided by KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA.

The all-Union information agency AZIYA-PRESS was formed on the basis of the concept of central press staff correspondents who are accredited in Kazakhstan and belong to the KAZINPRESS Association. This extensive network of correspondents generates the main stream of news reports for us, also from beyond the borders of Kazakhstan, as you may see from an item from Karakalpakstan being published today.

As far as the staff reporters of our agency are concerned, they are few and far between. We chase after the news all the time: Legwork is what keeps us going. We are

independent of political parties, various movements and schools of thought. However, this is not at all to say that AZIYA-PRESS has no position of its own. We keep this position "off screen" by presenting rival points of view on the most important events in the life of our society.

Items of most diverse genres on topics associated with the development of democratization, the market economy, and interethnic relations appear to be the most current to us, as well as all other items which may be of interest and perhaps of use to grain farmers, educators, and carpenters.

Kazakh Editors Appeal for Economic Help

91UN0916A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 12 Jan 91 p 1

[Open letter to Comrade N.A. Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, from a group of editors: "Toward a Market Economy—Without Newspapers?"]

[Text] Will the newspapers of Kazakhstan survive in a market environment? Journalists ask themselves this question with alarm because the outlook is pessimistic. The employees of the mass media alone are not in a position to check the rampage of monopolistic establishments which relentlessly jack up the prices of newsprint and services of the republic Ministry of Communications. All newspapers and magazines of the republic, virtually without exception, face the threat of bankruptcy. Losses go into the millions.

Do not be misled by the fact that newspaper prices have doubled, and profits have increased accordingly. Why do we make a loss? Well, let us calculate our outlays.

The republic Main Administration for Press Distribution has increased fees for the distribution and delivery of newspapers by a factor of 26! The Ministry of Communications has increased postal tariffs by a factor of 13! Let us add to this newsprint prices which have increased by a factor of four, and a paradoxical conclusion will emerge: The higher the circulation of a newspaper the greater its losses.

For your information: The communications workers of our republic are the only ones who have climbed to such heights. Our own, Kazakhstan Ministry of Communications claims an average of 60 to 63 percent of newspaper profits (let us note once again, local newspapers only, and not central newspapers), whereas in other republics it is not more than 30 percent. Why? Because they want to get everything, and right away. To be sure, businessmen from the Ministry of Communications who press financial claims now may lose their permanent partners in the future as the market closes down unprofitable newspapers. In this case, the Ministry of Communications may kiss its millions goodbye. It appears to us that the communications personnel proceed from a myopic desire to ensure instantaneous advantages. They are intoxicated by their monopoly position. They are

perhaps forgetting that a difficult hangover is in store for them because, according to the laws of the market, they will also go bankrupt along with their partner-newspapers, and thousands of people will be left without jobs. Has the Ministry of Communications of our republic given this any thought?

Please understand that we are not blowing things out of proportion. We are trying to objectively project the development of events which will inescapably result from the arbitrariness of any monopoly.

We appeal to the president of the Kazakh SSR with a request to address this issue carefully and facilitate the establishment of mutually acceptable and advantageous economic relations—in a word, civilized market relations based on cooperating on an equal footing—between these partners of long duration.

We ask that a specific decision be made even before anti-monopoly legislation takes effect in the republic because glasnost is being threatened

[signed] Sh. Murtazayev, editor in chief of SOTSIALISTIK KAZAKHSTAN, Kazakh SSR people's deputy

F. Ignatov, editor in chief of KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA

K. Smailov, editor in chief of the journal KAZAKHSTAN KOMUNISI, Kazakh SSR people's deputy

U. Kalikanov, editor in chief of LENINIKIN ZHAS

O. Nikanov, editor in chief of LENINSKAYA SMENA

Principals in Anti-PRAVDA Suit Interviewed

91UN0865A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 6, Feb 91 p 8

[Untitled report by A. Binev]

[Text] On 4 February the civil case of USSR People's Deputy G. Starovoytova against the newspaper PRAVDA and V. Petrunya, chief editor of the all-Union TASS, concerning his article "But Perhaps We Should Harvest the Potatoes Again," published on 2 October 1990, was heard in the premises of the Sverdlovskiy People's Court in Moscow.

According to the author, USSR People's Deputy G. Starovoytova had called for physical reprisals against those who think differently.

What did the court decide?

Our correspondent A. Binev asked those involved in the case to comment on the decision of the court, which found in favor of G. Starovoytova.

A. Makarov, lawyer for the plaintiff: In court V. Petrunya said he was not at the meeting at which Starovoytova spoke but was told about it by two TASS journalists. I did not see the reports but perhaps that is what they did write. In any event, the fact is that these journalists wrote what can be reduced approximately to the following: "I am reporting for your information that Starovoytova said or called for reprisals against those who think differently..." That is, in my opinion, what the TASS people said. It is not a question of whether this is false information or testimony but of what the TASS report was saying in this case. The newspaper PRAVDA is liable for this in accordance with Articles 23 and 26 of the Law on the Press and the Other Mass Media. The TASS author is not liable. The newspaper had the freedom of choice. Accordingly, to assert that they are not responsible for the authenticity of information sounds unconvincing. And it was not simply a question of a citizen of the USSR but of a people's deputy. And as far as the newspaper is concerned, which has now apologized, it is a matter of education.

I. Troitskaya, people's judge presiding over the case: We decided to recognize that what was reported in V. Petrunya's article was not in accordance with reality since he did not have at his disposal information that G. Starovoytova had called for physical reprisal against those who think differently. Because of this we obliged the newspaper PRAVDA to publish within one month on its front page, where V. Petrunya's article was published, a retraction, and in bold face. True, the newspaper still has the right of appeal.

As far as TASS is concerned, we reached no decision.

V. Petrunya: I am still of the opinion that a person who approves inhumane actions is indirectly calling for reprisals. Of course, my conclusion is controversial. Within the formulation of this phrase I failed in my vigilance. So I agree formally with the decision of the court. And I do not intend to dispute the issue publicly.

G. Starovoytova: It was not simply an issue of my honor and dignity. It seems to me that under the conditions of the onslaught against perestroika this small victory over a lie is of importance not only for me. This case is connected with a broader theme—pluralism and tolerance in our society.

Now it is up to PRAVDA, which is obliged within a period of one month to comply with the decision of the court, that is, publish a retraction on the same page and in the same bold face.

Biologist Outlines Kamchatka Nature Preservation Trends, Needs

91WN0243A Moscow *PRIRODA in Russian* No 11, Nov 90 pp 39-46

[Article by Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Kirpichnikov, doctor of biological sciences, senior scientific associate-consultant at the Cytology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "Kamchatka's Fate Rests in Our Hands"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] Valentin Sergeyevich Kirpichnikov, professor and doctor of biological sciences, is a senior scientific associate-consultant at the Cytology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. His scientific interests lie in the area of evolutionary theory, genetics and fish breeding. He is a winner of the N.I. Vavilov Prize and a Hero of Socialist Labor.

Preserving the wealth of nature which surrounds us has become as urgent a task for mankind as disarmament. This task is particularly pressing for our country, where, as a result of unthinking policies and irresponsible leaders many regions have ended up in a catastrophic state. Among those urgent measures to save nature one of the most important is the creation of a vast network of protected territories—wildlife sanctuaries, preserves and national parks.

Lately a great deal of attention has been devoted to the creation of national parks throughout the world. Unfortunately, only a few of the 15 of the national parks which exist in the USSR are actually operating. The three best—Ignalinskiy Park in Lithuania, Gauya Park in Latvia and the Lakhemaaskiy Park in Estonia are seriously in need of material and moral support. Other national and "natural" parks exist largely on paper or lead a miserable existence such as the Zhiguli Park on the Volga (Samara Bend), Losinyy Ostrov (Elk Island) near Moscow, Sevan in Armenia and many others.

The problem of expanding the network of wildlife preserves and organizing national parks has particular significance for Kamchatka—the amazing eastern outskirts of our country, an area which is unique in its beauty and the richness of its natural life.

Tall mountains (mud volcanoes), covered in ice and snow, with unpassable thickets of dwarf alder, birch, mountain ash and procumbent evergreen cedars on their slopes; oddly bent, frequently very large Erman birch trees; nine active and many extinct volcanoes; transparent lakes, rivers and streams, which are filled during the summer with large shoals of salmon rushing uncontrollably to spawn; rapids (bars) at the mouths of rivers, at which hundreds of adroit bearded seals, hunting for fish, stand guard; thermal springs and geysers; grasses which grow three meters in a month; flowers which replace each other in quick succession and open up in front of one's very eyes; brown bears, the ancient masters of Kamchatka, who are passionate fishermen—all this and much more makes a deep impression on the person

coming here for the first time from the west if, of course, he genuinely loves nature and he has not grown completely callous. I would like to add the special quiet of the Kamchatka forest, only occasionally disturbed by the monotone cries of the "deaf" cuckoo, the cawing of the black crow and the singing of a few song birds. Kamchatka has no snakes or frogs and consequently in the heat of summer it is difficult to protect oneself against the mosquitoes, especially in the taiga forests.

The Kamchatka Peninsula is undoubtedly unique in the beauty and striking combination of many unique features of nature. It can compete with any corner of the earth in either the northern or the southern hemisphere. The natural life of Kamchatka is diverse and changeable; frequent eruptions of the volcanoes continue to change the shape of its mountains, and they cover the dry land and water with ash. It is our duty to preserve this miracle as well as to make it accessible to all the people. Kamchatka gives us not only the joy of being with the beauty and power of nature, it provides many of the most valuable edible fishes. Every year the fishermen of Kamchatka catch almost 1.5 million tons of fish. The high-quality Pacific salmon are especially valuable; they bring the country substantial income.

Unfortunately, at present the danger of losing Kamchatka with all its natural resources is no less great than the threat hanging over the Aral, Azov and Caspian seas; Baykal, Balkhash and Ladoga; the Neva inlet of the Gulf of Finland; the southern part of Krasnodarskiy Kray and Moldavia. It is essential to preserve Kamchatka and at present that is still possible. It is necessary not only to protect the very vulnerable natural life of Kamchatka but also to adopt radical measures to restore and expand its main resource—the Pacific salmon, which every year come in million-strong shoals from the ocean to the rivers, streams and lakes of Kamchatka to reproduce. After spawning, all the salmon die, fertilizing with their bodies the Kamchatka waters, which are poor in organic matter, thus contributing to the better survival of their offspring.

It is very easy and very dangerous to disturb the balance of all the processes taking place in the waters and on the land of Kamchatka, a balance which ensures the preservation of its unique plant and animal world, including the large shoals of salmon. The sad experience of the declining salmon stocks in the Amur, in the coastal area and on Sakhalin provide eloquent evidence of this.

The damage inflicted on the natural life of Kamchatka by the uncoordinated and uncontrolled activities of geological expeditions, tourists and various agencies of the agricultural industry and of the forestry, mining and other industrial sectors, is very great. Loggers are destroying in a barbaric way the forests of the Kamchatka River valley, thus drying up the its tributaries and undermining the reproduction of salmon in the river. The cutting of trees has led to where submerged logs—in places—densely cover the bottom of the peninsula's main salmon artery. The sovkhoses located in the river

valleys are ruining the salmon rivers of Kamchatka; at the same time the zealous reclamation specialists are disturbing to an inordinate degree the water conditions which have developed over centuries.

The defenders of nature on Kamchatka have managed with great effort to slow up the construction of hydroelectric stations on the rivers—they would result in many problems for the peninsula's natural life and fishing industry. At the same time, despite sharp protests from the community, explosive work continues, as does the removal of earth from the slopes of the Petrovskaya Mud Volcano, which is completely covered in birch forests and is rich in mushrooms. And this magnificent natural park, which rises almost 400 meters above Petropavlovsk and extends for a good 15 kilometers, is a favorite recreation spot for people from the city. Avachinskaya Bay, one of the most beautiful in the world, is rapidly becoming polluted; it is approaching a critical state. The ominous list of thoughtless, ecologically intolerable measures which are being carried out on Kamchatka, could be continued.

Recently the vast Kronotskiy Sanctuary, which was formed in the 19th century on the eastern coast of the peninsula, was restored. It includes the magnificent Kronotskaya Mud Volcano, which rises 3.5 km into the sky and other volcanoes as well as the Uzon area—a volcanic crater with a network of warm and cold lakes and sulfurous springs. Nearby is the remarkable "valley of the geysers," unique in the USSR, which was opened about 50 years ago. The preserve includes the beautiful Kronotskoye Lake, which contains loach and "kokani," a local variety of Pacific red salmon.

In 1988 a preserve was developed on southern Kamchatka; it includes the deep Kurilskoye Lake and its environs. The lake is located between three volcanoes and is rich in salmon. There are many bears along the shores of the lake, as well as the streams and rivers which feed into it.

There is no doubt that it is essential to develop at least two or three more sanctuaries, including a minimum of one in northern Kamchatka in the Koryak Autonomous Okrug. The sanctuaries, however, are accessible only to staff members and a few scientists who come from other scientific institutions to work. They are also visited by a "selected few"—highly-placed officials and well-known figures of science and culture, as well as the occasional foreigner. For all the other residents of our country the road to the sanctuaries and preserves is usually closed. Protecting the natural environment by banning visits to any particular unique area is very common in the USSR (the mountainous part of the Crimea can serve as an example). Sometimes such restrictions are essential but certain regions of Kamchatka should be opened for tourists, both domestic and foreign.

This can be done by establishing national parks, visits to which will enable tens of thousands of tourists to become acquainted with the wonderful natural life of Kamchatka

without tangible harm to it. It is well known that the national parks in the United States and certain other countries flourish while preserving the uniqueness of their natural life. They bring in substantial incomes, comprised of entrance fees, payments from concessions and other services which operate within their boundaries, and other fees. A significant portion of the income from each park, if parks are developed on Kamchatka, could be utilized to pay for security guards, hunting experts, guides, fish conservation inspectors, foresters, gardeners, ecology specialists and other people who will ensure that all the features of the area are preserved within the park's boundaries.

The scientist I.I. Lagunov, who died recently, specialized in the study of this area. He was a passionate enthusiast for the protection of nature on Kamchatka and a tireless traveller; 15 years ago he first proposed that all of Kamchatka should be made into a sanctuary. He emphasized the need to preserve Kamchatka's natural life—its very pure rivers and lakes, the enormous shoals of salmon, the forest resources in the Kamchatka River valley, the very rich tundra areas and the reindeer farming in the north. In this process priority must be given to fishing—to providing our country with millions of tons of high quality fish.

The way to save Kamchatka, to preserve and expand its natural wealth, including its fish resources, is not only to create there a network of preserves, sanctuaries and national parks, but also to take a scientifically-grounded approach to the development of various branches of man's economic activities on Kamchatka. This concerns above all priority for the fishing and fish-processing industry, as well as measures for breeding salmon. Fishing and fish-processing on Kamchatka are extremely neglected; many claims could be lodged against the fishing industry, while fish breeding is hardly developed at all. I will cite only one vivid example of scandalous mismanagement. In mid-August 1987 more than 2 million red-salmon breeding sires had returned to spawn in Kurilskoye Lake in southern Kamchatka, and although the spawning grounds there were already filled beyond their capacity (crowding in spawning areas is very harmful to salmon reproduction), another 1.5 million breeding sires (approximately 4,000 tons of fish), which could have been caught by fisherman, were put into the lake due to the lack of packaging in the near-by Ozerovskiy Fish Plant. As a result the salmon spawning conditions in the lake and its tributaries declined significantly and very valuable fish output was lost. There was a similar history in 1988-1990.

The equipment on many fishing vessels and at nearly all the fish-processing plants is very poor, but the main problems are the lack of coordination in the activities of various organizations, the inadequate maneuverability of the fleet and irregularities of supply. Matters are not good with regard to fish breeding, which even now could increase supplies of the two most common species of Pacific salmon—the humpbacked and Siberian salmon. For a long time Kamchatka had only one fish-hatchery

(on Lake Ushki, in the lower reaches of the Kamchatka River). This hatchery has brought only harm: as ichthyologists from the Kamchatka Division of the Pacific Ocean Scientific-Research Institute of Fishing and Oceanography (KoTINRO) have established, increasing the roe collection from the chum and red salmon has led to a significant reduction in the number of breeding sires of these two species returning from the ocean to spawn. Trapping producers during spawning has undermined the bases of the natural reproduction of the lake's salmon. After several decades of such obviously harmful work the plant was finally closed last year. The effectiveness of the work done by the new Malkinskiy Experimental Fish Hatchery Plant, which is located in the upper reaches of the Bolshaya River, is still not clear. A fish hatchery, which was purchased in Japan, is being built on the Paratunka River, which runs into Avachinskaya Bay, although the advisability of building it on this river, which is not rich in salmon and is heavily polluted, is doubtful. In my view, it would be better to locate it on one of the two main salmon rivers of the peninsula, the Kamchatka (east coast) or the Bolshaya (west coast). At the same time it is essential to think through carefully the specialization areas and the species of salmon the new fish hatcheries will concentrate on, as well as the age to which the young will be raised and the food which will be used. And consideration should be given to the extensive experience accumulated by Japan, Norway and other countries in raising salmon.

One of the most important piscicultural measures is the fertilization of the cold Kamchatka lakes, which are poor in feed organisms. Successful experiments which have been conducted under the leadership of the well-known hydrobiologist I.I. Kurenkov (recently deceased) have shown that introducing phosphates can significantly raise the productivity of lakes, sharply increase the survival rate of salmon fry and, as a result, increase the number of breeding sires which enter Kamchatka lakes from the ocean every year. The economic effect of this kind of experiment, according to modest estimates, is 8-12 million rubles per year.

The development of the salmon fishery on Kamchatka (as in other regions) depends on our knowledge of the biological characteristics of the salmon, and in particular, the age and genetic structure of their populations, the dynamics of the spawning shoals, their migration paths, etc. The effectiveness of the salmon industry can be improved without undermining salmon stocks only if there is a high level of scientific research into these fish, especially research into their biology during the marine period of their lives. Science has an ever greater role to play in the breeding of salmon: other countries are making broad use of modern genetic methods in the artificial reproduction of salmon, specifically data on the genetic variability of populations obtained during the electrophoresis of proteins; they obtain polyploid (multichromosomal) forms and they change the sex of fish, using special crossings and hormonal reactions. Recently attempts have been made to shift useful genes from one species of salmon to another.

KoTINRO is engaged in scientific research on Kamchatka salmon, as are study teams and individuals at other sector and academic institutes. It is the lack of coordination among the work plans of the sector and academic institutes which interferes the most with the scientists' work. It is essential to have a single, authoritative coordinating center, which would direct all salmon research on Kamchatka and in the adjacent regions. Several years ago the USSR Ministry of the Fishing Industry established an all-Union scientific and technical program entitled "Salmon." However, the research planned on the basis of this program was not carried out; there were not enough specialists to head up the individual departments, and financing was not provided for the scientific work.

There is an acute personnel problem at present. The Far East has very few highly-qualified specialists. KoTINRO no longer has a single doctor of science, and it is receiving almost no talented young college graduates. The situation is made worse by the lack of idealism and the materialism of a significant segment of modern young people, who grew up in the period of stagnation, when there was no glasnost. The task of saving the natural life of Kamchatka and converting it into a sanctuary must become the ideological foundation for young people at the scientific institutes on Kamchatka and in the coastal area. However, the practical side of the question must not be forgotten: the everyday annoyances which young people inevitably confront, especially the serious housing problem, must be remedied.

The effectiveness of the scientific research being carried out on Kamchatka is also lessened as a result of the catastrophic condition of KoTINRO's field laboratories and fixed observation points. Two very old laboratories (on the Dalneye and Kurilskoye lakes) were founded more than 50 years ago by the remarkable scientists, F.V. Krogus and Ye.M. Krokhin, who were deeply involved in the study of Kamchatka. They lived for half a century on Dalneye Lake, carrying out continuous comprehensive research on the lake—its flora and fauna, the complex biogeochemical processes taking place in the watery depths, and the dynamics of the lake's salmon population. In the whole world this lake has no equal in the degree to which its biocenosis has been studied; only one lake in Canada can begin to compete with it in this regard. Long-term continuous work is being conducted by a group of scientists at Kurilskoye Lake as well.

It is difficult to overemphasize the significance of these projects, which have made it possible to resolve a number of very important theoretical problems in ichthyology, hydrobiology and limnology, and which have contributed to the successful development of the salmon fishery throughout the world. In 1973 genetic and population research on salmon was started at Dalneye Lake, and later at Kurilskoye Lake as well; this research has explained a great deal about the genetic structure of salmon populations and has made it possible to improve the methods for breeding salmon.

Unfortunately, in both laboratories scientific work is now being carried out in absolutely unacceptable conditions, in poorly adapted and crowded quarters. The laboratories have virtually no modern scientific equipment or scientific literature (even in Russian); the electricity is turned on for only a few hours a day, the food supply is poor; transportation and communications do not work well. The barriers on the rivers, which make it possible to make an accurate count of the number of salmon coming every year to spawn and of the fry moving into the ocean are not good: they should have been replaced a long ago with stationary, reliable hydroinstallations. I will not talk about the state of other KoTINRO observation points, I will point out only that they are completely unsuitable for carrying out any serious scientific studies. The question of renovating KoTINRO observation points, or more accurately of building new, modern laboratories, of building dams and providing housing and basic everyday conveniences for the scientific staff must be resolved immediately. Only if that is done will the fishing industry on Kamchatka, and specifically the prediction of the catch, be based on a reliable scientific basis.

Access to scientific information is no less important for the development of research; KoTINRO and its laboratories require sources of up-to-date scientific literature, including foreign literature. The exchange of information must be mutual and rapid. It is essential for Soviet scientists to participate in all major international congresses, conferences and symposia devoted to the study of fish, for young specialists to obtain internships in the best foreign laboratories and to invite major specialists from abroad to work in our country for extended periods. There should be no attempt to economize on these measures, and indeed it would be unprofitable to do so!

The fate of Kamchatka depends to a large degree on the right set of decisions about how to best combine the fishing industry and agricultural production, as well as on the level of development in other sectors of the peninsula's economy: the cutting, floating and processing of timber; hunting; mining for minerals; power generation and local industry, which serves the needs of Kamchatka's indigenous population. The main task consists in the coordinated and judicious development of all these sectors without damage to Kamchatka's natural life, and with the absolute condition that priority be given to the fishing industry.

Agricultural production here is in a singular position as Kamchatka has very little land for agricultural expansion. This is particularly noticeable in the Kamchatka River valley, where additional land for agricultural crops can be obtained only by clearing forest land. It has already been noted that the destruction of the forest threatens the very existence of this region, which is rich in fish and taiga animals.

Increasing Kamchatka's production of potatoes and other vegetables is possible only by intensifying field

cultivation or by developing hothouse farming using thermal sources. It is extremely dangerous to expand the use of fertilizers and pesticides for field cultivation of vegetables since this leads to the poisoning of salmon rivers and the cessation of natural reproduction by the salmon. Intensive land cultivation can also lead to the rapid erosion of soil, to increased washout of the cultivated soil layer into the rivers.

The only correct way to develop vegetable production on Kamchatka is to expand greenhouse growing. It provides very little output as yet, despite an abundance of powerful thermal sources. The potential for obtaining vegetables in greenhouses and hotbeds is extremely great. However, there is much that is not clear in this area: we need serious scientific research aimed at improving the technology for growing vegetable crops and creating "pure" varieties which are adapted to growing in greenhouses and which do not require mineral fertilizers.

The establishment of new animal-raising sovkhozes on Kamchatka should be rejected decisively. The productivity of animal husbandry should be raised by searching for the breeds of cattle and poultry which are best adapted to local conditions and to raising new highly-productive and stable breeds and hybrids.

The problem of how to best combine agriculture and salmon fishing on Kamchatka is complex and has not yet been resolved definitively. There is no doubt that when agriculture is either being established or intensified, particular caution is needed here; it is essential to avoid the negative consequences of expanded agricultural production, especially the irreversible pollution of the peninsula's rivers and lakes.

The question of the forest industry's future is clearer. Given the present rate of tree cutting, in 20 years (and maybe sooner) the peninsula's main river will become shallow; many of its tributaries will dry up, and the spawning places of the most valuable salmon will disappear. Unfortunately, at the present time logging is already being carried out in previously inviolable, protected zones of the Kamchatka River basin. If irresponsible logging is continued, the damage to the fishing industry will greatly exceed the income brought in by the forestry enterprises. The climate will also change in unpredictable ways. It is necessary to reduce immediately the area being logged and to completely halt the practice of floating logs down rivers. It is essential to correct the situation at Kamchatka's Klyuchevskiy Forestry Combine—obviously the mismanagement at this enterprise has become habitual for its managers. Exports of Kamchatka wood to other regions of the USSR and abroad should be rejected decisively.

A few words should be said about commercial hunting. Many commercially valuable animals live on Kamchatka, including sable, lynx, fox, otter, deer and bighorn

sheep. In the northern part of the peninsula one encounters moose, and at the mouths of the rivers there are many seals. The sea otters are of great value. There are bears everywhere.

The main requirement for commercial hunting on Kamchatka is that it must be very carefully organized. The shooting of bears and moose must be regulated (on the basis of licenses) in order to maintain their numbers at an optimal level.

The peninsula has no mining industry at present, but there are plans to start mining gold and non-ferrous metals, as well as pumice. Vast deposits of pumice were formed in the environs of Kuril'skoye Lake as a result of a catastrophic volcanic eruption which took place several thousand years ago. It was at that time that a deep lake (up to 300 meters in depth) developed. There is persistent talk about searching for oil and gas on the shelf along the coast of Kamchatka. The realization of these plans will lead to irreversible damage to Kamchatka's natural life and to the destruction of its fish resources. An exception may be made in the future for the extraction of pumice in southern Kamchatka (on the east coast), if it is organized within reasonable limits and if environmental-protection and fish-protection measures are strictly observed. There can be no discussion of oil-production on the very rich shelf of Kamchatka. It should not be forgotten that the Kamchatka fisherman catch a great many fish off the shores of Kamchatka and almost 40,000 tons of crabs.

Kamchatka's electricity needs may be met to a significant degree through the construction of geothermal power plants—the expansion of the existing Pauzhet'skaya Plant and the accelerated building of the new one—the Mutnovskaya Plant. In the opinion of specialists the normal operation of these plants requires the development of effective methods for removing harmful impurities from the thermal waters. This purely technical task should be resolved quickly. The hot waters and steam from the springs should also be used for curative spa treatments and, as noted above, for raising vegetables in hothouses.

The work of all local enterprises must be strictly regulated. It is essential to work toward ecological purity and wastefree production.

Many extremely varied and quite complex questions will arise during the implementation of the above-enumerated measures and others, the final and only goal of which is to preserve the unique natural life on Kamchatka and to increase its very valuable fish resources. If national parks are established and mass tourism is organized on Kamchatka, it is essential to determine how many tourists can be accommodated on Kamchatka every year and how their daily needs can be met without causing irreparable harm to nature.

The entire range of complex questions on how to combine the interests of fishing and farming requires the establishment on Kamchatka of strong, well-equipped scientific institutions concerned with pisciculture and agriculture; young talented scientists, who know all the latest research methods, must be recruited to work in these institutions. It is essential to have a single coordinating center, which is directed by authoritative specialists with the highest qualifications and which has the right to a deciding vote. It seems to me that this kind of center could emerge from the special inter-agency technical council organized under the Kamchatka Oblispolkom with participation by a number of major scientists, both local and staff members from scientific institutes located in Vladivostok, Moscow, Leningrad and other cities. This council would meet regularly and possess broad powers, including the right to allot the necessary funds, as well as the right to veto, upon examination, any projects for the development of Kamchatka's economy. The council must resolve issues concerning the organization of new sanctuaries and national parks on Kamchatka. The latter must be self-financing; they could be directed by joint-stock companies, possibly mixed and international. The determination of the site and boundaries of future national parks must be approached with great caution, taking into account the need to preserve the easily-damaged unique natural life of Kamchatka.

In concluding it is essential to touch on the question of whether it is advisable to site a large number of military units and garrisons on Kamchatka. There are no longer any secrets in this area: "military Kamchatka" has been studied by the Americans better than it has been by us. Many military subdivisions are guilty of causing substantial pollution of Kamchatka and destroying its natural life; the pollution of Avachinskaya Bay is especially dangerous. In the light of the reduction in armed forces which is now taking place in many countries of the world and the warming of the international climate, we can proceed boldly with the "disarmament of Kamchatka."

Kamchatka must become a reserve in order to protect all of its natural wealth, especially the salmon. The only alternative to a reserve is the industrialization of Kamchatka, but this would lead to its death. There is no doubt that the benefits of preserving the primordial natural life on Kamchatka and its miraculous salmon will exceed many times over the income from all possible "non-fish" production units. It should not be forgotten that the development of agriculture and mining will lead to irreversible changes in the water conditions and climate of Kamchatka, to a catastrophe comparable in scale to what has befallen Aral. It is essential to save Kamchatka from destruction—we need it, as does all mankind.

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Academy of Medical Sciences President on Extent of AIDS in USSR

91US03294 Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Feb 91 p 8

[Interview with Academician V.I. Pokrovskiy, USSR Academy of Medical Sciences president, by TRUD correspondent I. Tsarev under the rubric: "A Topical Interview": "No Aid for AIDS..."]

[Text] Every effort of the world scientists has been unsuccessful so far—nobody in the medical profession has found a radical remedy for the "plague of the 20th century." Meanwhile, the virus continues "to conquer" our planet. The epidemic is growing at a threatening rate. According to our data, as of 31 December 1990, there are already over 300,000 AIDS patients in the world; several million people have been infected (i.e. they have the virus present in their system but they are not sick yet). The list of contaminated territories already consists of 159 countries. How are things in our country? A TRUD correspondent met with Academician Valentin Ivanovich Pokrovskiy, president of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences.

[Pokrovskiy] Against the background of political, economic, and social events that are taking place in our country at present, the problem of AIDS has somewhat faded; it has taken second or even third place in people's thoughts. But that certainly does not mean that all the troubles are behind us. The situation remains very distressing, even though we have some positive changes: We managed to halt an increase in AIDS cases in the Soviet Union. According to a mathematical model devised by our scientists, we could expect 1,600 Soviet people to be infected with the HIV virus by 1991. But in reality that number was three times smaller. Today we have the following picture: We have registered 1163 HIV-infected people in the USSR; 584 of them are Soviet citizens and that number includes 274 children.

You should not confuse the infected people with the sick ones. AIDS—Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome—is the final stage of the disease and does not develop right away or, possibly, does not develop at all in some cases. At present we have 50 sick people in our country, with 32 children among them.

[Tsarev] It is always pleasant when dark forecasts fail to materialize. What helped to stop the spread of the virus?

[Pokrovskiy] Primarily we were helped by the fact that the Soviet Union already had a well-established epidemiologic service. That allowed us to become the first country in the world to start to register not only the people sick with AIDS but also the HIV-infected. Our health care institutions have examined over 87 million people by now. At the same time, we set up a network of specialized laboratories and regional centers for AIDS prevention. At present, 22 such centers are already functioning in the country. Practically every medical institute and every institute for advanced training of physicians has conducted training courses concerning

HIV. We were and are educating people about prophylactics for the disease—we have talked about the sources of the infection. One single computer collects the information from all over the country and that allows us to follow the situation immediately. However, we already have victims. Thirty people have died, 18 of them were children.

[Tsarev] I have to admit that to a nonprofessional these figures do not seem very terrifying. It is clear that there is a human tragedy behind each of them. But in general, the number of people who have died of AIDS since the virus appeared in the USSR equals that of the people killed in road accidents in our country in one day. Some of the TRUD readers are asking: Is AIDS as black as it is "painted"?

[Pokrovskiy] It is not that the virus threatens individual lives, it threatens all of mankind as such. The fact that its exact origin is still unknown and that there are no vaccines or medicines to prevent the disease in a reliable way does not present the entire problem. I hope that all of these will appear with time. But the epidemic grows like an avalanche and if we continue to rest on our laurels and allow some slackening in our work then nothing will save us. Today, for instance, there are 154,791 people with AIDS in the United States, 12,405 in Brazil, 81,019 in Africa, 9,718 in France, 7,576 in Italy, and 7,047 in Spain. We should not feel content just because things are relatively satisfactory in our country. The main thing has already happened—the virus penetrated our territory. It would be naive to rely solely on condoms or on disposable syringes whose production in our country is developing very slowly. The capitalist countries, which now we start to call "civilized," are chock-full of all this stuff. But experts say, however, that by 2010 the virus will "eliminate" entire social groups of the American population. In Africa by that time, in areas where even now up to 80 percent of prostitutes are HIV-infected, certain regions will lose their entire population. So, it is criminal to underestimate the danger. A governmental commission for the prevention of AIDS in the USSR has been set up that will combine the efforts of scientists, practitioners, people working in the chemical industries, of agencies responsible for the production of medical equipment, and of institutions involved in sociological research and other aspects of fighting AIDS.

[Tsarev] Is there any remedy at all that can help combat the illness?

[Pokrovskiy] The only approved medication used to fight the HIV infection is Azidotimidin. But this remedy, together with some other drugs that allow us to regulate the human immune system, does not cure the disease: it only impedes, slows down the illness. That is the reason why hundreds of science institutes in the world are looking for a vaccine. I doubt that it will appear before the year 2000.

[Tsarev] If the existing treatment does not provide a reliable result, what can impede the progress of the virus?

[Pokrovskiy] Until we have a vaccine, the HIV-epidemic can be stopped by a whole number of measures. First of all we need to change people's sexual behavior and that may become possible only when we conduct some very aggressive educational work aimed at certain strata of the population. For that we need to have considerable funds. In the United States, for instance, such allocations are measured in hundreds of millions of dollars. But our finances are a lot more modest. The recently established AIDS prevention association whose goal is to spread AIDS related information and to provide social protection for the infected and the sick has financial difficulties. For that reason I want to use the occasion and mention here its bank account numbers for those organizations and individuals who want to contribute to the fight against the "disease of the century": No. 700470 in the USSR Zhilsotsbank and No. 70800005 in the USSR Vneshekonombank.

[Tsarev] The new law: "On AIDS Prevention" has come into effect since 1 January 1991. How different is it from the decree that was in effect before?

[Pokrovskiy] It provides new and more distinct legal guarantees for the fight against the spread of the virus. It sets examination and preventive observation procedures for people. It also has certain items dealing with the patients' social protection measures. A person, for instance, cannot be fired or denied employment only because he is infected with AIDS. If a person became infected in a medical institution he would be given a pension. There are provisions for free round trips to the treatment centers and free drugs; it might be possible for the parents to stay in the hospital with their children on a paid sick leave.

We have to remember that AIDS is a deadly disease. We have to take all possible measures to impede the spread of the virus while we are searching for effective treatment and prevention measures. The life of mankind depends on the success of this program.

AIDS Cases in Kalmyk ASSR Profiled; More Funding for Care Urged

91US0327A Moscow, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 31 Jan 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by V. Kovalev: "Our Common Trouble: AIDS Centers Need Help"]

[Text] Elista—A small coffin is being lowered into the grave. This is always a tragedy. And if it happens because the tip of a needle puts into a little guy's blood a virus that is now called "the plague of the 20th century," this is not just unprofessional; this is something much worse... Last year two HIV-infected children died in Kalmykia. The total death toll now stands at 13.

According to an old Russian custom, when trouble comes all the bells toll. Teletypes went on line tapping to the whole world the sensational news from Elista: The AIDS virus has been detected in the blood of little patients in a local hospital. For those not in the know it came out of a clear blue sky. Those in the know had predicted this situation and knew about it. So as not to be accused of unsubstantiated statements, I will quote:

"We medics understood ten years ago, when AIDS became known, that the lack of disposable medical instruments might lead to a horrible epidemic in our country. But we stayed silent for ten years..."

So much for that: We knew and we kept silent. And so AIDS caught us by surprise. We got confused. And amidst this quite understandable confusion we made a lot of mistakes. It is a shame to recall it, but in the search for the "source" here in Kalmykia the nationality factor prevailed. It was stated publicly in the press that the person was of "nonnative nationality." As if this was the main factor and could have saved us from the calamity.

The clamor around this affair has abated. But AIDS has stayed. At that time we were nearsightedly blaming it all on homosexuals, drug addicts, and sexually loose people. Without a doubt, they are among the main transmitters, but, as we have found out, AIDS is also transmitted through quite innocent channels. In Elista, for instance, it passed from an infant to a nursing mother—through the saliva.

The mothers received a detailed explanation. And advice: To save the child, good nutrition is essential. And the child must live in normal conditions. It soon became clear that many families are not able to ensure either the former or the latter. Some had a room in a dormitory where four people shared a room of 15-18 square meters. As for nutrition, many were on the so-called "bread and potatoes diet." There was no way to hope for a favorable outcome under these circumstances.

And only then did we start talking about charity. Did we start to think how to help our neighbors. With endemic shortages, this is not an easy undertaking—some people wait for 10-15 years for an apartment. Nevertheless, a preferential waiting list for AIDS patients was put together. Seven families were provided with housing. Parents started to receive a 70 ruble [R] allowance per month for AIDS-infected children. Since last September they have also received free meals. The republic Children's Fund and the anti-AIDS Fund of the Kalmyk SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers allocated R28,000 for this purpose. Twenty low-income families received financial assistance totaling R30,000 from the same funds.

Is there any need to explain that both funds have been, and are being, replenished with voluntary contributions both from individual citizens and workers' collectives and organizations. The doctors' plea for help did not leave people indifferent.

Now the center provides the children with retrovir—a medicine that suppresses the virus and keeps it from multiplying. The United States and some other countries are conducting intensive research, trying to find new treatments. The forecast is that it will take two to three years. The children now have a chance to survive; they only need to be helped to hold on.

Offers to help have also come from across the ocean. By the way, there are quite a few of our compatriots living in America; there are some Kalmyks among them. Having learned of the calamity that had befallen us, they collected a considerable amount of money, purchased disposable syringes and diagnostic equipment, and gave it all as a gift to Elista medics. I will only name a few such people of noble heart: Arkadiy Tsebikov (he purchased dental instruments with his own money and gave it as a gift to Elista dentists); Polina and Vasily Honinov (they sent the children's hospital a supply of disposable medical equipment). The American Kalmyks also sponsored a trip by a Kalmyk medical delegation to the United States. This undertaking was headed by businessman Giga Andreyev.

And suddenly a piece of different kind of news: A man named N. was detained in Elista airport carrying bags stuffed with... disposable syringes. The "black market" is already conducting a lively trade in these items.

Where did he get the syringes? Perhaps in the republic hospital, where Head Nurse M.Kh. Purbeyeva disposed of them practically at her discretion? The nurse has now been fired from the hospital on the grounds of no-confidence. Or, perhaps, they came from the store of the Medtekhnika industrial amalgamation, where a shortage of 17,000 syringes was discovered? Store employees I.A. Bevelikova and I.E. Balanova altered invoices and falsified documents. For instance, an invoice showed that the Children's House was shipped 3,000 syringes at 6 kopeks each. In reality, only 1,000 syringes costing 16 kopeks each were shipped and this should have been reflected in the documents.

M.A. Erentsenov, chairman of the oblast committee of the medical workers trade union and Kalmyk SSR Supreme Soviet people's deputy, said bitterly: "Where will it all end? Thefts have now been discovered in almost all medical organizations!"

Local officials bumped from the waiting list a family whose AIDS-infected child had died. "Since he has already died, the family is not entitled to an apartment"—this was the logic. The city was not able to provide decent housing for another family living within the Elista city limits in an extremely dilapidated house. "To spend the winter in this house is like a death sentence for us," said the head of the family.

We are still afraid of people infected by AIDS. This is the main reason for the high personnel turnover at the republic center, especially among junior personnel. Nurses leave for a variety of reasons: A husband prohibits one from working there, or the parents are

opposed to it. Doctors have psychological problems in caring for these patients: A doctor wants to see the result—a patient returned to health. Here, at the AIDS Center, the children are weakened...

Doctors believe that the main danger now is not so much the patients themselves as the so-called virus carriers. Such people do not display any symptoms of the disease. But they are contagious. Little is done now in our country to identify such persons. Meanwhile we are opening our borders. We will travel freely, and others will visit us freely.

According to expert opinion, the AIDS peak here will come in 1993. It is possible that there will be more than 1 million people suffering from AIDS by then. We will become a country with one of the highest mortality rates in the world. The deputies of the Russian parliament, however, do not seem to be worried; they do not demand the money needed to fight AIDS...

The money is needed—big money—to create a network of AIDS centers, equipped with modern medical equipment and staffed with competent specialists.

USSR Rising Mortality Rates Analyzed

91UN0893A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian No 4, 25 Jan 91 p 4

[Article by Vadim Grigoryevich Pervyshin: "What Next?: A Real Threat to the People's Genetic Stock Has Emerged"]

[Text] During the perestroika years our public has found out about the colossal losses of many millions of people in the Civil War, during collectivization, in the famine year of 1933, in the terrible 1930's during the struggle against "enemies of the people," and during the Great Patriotic War. Yet few people are aware that instead of overt destruction a form of hidden annihilation of the Russian people continues to this very day, in peacetime, and the scale of this crime has assumed ominous proportions: it has cost millions of human lives.

If one leaves aside the aforementioned horrors resulting in the violent death of innocent people and takes a look at official data from USSR population censuses from the past 30 years instead of from that terrible time one will also find some chilling figures.

The full results of those censuses—taken on 15 January 1959, 15 January 1970, 17 January 1979 and 12 January 1989—until recently lay gathering dust in the USSR State Committee for Statistics archives, marked "for official use only" and kept carefully hidden from the people. In the surveys used in those censuses the state asked a very wide range of questions of its citizens, but their answers were not of any interest to politicians, economists, sociologists, demographers or any of the rest

of the state employees for whom they were intended. No one took an interest in the people's standard of living nor

in the emerging trend toward their extinction. Let us look at the figures which prove this

	1959		1970		1979		1989
Total Population, in Millions	208.8		241.7		262.4		286.7
Relative Growth Rate, in Percent	100		115.7		125.6		137.2
Average Annual Growth Rate of Entire Population Between Censuses, in Percent		1.35		0.91		0.89	
Russians, in Millions	114.1		129.0		137.4		145.1
Relative Growth Rate, in Percent	100		113		120.4		127.2
Average Annual Growth Rate of Entire Population Between Censuses, in Percent		1.1				0.89	

Over the past 30 years of peaceful but constantly worsening living (1959-1989) the USSR's population grew from 208.8 million to 286.7 million people, an increase of 77.9 million, or by a factor of 1.372.

In his "Legacy Thoughts" the great D.I. Mendeleyev expressed the opinion that the strength of a country is determined by the number of its citizens, by its population, and asserted that a minimum annual growth rate of two percent was required not only to ensure simple reproduction of the population but also to ensure that Russia's strength and might would continue to increase. If that were the case, Russia's population would have reached 350 million in 1990, yet 40 years later we have not even reached 290 million, though on 1 January 1913 Russia's population was 170,902,900, of whom 135 million were Russian peasants and only 11.5 million were "foreigners" from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.

Thus, "according to Mendeleyev" our country's population should have grown by a factor of at least 1.811 over the past 30 years, i.e., by 169.4 million people, for a total of 378.2 million. As of 12 January 1989 the "birth shortfall" was $378.2 - 286.7 = 91.5$ million people.

Let us look at the figures and determine how the population of our peripheral areas has grown during the same period. We find that over the past 30 years the number of Uzbeks has increased by a factor of 2.775, that of the Tatars by a factor of 3.019, the Turkmen by a factor of 2.725, the Kirghiz by a factor of 2.611, the Kazakhs by a factor of 2.246, and the Azerbaijanis by a factor of 2.303. In other words, in those areas natural reproduction of population is occurring, and the USSR's population growth is based solely on growth in the Muslim populations of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. I am not opposed to all people, regardless of their nationality, race or religion, living in happiness and prosperity, but I as a Russian am primarily interested and concerned by how the Russians are living, or rather how they are eking out their miserable existence.

The total number of the "great Russian people" was 114.1 million in 1959, yet it had risen to only 145.1 million in 1989, i.e. increased by only 31 million or by a factor of 1.272, which was substantially lower than for the country as a whole—a factor of 1.372 increase—and substantially lower than the two percent mark. The average annual growth rate of the Russians has dropped steadily every decade, in the 1960's it was 1.1 percent, in the 1970's 0.7 percent, and in the 1980's 0.61 percent (the latter figure for the country as a whole was 0.89 percent and for the entire world two percent).

Russian villages are dying out. Over the past 10 years the number of rural residents decreased by 3.2 million, while the number of villages decreased by 51,000, or by 13 percent. Let us recall that during the war the fascist invaders destroyed and burned 70,000 large and small villages. Yet in 1974 it was "planned" that only 29,000 of the 143,000 villages in the Non-Black Earth Region alone would be "left alive," and that the rest would be "eliminated as unpromising." The ideologues behind those plans remain alive, well and unpunished to this day.

The "birth shortfall" of the Russians in 30 years of peacetime have been 61.4 million, more than all the losses of the Russians in World War I, the Civil War, the Finnish War and the Great Patriotic War plus the years of collectivization and the terrible 1930's put together. This is also attested to by figures showing a sharp drop in the number of births per thousand people in our country. In 1913 this figure was 45.5 (a rate of "natural" growth not exceeded by any country in the world, even the United States and Argentina, which were attracting immigrants); in 1926—44.0, in 1937—39.9, in 1940—31.2, in 1959—25, in 1979—18.2, in 1990—16.8. This is clearly leading to the extinction of our people! The percentage of Russians in the USSR's total population has decreased in 30 years from 54.6 to 50.6 percent.

Russians in their own country are becoming not simply unwanted, but actually "superfluous" people. Especially tragic is the fate of the 28 million Russians living outside

the RSFSR in the other union republics. These "occupiers" are the descendants of Russians who have lived in those lands for 50, 70 or 100 years, yet they are being intimidated and driven from the Baltics, the Transcaucasus, Moldova and Central Asia. Moreover, Russians are beginning to be driven out and killed by the "locals" in their "sovereign" states—the former autonomous republics within the territory of the RSFSR.

The tragedy of the Russians is not just that they are being driven out, they are simply being killed with impunity. Our President and our government are well aware of these innocent victims, yet they pretend that nothing out of the ordinary or terrible is happening. "Ordinary, everyday hooliganism" explained the chairman of an emergency commission, yet he failed to add that six people, six Russians, were lured into an ambush on a square where a mob awaited them. There they were brutally and without reason murdered; or rather there was a reason, the fact that they were RUSSIANS. They were doused with gasoline and set on fire, not drunken Russians, but sober Russians in the uniforms of Soviet Army soldiers; this happened in Namangan on 2 December 1990. Yet on 6 December Central Television presented this as a drunken brawl. Would it have been possible 30 or 50 years ago in those places for even a single Russian to have been killed with senseless cruelty, and a soldier at that, and for the perpetrators to go unpunished? Yet today this is considered virtually a demonstration of "national pride" and "struggle against the occupiers." Why was it that "Russian occupiers" from the battalion commanded by Major V. Tezikov who arrived on the scene of their comrades' deaths did not shoot anyone on the spot, as is customarily done by real occupiers to "keep order"?

No matter how complacent Russians may be, no matter how much they may want to live in peace with all peoples, the fact that Russians have become refugees in their own country is going too far. There should be a limit to our peace-loving nature and indifference. It is time to demand restoration of authority, and force where needed.

A particularly ominous situation has emerged in our country during the past five years of perestroika. There has been a sharp drop in the birth rate, and the reason for that was a sharp decline in working people's standard of living, their total impoverishment, their lack of faith in a "better tomorrow." The hopes that people attached to perestroika and the disillusionment which it caused are evident from these striking figures on the number of births in those years.

1985—5,374 million—emergence from stagnation

1986—5,611 million—high hopes.

1987—5,599 million—doubts.

1988—5,381 million—disillusionment.

1989—5,062 million—disbelief.

1990—4,850 million—bitterness

Even more striking is the rising mortality rate among deprived, defenseless people.

1986—2,737 million—unhappiness.

1987—2,804 million—misfortune.

1988—2,888 million—grief.

1989—2,875 million—suffering

1990—3,009 million—a tragedy for the people

Each year fewer and fewer Soviet citizens are being born while more and more are dying. In five years of perestroika the birth rate has dropped by 761,000 while the mortality rate has risen by 271,000.

The tragedy also stems from the fact that each year at least 120,000 inferior, defective and mentally retarded children are born with severe mental and physical handicaps. Furthermore, the situation is worsening with each passing year. A real threat to the genetic stock of the people has emerged. In our country there are one million preschoolers and 1.8 million school-age children who are congenitally deaf and blind.

Since in our country there are 52 million women of childbearing age, i.e. between ages 16 and 44, and it is a well-known fact that of every 1,000 women 180 have an abortion each year (in Germany this figure is seven per 1,000!), then that means that each year 9.5 million children are murdered in their mother's womb. One woman in seven suffers from a reproductive system disorder. Every year 3,000 mothers and 200,000 children die in childbirth, and another 116,000 infants die before they reach their first birthday.

In our country there are 1.5 million people who have tried or currently use narcotics, 5.5 million people are registered with psychiatric treatment facilities, and five million people are registered alcoholics. Each year there are at least one million deaths in our country related to drinking (serious on-the-job injuries, transportation accidents, poisoning by drinking "chemicals" [alcohol substitutes], death by fire and death by drowning). Each year the suicide rate goes up. In 1989 it reached 60,000.

It appears that it is possible without wars, firing squads or anti-kulak campaigns to create living conditions under which people will die out in peacetime. In terms of average life span the Soviet Union is in 34th place—last place—in Europe. How can people be reduced to this state? Quite simply. In order to achieve this one must do the following:

1. House 29 million people all across the country in cell-like rooms, where each one who remains alive has fewer than five square meters of living space. Another 47 million people have fewer than seven square meters, and 53 million people have fewer than nine square meters.

2. Keep 59 million retirees, 20 million handicapped individuals, nine millions students at VUZs, tekhniums, and vocational and technical schools, 30 million elderly living alone, seven million unemployed, one million refugees and one million bums living on miserable pensions, subsidies and stipends, or give them no

money at all. These people are living below the poverty level, and on the verge of starvation.

3. Keep six million formerly healthy citizens of Belorussia, the Ukraine and the RSFSR living in radiation-polluted areas covering over 460,000 square kilometers and force them to do the thing that kills both the adults and the children who remain in that zone: carry on agriculture—grow grain which cannot be consumed, milk cows whose milk is contaminated, harvest vegetables and fruits which will poison you and everyone around you. The stain of radiation is slowly but surely continuing to spread, encompassing more and more regions.

4. Abandon and condemn to a slow death the 600,000 people who helped clean up the effects of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, who at the call of the party and the government took so many risks that the imminent death of these heroes will mean the end of their bloodlines on earth. In 103 cities around our country with a total population of over 50 million the concentration of toxic substances in the air is tens and hundreds of times higher than permissible norms. Contamination of food products is on the rise.

What surprises does this winter hold? Perhaps more victims? Even the foreign moneybags are concerned about this, because they realize that hungry people are dangerous not only to their own bourgeoisie, but also to the world bourgeoisie. Old strategic stockpiles of food in Berlin (on which the expiration dates were approaching anyway) are being shipped on an emergency basis, and already hundreds of trucks are arriving from Germany loaded down with food shipments sent to "help the Russians." Food shipments worth mere kopecks bludge and degrade the Russian people. They are not being told and do not yet realize that all these aims and sops are enslaving Russia and turning it into a colony. We will have to pay with our timber, fish, furs and oil with our whole lives. With the lives which are being taken from us before our very eyes.

(Vadim Grigoryevich Pervushin, born 1938, is a graduate of the Leningrad Finance and Economics Institute and writes articles for the press on economics and sociology.)

Armenian Health Minister on Issues Facing Republic Population

91US03124 Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
17 Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with M. Nazaretvan, under rubric "Minister's Portfolio," by N. Ravich. "Public Health: Urgent Measures"]

[Text] The state of public health in our republic requires serious changes. There are many reasons for this: the lack of knowledge, the weak material-technical base, the lack of provision with medicines, and other "unexplored areas" in the health service. Recently M. Nazaretvan was

appointed minister of public health for the Republic of Armenia. Previously he had been director of the Institute of Hematology and Blood Transfusion. GOLOS ARMENII correspondent N. Ravich discusses with the minister the concept for the restructuring and improving of public health and the first-priority tasks in that field.

[N. Ravich] Migrant Konstantinovich, apparently a program is already being developed for measures aimed at raising the level of medical service. You are acquainted with the organizing of medicine in foreign countries and with the tasks that are posed by the World Health Organization. From those positions, how do you evaluate the state of our public health and the first-priority tasks that will have to be resolved?

[M. Nazaretvan] The present state of public health cannot fail to cause alarm. In the experience of past years, without a doubt, there has been much that was valuable. But considerably less was done than should have been done. The chief principle that will definitely be implemented is the rejection of a buildup of any quantitative indicators and the resolution of the task of taking all steps to improve the quality of the work at all levels. Changes in the structure of the Minzdrav [Ministry of Health] system stipulate the elimination of the functionally improper subdivisions and the creation of new ones, including those using untraditional methods of treatment and folk medicine, "crisis medicine" and "medical rapid deployment" subdivisions, groups to develop economic mechanisms and to introduce them into public health, etc. As for the medical subdivisions that do not justify their existence, the decision concerning them will be preceded by a stock-taking procedure and by accreditation. The promising ones will change over to various forms of ownership, state, leased, cooperative, and private, with varying volumes of rendering medical assistance.

[N. Ravich] What practical content is being put into the principle of rejection of the "buildup of any quantitative indicators"? Because an increase say in the number of hospitals, clinics, and other services will not be taken off the agenda, will it?

[M. Nazaretvan] Rejecting any bewitching figures is a real necessity. For example, it is felt that the republic's medical institutions have 30,000 hospital beds. Actually, however, there are only 22,000-23,000 of them. Approximately 80% exist only on paper. It is precisely those beds, which are frequently empty, that must be changed over to use as beds for obstetric, children's, infectious, and surgical patients, which beds are constantly in short supply. Certain medical centers and hospitals must be reorganized so that they will conform completely to the requirements of various forms and types of medical assistance.

[N. Ravich] But do we have a base and the conditions, primarily the buildings, for the changes being considered? Because many hospitals, clinics, and rural medical

aid stations are still being housed in old accommodations that do not correspond to the purpose for which they are being used.

[M. Nazaretyan] Unfortunately, that is true. That is all the more reason why it is necessary to carry out a kind of stock-taking of the buildings, and to ascertain those that do not conform to their functions, in order to use the buildings for their actual purposes, rather than for show. Because frequently that is exactly what happens. When our foreign colleagues arrive in our republic to render assistance, they are ready for the very worst, and they come completely equipped. In our attempt to create the maximum conveniences for our guests, we sometimes provide them with comfortable conditions, and then we show them our medical institutions, which sometimes are in poverty conditions. The foreigners lose respect for us. And one can understand them.

[N. Ravich] What is your point of view with regard to the training of physician cadres and with the rate of provision with specialists?

[M. Nazaretyan] That is a very pertinent question. I am an adherent of training specialists with a broad range of expertise, the so-called "home physician." I feel that specialization in the medical higher-educational system is undesirable. A physician should learn a narrow specialty in the subsequent two or three years of training. I would also like to mention a factor which, in my opinion, is of no small importance. Recently I was literally attacked because I have been allegedly "providing protection" for the creation of a cooperative medical institute. That is a complete fabrication. I consider the organizing of such a higher-educational institution to be undesirable. That is the ministry's point of view. Fundamental laws for privatizing higher education do not exist. Furthermore, the republic is oversaturated with physician cadres. Compare the figures: in Armenia there are 40 physicians for every 10,000 inhabitants. In America there are 24. In some of our hospitals the doctors, so to speak, have nowhere to sit down. For example, in the Yerevan hospital for infectious diseases the physicians teach the students while the physicians are sitting on the windowsills. Certain people see a touching prospect: a housewife with a physician's diploma. I feel that such alternatives are unpromising and extravagant. And if the cooperative members could organize the training of junior medical personnel and a charity service, that would be actually aid to our domestic public health. In our republic there are slightly more than two nurses for each physician. In America there are six to eight. And, finally, is it possible to create a medical institute when there is no corresponding base? That is unprofessional. It is not excessive to state that the creation of a cooperative higher-educational institution specializing in medicine stipulates the coordination of the question with the ministry. The development and introduction of the concept of the professional training of medical specialists is one of the absolutely fundamental tasks. We shall also promote the entry of the Armenian church into therapeutic institutions. Charity

must assist the physicians in the fight for people's health in the treatment of ailments.

[N. Ravich] Migran Konstantinovich, what do you value in the past experience of the health service? What do you consider necessary to strengthen and to enrich? And what do you reject? What is your opinion about the diagnostic center?

[M. Nazaretyan] I reject the striving to achieve overall indicators, which do not characterize in any way the high quality of public health. For example, the total number of beds, physicians, centers, or laboratories does not say anything about the quality of the medical service. As for the diagnostic center, in our republic, under conditions when the distributional mechanism is operating unevenly, intelligent centralization serves the job that has to be done. Abroad, such centers are considered to be customary. But at the same time they have the capability of distributing everything to all the medical institutions. But in our republic the role of a number of centers and laboratories has been exaggerated. I feel that they should be decentralized, and their equipment and apparatus should be used efficiently. Especially since the question of instrumental methods of research is a very acute one. For example, a centralized service has been created in Leninakan and has been called upon to carry out analyses and research. But it is operating in a manner that is far from the best. For example, no one is on duty in the center on Saturdays. Instances such as this must be eliminated. Incidentally, I consider it to be important to create expert groups of independent specialists to evaluate the quality of medical aid in the outlying areas (Association of Armenian Physicians)

[N. Ravich] Recently GOLOS ARMENII published a letter from section physicians at Yerevan Clinic No. 9. The letter stated that the clinic physicians, essentially speaking, have been deprived of the opportunity to treat the patients, and that the entire reliance is being placed on the in-patient facility. How would you comment on that point of view?

[M. Nazaretyan] I feel that 80 percent of the medical aid should be provided in clinics. Therefore those clinics also need physicians with overall practical experience with a broad area of specialization, so that the patient can have "his own physician" to whom he can go whenever he gets sick. It is another question that, as of today, the lack of diagnostic apparatus, including portable, does not provide the clinic specialist with the opportunity to conduct diagnostics or treatment at the proper level. Abroad, the physician has in his hand a recording pen, the other end of which he can use to examine the patient's throat, ear, etc. The lack of the necessary medical technology, the equipping of clinic physicians and laboratories, etc. are problems that have not yet been resolved by our country's medical service. A problem that continues to be a very serious one is the problem of creating a base for medicines. Of course, the republic cannot produce all the medicines, but it can produce those that are most frequently used. The chief

step toward this is the creation of a pharmacological committee or commission for the Republic of Armenia. So far as I know, that same position is adhered to by the Institute of Precision Organic Chemistry, of the republic's Academy of Sciences, where many valuable medicines are being developed.

[N. Ravich] The Republic of Armenia is striving for independence in all spheres and areas of life: in industry, economics, and the social sphere. How will these principles be implemented in public health?

[M. Nazaretyan] The concept of public health—in other words, the development of a national policy in that field—will become the basis of our work. It must promote the interests of the population. It must taken into consideration the national peculiarities of our people—social, geographic, genetic, historic, etc. I am an adherent of the cooperative system with specialists in many countries that was born during a time that was very difficult for Armenia. Currently people are thinking about proposals to cooperate with major centers in the Union and in foreign countries. Staying within the confines of the republic or the country, and a policy of isolation, inevitably doom medicine, like any other field of knowledge, to semiliteracy and poverty. The intensive development of public health must take the place of extensive development. The technological equipping of medicine and new principles for administering hospitals (a manager and a chief physician) must replace the old, obsolete schemes. The overcoming of inertia, dogmatism, and standard approaches taken by physicians, the increasing of their activity rate, and the complete support of our population will help us. The important tasks include the providing of all kinds of assistance to the earthquake area and to NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast].

Representative Interviewed on Growth of Islam in Turkmen SSR

*9105008 TURKMENSSR TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian, 23 Jan 91, 2*

[Interview with Yu. Dzhumayev by TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA correspondent M. Bektasov. "New Roads to the Temple, or Changes in the Life of the Believers of Chardzhou Oblast"]

[Text] During the many years of my life as a journalist, I have seen hundreds of official blank forms. But this is the first time I have held one like this in my hands. On both sides of the USSR coat of arms are inscriptions in Turkmen and Russian: "Authorized Agent of the Council on Religious Affairs for Chardzhou Oblast, Turkmen SSR, under USSR Council of Ministers." That's right—not the name of an enterprise or organization, but the name of a position held by an individual. The very appearance of the blank form bespeaks the responsibility of the person who places his signature on it.

So we now present Yu. I. Dzhumayev, Authorized Agent of the Council on Religious Affairs for Chardzhou Oblast,

Turkmen SSR, under USSR Council of Ministers. Today he is granting an interview to TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA.

[M. Bektasov] Yusup Ishanguliyevich, you have held this position for less than a year. Can you compare what changes have occurred in the life of the believers of Chardzhou Oblast during recent years?

[Yu. Dzhumayev] By education I am a teacher, but I have also worked in the oblast House of Scientific Atheism. So I am familiar with the situation. There have indeed been changes, and they became possible thanks to the democratization and glasnost. Prior to 1989 there was not a single registered mosque on the territory of the oblast. Today there are six of them. The first mosque to be opened is one that is not far from Chardzhou, which has been given the name Sakhidzhar. The believers made a request to the local soviet agencies and got their support. A suitable building was found on the territory of Kolkhoz imeni Chapayev, Chardzhouskiy Rayon, with a "hauz" and a garden (the building had formerly been a cult building that at one time had been converted for use as the kolkhoz library). An asphalt road to the building was installed and a special bus from the city went there on Fridays, on the day of prayer.

It is noteworthy that, at the opening of the mosque, the republic "kazi," Nasrulla Ibadullayev, called upon people to support the policy of perestroika and of freedom of conscience. He censured bribe money and self-immolation, and the wilful interpretation of the Koran, and reminded his listeners that all people are equal and that those who commit violence fall into grave sin... On that day, mullahs from the Afghan province of Faryab, who participated in the ceremonies, prayed alongside of the local Muslims.

Today mosques exist in Khodzhambas, Charshanga, Gaurdak, and Kerki. In Chardzhou a mosque for Shiite Muslims has been opened, and the believers who go there to pray are Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Persians.

[M. Bektasov] Mosques cannot operate without imams. How has that question been resolved?

[Yu. Dzhumayev] The believers determine locally who should be the imam and who should be the "mutayelli"—the person who is second in importance after the imam. But I must note that none of these ministers of the faith (except one) have a spiritual education. Moreover, all of them do not have an ordinary secondary education. But in order to persuade people and to lead them, faith by itself is not enough. There is a need for extensive knowledge, and not just of the Koran. For example, this year for the first time there was an international Muslim conference dealing with questions of family planning. And people cannot go there without the appropriate training.

There is also a need for worldly wisdom. Here, for example, is a concrete situation. The party and soviet agencies nowadays receive a large number of requests for

help in opening mosques. But there are not enough building materials even for erecting midwife and medical-aid stations, hospitals, libraries, or club houses. Does it make sense, or is it even possible, in such a situation to fulfill the believers' requests? Sober-minded ministers of the faith, on the basis of common interests, must know how to carry out the appropriate work with the believers who constitute only a part of the population.

[M. Bektasov] Is it necessary, then, for the imam or the "mutavelli" to be not only educated people, but also persons with authority, in order to lead the believers.

[Yu. Dzhumayev] I will give the following example.

A mosque has been officially registered in Kerki. But there is no imam there. This is the reason: Muslim believers of any nationality can pray in the mosque. So the Turkmens nominated their person to be imam, and the Uzbeks nominated theirs. In order to resolve the conflict I went to Kerki with Kuvandyk Khallyyev, imam of the Sakhidzhan mosque. Locally he examined the claims of both pretenders. It turned out that one was better in analyzing spiritual questions, but was unsuitable on moral grounds. The other had an unblemished biography, but his knowledge of the Koran was worse. In that situation the imam gathered the ministers of the faith in Kerki, in order for them to make other nominations. But no one who was worthy in all respects was found. The question has been postponed.

There is hope of getting the assistance of Ashir-mukhammet Shaymanov, the second imam of the Sakhidzhan mosque. He is a member of our republic's Kaziate of Muslims, and is in his last year at the Tashkent Islam Institute imeni Imam Al-Bukhari. Also studying there, in the preparatory department, as well as at the "medres" in Bukhara, are three young people from our oblast.

[M. Bektasov] It would appear that we are experiencing a large upsurge of religious spirit. Both in the oblast and the republic, and in the other regions of the country.

[Yu. Dzhumayev] I would evaluate that process in this way: emotions that have been held inside of people for years have broken out to the surface. Two years ago there were approximately 30 unregistered ministers of the faith in the oblast, and today there are almost 10 times more. Yet all of them also were active previously. It is simply that they did not always do so openly.

[M. Bektasov] Yes, I remember being an accidental witness to an unusual meeting in the city's ispolkom with the participation of the imams, the unregistered ministers of the faith in Chardzhou, and Soviet workers. You also were there, as authorized agent of the Council on Religious Affairs. The meeting began with Ashir-mukhammet Shaymanov reading a sura from the Koran.

[Yu. Dzhumayev] That was one of a series of joint measures where the participants discussed the ways to

introduce order into the activities of the unregistered mullahs. Incidentally, the ministers of the faith are not really as conservative as many people seem to think. They do not live only in their own little ivory tower. They eagerly accept that which is new. So far as I know from the imams at the Sakhidzhan mosque, there are plans in the city to certify all the mullahs and to eliminate those who are unsuitable or are self-proclaimed, who are pursuing selfish goals.

[M. Bektasov] There is also an Orthodox church in Chardzhou.

[Yu. Dzhumayev] The Russian Orthodox church of Saints Peter and Paul has been in operation since 1945. Until recently the senior priest there was Archpriest Georgiy. But he was transferred to another city. I would like to say kind words about that no longer young, but still energetic person. While he was senior priest, there was an increase in the order in the church. The almost forgotten charity was reborn. As a member of the presidium of the oblast's Miloserdie [Charity] Society, Father Georgiy did a very great deal. The church provided moral and material assistance to the persons living in the home for the elderly. It contributed to the culture fund, the fund to help the victims of the earthquake in Iran, and to the USSR Children's Fund.

[M. Bektasov] Do you know that I was simply astonished to hear that the Christians from Chardzhou had sent money to the Iranian Muslims who had suffered from the earthquake. Genuinely human sympathy knows no boundaries, and does not divide people on the basis of nationality or religion. But in this regard I catch myself thinking: do both the believers and the nonbelievers want to help the adherents of extremism and nationalism? It seems to me that this is a question that all of us ought to ask ourselves more frequently—whether we are believers in Allah or in Christ, or are convinced atheists.

Increased Number, Role of Islamic Organizations Under Perestroika

911.503.784 Tashkent PRAVDI DOSTOK 1990 Russian 8 Jan 91 p 7

[Article by K. Moldabases, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Council for Religious Affairs: "Perestroika and Islam"]

[Text] Statistics indicate that by the beginning of 1985 there were only 392 mosques in our country or, more precisely, that many remained. Before the revolution, their number came to several dozen thousand. The abrupt reduction in the number of mosques occurred largely due to harsh administrative pressure on the faithful and repressive measures with regard to the clergy.

A fundamental turnaround in the direction of democratizing all spheres of life and creating a rule-of-law state has changed the situation. At present nobody conceals either his faith or his desire to set up a religious society.

or get a religious education. The faithful vigorously seek to fully exercise their right to the freedom of conscience.

In the years of perestroyka, the number of registered mosques has quadrupled and now amounts to more than 1,500; one-half of them were registered in 1990. The buildings of mosques have been returned to the faithful, and new mosques are being built. The total number of mosques almost coincides with the number of registered religious communities. Turning over the buildings of mosques, which are known not only in our country, but worldwide as brilliant works of architecture and unique monuments of history and culture, to religious communities has become a big event in the life of the faithful and the public at large. They include Kolyan in Bukhara, Dzhami in the Fergana Valley, the Bagautdin complex Nakshtashdiya in Bukhara Oblast, and others.

The transfer of the Osman Koran, which is sacred to all Muslims, to the Spiritual Administration of Central Asia caused the greatest response from among this series of state acts.

An increase in the number of Muslim communities raised the issue of developing a chain of religious educational establishments. Six of them have been opened in the past two years: Islamic institutes in Alma-Ata and Dushanbe, and madrassah in Baku, Ufa, Grozny, and Makhachkala. The admission of students to the Tashkent Institute and the Bukhara Madrassah has increased. In addition, the training of the clergy at foreign schools has been increasing year after year. At present, Soviet Muslims study in Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Turkey, Libya, and Pakistan.

Vigorous efforts to provide religious literature for the faithful are under way. A mass edition of the Koran has been published for the first time. Translations of the Koran into the Uzbek, Azeri, Kazakh, Tadjik, and other languages are being prepared. The topical scope and volume of published liturgical literature have increased. An action of the king of Saudi Arabia who handed over 1 million copies of the Koran as a gift for Soviet Muslims has been received with gratitude.

The place and role of religious organizations in society have changed. Representatives of the Muslim clergy have been elected people's deputies of the Supreme Soviets of the USSR, Union and autonomous republics, and local soviets of all levels. Religious figures have become participants in a public dialogue on an equal footing. They have gained extensive access to the mass media. Many spiritual administrations of Muslims (Central Asia, Transcaucasia, the European part, and Siberia) already have their own printed organs—newspapers and magazines. Others have embarked on setting them up.

Contacts between the Soviet Muslims and their fellow faithful abroad are becoming increasingly intensive and close. Businesslike cooperation between them is being established that extends to still new spheres. There is virtually no Muslim country that our faithful have not visited.

In 1990, many changes for the better occurred in the life of Soviet Muslims. Nonetheless, this year will be memorable, first of all, because of their pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj). The number of pilgrims, more than 1,500, turned out to be absolutely unusual for us.

Reconsideration of views on religion that prevailed in our society until recently is important in principle. Many examples may be given of recognizing the role of Islam as one of the bearers of general human values. Here are some pertinent characteristic facts. In 1989 and 1990, two events were celebrated as milestones in the history of Islam in our country. At issue are the 1,100th anniversary of the adoption of Islam by the Volga Bulgars, the ancestors of the present-day Tatars, and the 1,200th anniversary of the birth of Imam at-Termezi. Both these events have elicited a response on the part of not only the faithful but also the public at large.

This would have been inconceivable before the time of perestroyka.

The volume of this article prevents the author from discussing all changes under way in the religious life of the Muslims in our country in the era of perestroyka. However, it may be seen even from what has been said that these changes fully comply with the spirit and letter of international human rights norms and meet the interests and expectations of the faithful. While happy with changes for the better, we at the same time understand that in store for us is a tremendous effort to form a civic society and a rule-of-law state that will profoundly change the life of all and, of course, the life of the faithful. The adoption of the law: "On Freedom of Conscience" represents a huge step in this direction. It has granted religious organizations the rights of corporate persons, making it possible for them to independently resolve all issues involving their life and activities. They have also been given the right to set up their own enterprises, have parcels of land, publish literature, set up their own press organs, instruct children and adults in the faith, and many other things. In a word, at present religious organizations have a firm foundation for their activities, and have a real opportunity to augment their contribution to asserting spiritual principles in our society.

Constantinople Patriarch Supports Russian Orthodox Church

*91P50085A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 91
Union Edition p 6*

[Missive of Dmitriy I, Patriarch of Constantinople to Aleksey II, Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church: "Message of the Most Holy Patriarch"]

[Text] Dimitriy I, the Most Holy Patriarch of Constantinople, and Aleksey II, the Most Holy Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus, exchanged messages. These documents concerned the circumstances which have recently arisen in the life of the Russian Orthodox Church.

As reported to the TASS correspondent for the Moscow Patriarchate, Patriarch Dimitriy's message devoted special attention to events in Ukrainian church life. Regarding negative factors which have given rise to the church mood in this region, the Most Holy patriarch declared: "Our mother, the Great Holy Church of Christ, being always on the side of its beloved daughter and sister the Russian church, resolutely condemns them [the incidents]. The matter in part concerns the unsupportable and in many cases unchristian activity of the Uniates to the detriment of the Orthodox believers of the western Ukraine, the seizure of holy churches by them, vandalism, sacrilege and so forth, the movement of Autocephalists in the Ukraine, the activity of the so-called emigre Russian Orthodox Church and other small groups to the detriment of Orthodox interests." The document emphasizes that "the universal patriarchate recognizes only one canonical Orthodox Church in the bounds established by way of the patriarchal and synodal method in 1593, that is the Holy Russian Church, which is recognized by all local canonical churches, honored and mentioned in sacred writings."

In concluding Patriarch Dimitriy assures the Russian Church: "We are always on your side, both in joy and in the resolution of your problems, rejoicing and suffering with you."

Rivival, Problems Of Russian Orthodox Church Detailed

91P500994 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Feb 91
Union Edition p 3

[Article by G. Charodeyev: "The Church Has Its Problems Too"]

[Text] **The Soviet government continues to return church buildings and monasteries to the Russian Orthodox Church. In the last few years the number of active parishes has increased by nearly twofold.**

"At the end of 1990, there were about 12,000" says Vyacheslav Ovsyannikov, director of the information center of the Moscow patriarchate and candidate of theology. "On the territory of the USSR more than 50 monasteries are operating now, as well as 26 religious educational institutions, including academies, seminaries and specialized schools. It is necessary to say something special about Sunday schools. The newly elected Most Holy Patriarch Aleksiy II expressed the wish that each parish have such schools. We hope that that this will soon come to be."

We have schools of icon painting. Gifted young people study in them. Specialists in icon painting and church restoration are already much in demand.

Eparchies, which previously had only a provisional status, for example Tobolsk, Brest and others, are being revived. In this connection, the number of higher clergy has increased, and now number more than 100 in the Russian Orthodox Church.

Last year the Patriarchal and Synodal Bible Commission was formed, which was the successor of the Bible Commission of 1915. A Synodal Commission for the Revival of Moral Upbringing and Charity was also founded under the direction of Kirill, Archbishop of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, and director of the Department of External Church Relations.

The local council, which elected Patriarch Aleksiy II, canonized John of Kronstadt. For us he is a great saint. He was a man of high spiritual life and the organizer of widespread philanthropy. This is even more important now, when charity is being revived in our country.

The hierarchical council, which took place last October adopted a resolution on the implementation of the law on freedom of conscience and religious organizations in church life. In connection with this, new model rules for the Orthodox parish were adopted.

At the beginning of this year we held an international festival of Russian Orthodox music, as well as a festival of Orthodox films. I hope that a fine tradition grows out of these unique events.

In October something happened that perhaps was not noticed by everyone, but nonetheless was an important event for the church: our church press organs, ZHURNAL MOSKOVSKOY PATRIARKHII and MOSKOVSKIY TSEKOVNYY VESTNIK, were officially registered in the State Press Committee. However, as before, many problems remain. The church lacks its own printing base, and is experiencing an acute paper shortage.

I would like to mention several events which one would not call joyful. The conflict with Catholics of the Eastern Rite (Uniates) continues in the Western Ukraine. This conflict, according to numerous accounts, apparently is far from being resolved. The Most Holy Patriarch has characterized the activities of the schismatic autocephalists in the Ukraine as destructive. Another sad occurrence is the crude interference in our internal life by the emigre Russian Church. Several priests announced their departure from subordination to the Most Holy Patriarch and the Holy Synod and their transfer to the jurisdiction of the emigre Russian Church. This action is not understandable, it is not part of any norms, neither canonical nor human. The emigre Russian Church should renounce its attempts to admit parishes located within the territory of the USSR, which belong to the Moscow patriarchate."

Bishop Interviewed On State of Latvian Baptist Church

91P500984 Riga BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA in Russian
15 Dec 90 p 4

[Excerpts of interview with Janis Ejsans, bishop of the Latvian Baptist Church, conducted by Jana Rubinchik: "The Baptists"]

[Excerpt] [Rubinchik] What is the Baptist Church in Latvia like today? How many parishioners does it have? Where do you train priests?

[Ejsans] In Latvia the Baptist Church has a little less than 5,000 members (we do not keep count of parishioners). Out of the 59 churches, six operate in Riga. The seminary illegally resumed operation in 1984. It was only officially registered this year. Fifteen persons are studying there, by correspondence and part-time, i.e. Fridays, evenings, and Saturdays. The length of instruction is four years. Only after finishing one course is it possible to take the next one. The Union of Latvian

Baptist Parishes is attempting to return to the building on Marupes 16, which is still empty. Right now the seminarians must study in the chancellory of the St. Matthew Baptist Church, where those who do not have seats must write down lectures holding their notebook on their knees. Besides attending Sunday schools, where whole families learn, and participating in concerts of sacred music, Baptists visit prisons, psychiatric hospitals, and look after elderly people that live alone.

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